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- Xref: sparky sci.cognitive:699 sci.philosophy.tech:4186 sci.lang:8108
- Path: sparky!uunet!mcsun!uknet!edcastle!edcogsci!cogsci!rjc
- From: rjc@cogsci.ed.ac.uk (Richard Caley)
- Newsgroups: sci.cognitive,sci.philosophy.tech,sci.lang
- Subject: Re: Theories of meaning not relying solely on sym
- Message-ID: <RJC.92Nov19173454@daiches.cogsci.ed.ac.uk>
- Date: 19 Nov 92 17:34:54 GMT
- References: <1992Nov17.092016.28202@news.unige.ch>
- <1992Nov17.221542.17555@husc3.harvard.edu>
- <1992Nov18.132612.8892@news.unige.ch>
- <1992Nov18.134406.17573@husc3.harvard.edu>
- Sender: rjc@cogsci.ed.ac.uk
- Organization: Human Communication Research Center
- Lines: 19
- In-reply-to: zeleny@husc10.harvard.edu's message of 18 Nov 92 18:44:04 GMT
-
- In article <1992Nov18.134406.17573@husc3.harvard.edu>, Michael Zeleny (mz) writes:
-
- mz> You are not even close. The point is that a *correct* and
- mz> *comprehensive* normative description will _ipso facto_ have full
- mz> descriptive adequacy.
-
- And a contradiction implies anything, and if you hypothesise a
- completely implausible object you can ascribe whatever properties you
- like to it.
-
- mz> Ah, "philosophy at Harvard"... thank you for answering my query about
- mz> the state of scholarship at the University of Geneva [etc.]
-
- Ad hominem as `rationalism'. Hm, what a novel idea. Can we have
- sticking your tongue out at people as nominalism next. :-)
-
- --
- rjc@cogsci.ed.ac.uk _O_
- |<
-