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- Received: (from teverett@localhost) by osiris.ac.hmc.edu (8.6.12/8.6.12) id JAA09931 for executor@nacm.com; Mon, 25 Sep 1995 09:48:56 -0700
- From: Tobermory Everett <teverett@osiris.ac.hmc.edu>
- Message-Id: <199509251648.JAA09931@osiris.ac.hmc.edu>
- Subject: Security Hole in Executor/Linux-SVGALIB
- To: executor@nacm.com
- Date: Mon, 25 Sep 1995 09:48:56 -0700 (PDT)
- Reply-To: Tobermory_Everett@hmc.edu
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-
- It looks to me like setting up Executor/Linux-SVGALIB as setuid root is a
- wide open security hole. All hard drive access is done as root. This
- includes things like writing /etc/passwd:). I don't know if there is any
- easy way around this, short of deciding to give a trusted group of users
- (who are allowed to use Executor) root access or alternatively leaving
- everything wide open to anyone who can get to the console.
-
- The other interesting problem is that running Executor/Linux-SVGALIB ends up
- resetting the owners on a bunch of files, which means that you pretty much
- have to run Executor/Linux-X as root in order to save changes to the Browser
- and the like.
-
- --Toby Everett
-
-