NetNews Usenet Archive 1992 #27/NN_1992_27.iso/spool/talk/abortion/48798

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Newsgroups: talk.abortion
Subject: Re: ATUI: The Conservative Position, and Why it's Morally Correct
Message-ID: <[e-mail]>
From: [e-mail]
Date: 19 Nov 92 12:38:57 CST
References: <[e-mail]> <[e-mail]>
Organization: Brandon University, Brandon, Manitoba, Canada
Lines: 320

After extensive email correspondance, the post finally shows up at BU
so Brian can respond :)

In article <[e-mail]>, [e-mail] (Robert S. Parker) writes:
> [e-mail] writes:
>>The Conservative Position, and Why [it  *says*] it's Morally Correct
>                             I added this ^^^

I am not the conservative position.  Nobody is!

>      A common, but not entirely sound argument used by conservatives
>>is tht of the Golden Rule:  "Do unto others as you would have them
>>do unto you" is not an intelligent statement taken literally as such
>>(Rachels, 1986).  If one were to adhere to such a rule, then one
>>would be obligated to allow sadists and masochists to tie you up,
>>and cause pain to your body.
>
> You lost me.  I don't see how adhering to that rule obliges you to allow
> such things.

Well, they would be justified in their actions, and there would be nothing
you could do about it if society took the Golden Rule as law.

>>                               It is not difficult to apply this
>>argument to abortion, even if it is too general in some cases.
>>If you follow the rule, you cannot abort a fetus because you
>>are likely grateful that when you were a fetus, no one aborted you.
>
> How can I be grateful something didn't happen, when it wouldn't have happened
> anyway.  I was not aborted, because my parents had no reason to.  To apply
> your gratitude to *all* abortions is rediculous.

I never made any such application.  I was just pointing out how the Golden
Rule is applied to the abortion issue.  I didn't say it was an intelligent
position, in fact, I showed that it was quite useless.

>>The argument seems concrete, but there is a loophole.  How can anyone
>>say what an actual fetus would or would not want?  Could a fetus want
>>people to treat it in any particular way?
>
> That leads quite smoothly into one of my arguments for pro-choice.

So what?

> [part about suicides deleted; it makes refuting pro-life too easy.]

I fail to see your purpose.

>>Evidently, the Golden Rule needs some work done to it before it
>>may be considered acceptable to follow.
>>     A more concise derivation of the Golden Rule may be found in
>>Shakespeare's (1965) "The Merchant of Venice":
>>     I am a Jew.  Hath not a Jew eyes?  hath not a Jew hands, organs,
>>     dimensions, senses, affections, passions?  fed with the same food,
>>     hurt with the same weapons, subject to the same diseases, heal'd
>>     by the same means, warm'd and cool'd by the same winter and summer,
>>     as a Christian is?  If you prick us, do we not bleed?  if you
>>     tickle us, do we not laugh?  if you poison us, do we not die?
>>     (p. 261)
>
> Nice quote.  I'm not sure I see it as a statement of the Golden Rule, merely
> an argument as to why such a rule is "morally correct".

Did I say it showed the Golden Rule was morally correct?  No.

>>If "Jew" is replaced by "fetus", and "Christian" by "person", the argument
>>still holds true.
>
> Let's try it:
>     I am a fetus.  Hath not a fetus eyes?  Hath not a fetus hands, organs,
>     dimenstions, senses, affections, passions?  Fed with the same food,
>     hurt with the same weapons, subject to the same diseases, heal'd
>     by the same means, warm'd and cool'd by the same winter and summer,
>     as a person is?  If you prick us, do we not bleed?  If you
>     tickle us, do we not laugh?  If you poison us, do we not die?
>
> Oh, this is too easy...  A fetus can not be said to have affections or passions,

As I said below.  Thank you for repeating that.

> is *not* fed with the same food,

Close enough.

>can *not* be healed by the same means (immune
> system isn't as strong, other bodily systems more sensitive to tampering), is

Close enough.

> generally maintained at about 98.6 degrees Farenheit regardless of the season,

But they are still vulnerable to temperature changes.  If a woman were to
lie naked in the snow for a few hours, the fetus would freeze soon after she
did.

> and they are very hard to tickle.

But you seem to imply they are ticklish.

>So much for your argument still holding true.

It's not my argument.  Might not even be Shakespeare's argument.

>>                   This argument surely calls upon our compassion for
>>those who may be called "persons", as the fetus matches each of these
>>perspectives just as well as any person would.
>
> If that is what you are basing your position on, I just showed you are wrong.

Don't bother to read an entire post before responding.

>>The only terms not readily proven by medical facts
>>are whether or not a fetus has "affections" or "passions", but every
>>other premise holds true.
>
> So you ignore the most important attributes (which are not proven by medical
> facts and are contrary to common sense) since all the lesser attributes are
> trivially true?  Ignore what would make you be wrong because things that make
> you right are easier to think about...sounds like a great basis for morality.

The affections and passions will more than likely develop anyway.
If you have the raw materials to make a person, the intrinsic qualities
will follow unless the fetus is destroyed.
[...]
>>How can you have a positive experience when you have an abortion?
>>Surely it isn't enjoyable, or something anyone would go out of their
>>way to do just for the sake of having an abortion.
>
> In other words, it only happens when someone is presented with an even worse
> alternative, say...an unwanted pregnancy.  You just said that about two thirds
> of women who had an abortion (or was it just one *type* of situation?) did NOT
> have these negative feelings.

No shit.  You might have noticed that I also said "what about the other 35%"
I wasn't concerned with the 65% with positive feelings.  An act is not right
just because the majority feels good about it.  This is akin to saying that
abortions for rape victims are alright because they comprise such a small
percentage of abortions.  It doesn't work that way.
[...]
> Most of one third is still a minority no more than half the size of those who
> did *not* match this description.  You make it sound like they are an
> overwhelming majority.

Just a sprinkling of propoganda.  My facts very obviously stated there was
not a majority.  Everything else was clearly stated as my own opinion.
[...]
>>When an act causes oneself grief and psychological pain, it is certainly
>>not an act to be looked upon in a positive way.  The feeling of loss
>>does hint that our human nature does not approve of abortion.
>
> But the fact that less than 1/3 (according to your own figures) actually feel
> that way shows quite the opposite:  human nature *does* approve of abortion.

I didn't say it didn't.  I said that hinted human nature doesn't approve of
abortion.  Besides, democracy does not govern morality.

>>     For me, the most convincing conservative argument is that of
>>potentiality used in conjunction with the argument of probability.
>>The first argument may be stated as such:  The fetus is a potential
>>person from conception.  It is wrong to kill a potential person simply
>>because of that potential, therefore abortion is wrong.
>
> I'll assume you *meant* to say that the potential makes it wrong rather than
> saying it is wrong to kill something just for its potential.  (It's a little
> ambiguous the way you stated it.)

It is wrong to kill a potential person simply because of that potential.
What's ambiguous?  Something has the potential to become a person, so it
is wrong to kill it.

> You say it is wrong to kill where potential exists, I say it is better to kill
> it when it is *only* a potential rather than put two or more *real* people
> through suffering (the mother and the "unwanted" child).  We would agree that
> is it wrong to kill a potential arbitrarily (for no particular reason), but
> that is not sufficient to outlaw all abortions (or even *most*).

Why do you insist on restating my beliefs?  I never said there was any reason
to outlaw abortions.

>>                                                         This seems
>>reasonable, especially when applied to this analogy:  Suppose there
>>was a cocoon which was tested by experts, and was discovered to be
>>housing a man who was in some sort of temporary sleep.  It would not
>>be right to terminate the life of the man in the cocoon simply because
>>he would eventually wake up, exit his cocoon, and become a person.
[...]
> On the other hand, you probably meant that someone might decide to kill the
> man (because he's asleep or something, I don't know) and that it would be wrong
> because he would otherwise wake up and "become a person" (your words).
> Yes, that would be wrong.  Yes, part of why it would be wrong is because he
> *can* wake up (eventually) and become a person again.  The key though, is the
> word "again", which you neglected.

I had intended the analogy to imply there was no man existing before the
cocoon.
[...]
> However, since he is *not* currently a person, it would not be reprehensible if
> we left him alone and he died in the cocoon if we could not afford to sustain
> him.

So are you saying that it would be immoral to destroy the man if we were rich?

> It is even less reprehensible to let him die if we know he will *never*
> wake up (he's essentially already dead).  That doesn't mean he *should* die,
> merely that we don't *have* to sustain him indefinitely when we know he will
> never "wake up".

But he will more than likely awaken, there's no way of telling for sure.
[...]
> A person does not have the *right* to be created, once a *person* is created
> (and not just the *potential* of a person) THEN that *person* has the right not
> to be destroyed by another person.  (You can't talk about the right not to be
> killed in an accident.  You have the right to as much saftey as society can
> provide for each of its members, sure, and when someone threatens your safety
> they are violating your rights.  But you can't have a "right" not to be caught
> in an earthquake.  ...thus the qualifier "by another person")

I was only making a case that a potential person has enough worth to be
paid some degree of compassion.  I never mentioned any rights that it "should"
have.

>>The main problem with the argument is the fact that it may be reduced
>>to the absurd.
>
> The fact that even you can *see* that your argument is absurd makes me suspect
> the validity of your "moral" conclusions.

Again, you fail to read the whole post before replying.  The argument of
potential is clearly preposterous taken at face value.  If you add
significance to potentials, then the argument is worthy of discussion.
I was outlining a problem with the argument which must be solved.  It
was a guide of sorts for the reader.

>>                             The argument of probability clears this
>>discrepancy up by saying that the higher the probability personhood
>>will be achieved, the greater our obligation is not to destroy that
>>potential (Noonan, 1972).  In one ejaculate there are anywhere
>>between two and four hundred million sperm (Haas & Haas, 1990).  Only
>>one of these sperm may fertilize an ovum, if the ovum is fertilized
>>at all.  That means that any single sperm has, at best, a one in
>>two million chance of creating what could be a potential person.
>>Indeed, the potentiality of a sex cell to become a person is negligible.
>>A newly conceived zygote, on the other hand, has about an eighty
>>percent chance of implanting in the uterus and developing into a
>>person (Noonan, 1972).
>
> Actually, I think it's more like 50% of conceptions when you include things
> like unpreventable miscarriages.  (I think I read that in Discover, but I'm
> not positive that was the source.)

Let's assume you are correct.  So what?  50% is still a large chance.  Much
better than 1 in 2 million.  Incidentally, I heard on the news that in the
past 50 years the average human sperm count/ejaculate has decreased by 50%,
down to 80 million sperm or so.  A sperm still has a clearly inferior chance
of becoming a person when compared to an implanted embryo.

>There are a lot of miscarriages that occur
> so early that the woman doesn't even realize she was ever pregnant.  (I don`t
> know if that includes ones that fail to implant, ones that implant but get
> disrupted, or both, in addition to the *obvious* miscarriages.)

To discuss morality, do we not need to consider hypothetical situations?
If the miscarriage was undetectable, what difference does that make to the
discussion?
[...]
> So you get around how absurd your whole point was by trying to include
> probability?

Since it quite obviously causes the argument not to be absurd, yes that's
how I get around the absurdity.

>Ok assume that 80% of conceptions would lead to a normal birth.
> (That's a bit high, but I'll take your figure for now.)  You are then claiming
> that killing one of these 80%-probable future-people is as wrong as killing a
> 100%-certain present-person.

No.  I made no such claim.  When did I ever claim abortion was akin to murder?
I said abortion was immoral after implantation.  I didn't say how terribly
evil or good it may be, I just said it was not morally correct.  Carrying
an unplanned pregnancy to term can easily be not morally correct as well.
[...]
> my real objection to your line of reasoning was stated earlier:  A person does
> not have the *right* to be created; only once a *person* is created can it have
> "rights".

I made no mention of rights that a potential person should have.  I just said
it was wrong to kill a potential person.  It should be avoided within reason.
[...]
> Thus, not only is abortion *not* immoral,

I disagree.

>in some cases it may be *more* moral.

I never said it wasn't.

> In this response I have basically refuted all--or nearly all--of your most
> important arguments while providing some of what I consider to be the most
> important arguments for the opposite conclusion.

I disagree.

> The hinge is that we disagree as to what is important.  You say it is a present
> or future person; I say it is a present person and a past-and-future person,
> not a future-only person or a past-only person.  Similarly, many pro-lifers
> feel that human life is what is important; I feel that it is *people* that are
> really important.  I accept that a fetus is a living unborn human child (all
> are trivially correct, and just plain trivial), but I do not accept that it is
> a person--in fact, you don't seem to believe that either.

Of course not.  Why would I refer to it as a potential person?  You seem to
be confused in this post.  I'm sure our email has helped to clear your mind.

>I don't expect to
> change your mind to see things my way, I just want people to know that pro-life
> is not the only interpretation of "morality" that you make it out to be.

I didn't make it out to be the only interpretation of morality.

Brian McBean  -  [e-mail]