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- Newsgroups: sci.logic
- Path: sparky!uunet!zaphod.mps.ohio-state.edu!cs.utexas.edu!bcm!tamsun.tamu.edu!cmenzel
- From: cmenzel@tamsun.tamu.edu (Chris Menzel)
- Subject: Re: recursive definitions and paradoxes
- Message-ID: <1992Nov20.210803.5903@tamsun.tamu.edu>
- Organization: Texas A&M University, College Station
- References: <26788@optima.cs.arizona.edu>
- Date: Fri, 20 Nov 1992 21:08:03 GMT
- Lines: 44
-
- In article <26788@optima.cs.arizona.edu> gudeman@cs.arizona.edu (David Gudeman) writes:
- >A "recursive definition" of a name X is a sentence of the form
- >
- > X := E
- >
- >where E is an expression that contains X as a free variable. Naively we
- >might associate with such definitions the axiom
- >
- > X := E => X = E
- >
- >To express what a definition means. (We also need some syntactic rules
- >to allow the introduction of definitions so that the same name is not
- >used for different purposes.)
- >
- >Here are some examples of recursive definitions:
- >
- >(1) x := x + 1
- >(2) x := x * 2
- >(3) x := 1/x
- >(4) x := x * 1
-
- It seems to me, David, that you cause unnecessary confusion by calling
- these and, as you do later in your post, the definition of the Russell
- set recursive definitions. By my lights, the usual understanding is
- that a recursive definition is one in which a function f is defined on
- a well-founded relation R such that for each object b in the field of
- R, f(b) is defined in terms of f(x) for x such that xRb. (The
- legitimacy of such definitions in set theory is of course a theorem to
- be proved; I believe von Neumann was both the first to see this and
- the first to provide the requisite proof. Levy's Basic Set Theory
- has a nice, detailed proof in ZF.) Unless I'm really missing
- something, the above are not recursive definitions in this sense, nor
- is the definition of the Russell set.
-
- Since you say at the beginning of your note what *you* mean by a
- recursive definition, my comment here is essentially a quibble that
- doesn't address the substance of your remarks. But if you are in fact
- using such a deeply entrenched term in a nonstandard fashion, you
- would seem to be a lot better off calling the notion you've defined
- something else.
-
- --Chris Menzel
- Philosophy Department
- Texas A&M University
-