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- Path: sparky!uunet!noc.near.net!news.Brown.EDU!news.Brown.EDU!news
- From: PL436000@brownvm.brown.edu (Jamie)
- Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.tech
- Subject: Re: That which hurts
- Date: Mon, 28 Dec 1992 10:54:41 EST
- Organization: Brown University - Providence, Rhode Island USA
- Lines: 63
- Message-ID: <1hn7vnINNd6d@cat.cis.Brown.EDU>
- References: <1gib6mINN76i@cat.cis.Brown.EDU> <1992Dec14.201453.17282@guinness.idbsu.edu> <1gius4INNo68@cat.cis.Brown.EDU> <1992Dec20.235407.14044@news2.cis.umn.edu> <1h4r5rINNbl@cat.cis.Brown.EDU> <Bztz5L.DMM@casper.cs.uct.ac.za>
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- In article <Bztz5L.DMM@casper.cs.uct.ac.za>, nhorne@casper.cs.uct.ac.za (N E
- Horne) said:
-
- >Somewhere along the "Truth" thread, Jamie writes:
- >
- >
- >" Consider the sentence which would come first on an alphabetized
- > list of 100-word sentences of English.
- >
- > It is either a true sentence of English or a false one. No one has
- > ever interpreted it (I'll wager). With the possible exception of
- > one of us, no one ever will. "
- >
- >That something's amiss becomes clear when you consider that in the event of
- your
- >sentence being an imperative (the requirement of alphabetic order may yield
- >something like "Abandon aardvarks!" at the top of your list) or a question
- >the sentence is neither true nor false.
-
- Quite so. I should have said, "indicative sentences."
-
- >In fact, it is widely held that propositions, as opposed to sentences, are the
- >bearers of truth value.
-
- In fact, it is not.
- In fact, it is widely held that propositions, *in addition to sentences*,
- are the bearers of truth values.
-
- Many people, including theorists, do not like propositions at all.
- I do. But in the spirit of my ontological liberalism, I try to
- make as many accomodations for the propositional skeptics as I can.
- This liberalism stood me well in a brief conversation (resulting
- from one of my postings to this news group) with a Wittgensteinian,
- about propositions unexpressable in English.
-
- Even so, I take your point, approximately.
-
- >The process of interpretaion involves nothing less
- >than establishing a correspondence between sentences and statements (which
- >also have no truth value) and if possible (and this is not possible in the
- >cases mentioned above) between statements and propositions.
-
- Again, I agree with the spirit.
- I would not call interpretation a "process." There need be no literal
- process of interpretation in order for a sentence to be interpreted.
- An interpretation (thought of as a mathematical function) once
- stipulated, no one actually has to apply it. Thus, we may think
- of the alphabetically first 100-word INDICATIVE (nb my concession)
- sentence of English as interpreted, and as being true or false,
- even though there has never been any intepretive process for it.
-
- >Consider also what truth value you would care to assign to ambiguous
- sentences.
-
- Again, I take the point.
-
- I am inclined to think of ambiguous sentences along the lines of
- indexical sentences. Is that sufficient?
-
- Jamie
-
- >Neil Horne
- >Cape Town
-