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Received: from osiris.ac.hmc.edu (Osiris.AC.HMC.Edu [134.173.53.2]) by nacm.com (8.6.10/8.6.9) with ESMTP id JAA29099 for <executor@nacm.com>; Mon, 25 Sep 1995 09:49:03 -0700 Received: (from teverett@localhost) by osiris.ac.hmc.edu (8.6.12/8.6.12) id JAA09931 for executor@nacm.com; Mon, 25 Sep 1995 09:48:56 -0700 From: Tobermory Everett <teverett@osiris.ac.hmc.edu> Message-Id: <199509251648.JAA09931@osiris.ac.hmc.edu> Subject: Security Hole in Executor/Linux-SVGALIB To: executor@nacm.com Date: Mon, 25 Sep 1995 09:48:56 -0700 (PDT) Reply-To: Tobermory_Everett@hmc.edu X-Mailer: ELM [version 2.4 PL22] MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Content-Length: 682 Sender: owner-paper@nacm.com Precedence: bulk It looks to me like setting up Executor/Linux-SVGALIB as setuid root is a wide open security hole. All hard drive access is done as root. This includes things like writing /etc/passwd:). I don't know if there is any easy way around this, short of deciding to give a trusted group of users (who are allowed to use Executor) root access or alternatively leaving everything wide open to anyone who can get to the console. The other interesting problem is that running Executor/Linux-SVGALIB ends up resetting the owners on a bunch of files, which means that you pretty much have to run Executor/Linux-X as root in order to save changes to the Browser and the like. --Toby Everett