NetNews Usenet Archive 1992 #31/NN_1992_31.iso/spool/talk/abortion/53827

Text File | 1993-01-01 | 5.5 KB | 136 lines

Newsgroups: talk.abortion
Path: sparky!uunet!usc!wupost!uwm.edu!spool.mu.edu!nigel.msen.com!heifetz!rotag!kevin
From: [e-mail] (Kevin Darcy)
Subject: Re: Pro-choicers must condone infanticide
Message-ID: <[e-mail]>
Organization: Who, me???
References: <[e-mail]> <[e-mail]> <[e-mail]>
Date: Fri, 1 Jan 1993 10:29:17 GMT
Lines: 125

In article <[e-mail]> [e-mail] (Muriel Nelson) writes:
>[Note: this exchange was getting very long, and I've deleted
>much, while attempting to retain context.]
>In article <[e-mail]> [e-mail] (Kevin Darcy) writes:
>>In article <[e-mail]> [e-mail] (Muriel Nelson) writes:
>
>>>>
>>>Uhhhhh.  Do you think parturition is always an 'operation'?
>>
>>As far as I know, the procedures which both
>>    A) Assert the woman's BA prior to the "natural" way of regaining it,
>>       i.e. birth,
>>        and
>>    B) Maximize the survival chances of both patients
>>all involve some sort of "operation". Please correct me if I'm wrong.
>>
>An induced early labor would fit both in some instances.
>There are natural substances which would accomplish
>induction, but I won't mention them here.
>In most instances, the fetus has better chances if
>parturition is delayed until full-term.

Okay, okay, if you don't like the word "operation", substitute "procedure"
instead. This is tangential to my main point anyway.

>[deletia. time to clarify definitions]
>
>>>You are living in a fantasy world, Kevin.  How can its
>>>rights be 'essentially independent of the woman's'  when
>>>her physical form prevents its motility?
>>
>>Because motility is not a prerequisite for bodily autonomy.
>>
>autonomy, n.
>
>1. The quality or state of being self-governing
>2. A self-governing state
>3. Self-directing freedom esp. moral independence
>
>source: Webster's Ninth New College Dictionary
>
>One of the things that animal bodies do is MOVE.
>Inability to move about as one pleases leaves
>little freedom to govern oneself.

That's a limitation of PHYSICAL autonomy, as previously pointed out, not
necessarily BODILY autonomy.

But, even if we were to erase the physical/bodily autonomy distinction,
where would your "motility" argument get you? The fetus has the FREEDOM to
move anywhere it "wants" to, Muriel, it simply doesn't "want" to exercise
that freedom. No-one is denying its autonomy, via the natural process of
pregnancy -- it just fails to exercise its right to sneak out of the womb and
take a stroll once in a while. I can't fly to Jupiter by flapping my arms
either -- that's a natural limitation on my "motility", but does it mean I
lack "autonomy", especially if I never actually WANT to travel to Jupiter
like that? Does a cripple have less autonomy than a normal, healthy person?

>[more deletia. Kevin has asked why fetuses should differ
>from newborns in terms of the recognition of autonomy rights.]
>
>>As I speculated, you seem to have subjugated your BA argument to some other
>>belief system -- something which gives emphasis to "membership in society".
>>All that matters to pure Bodily Autonomy is whether the organism is human
>>or not -- "membership in society" is seen as a mundane, bureaucratic
>>classification.
>
>So 'dead' would make no difference either?  As long as
>the organism is human?

It's not really an "organism" once it's dead -- it's just a collection of
organic matter.

>I think membership in society
>goes a long way towards defining the recognition of rights.

I think it's much too narrow and self-serving. It also renders the whole
notion of "autonomy" pretty redundant to the main argument:

    1) Abortion should be legal because the woman has "autonomy", and
       the fetus doesn't

    2) The fetus doesn't have "autonomy" because it's not a "member of
       society"

Why not just apply Occam's Razor at that point, and reduce it to the single
step

    1) Abortion should be legal because it's OK to destroy humans who
       aren't a "member of society"

Which is just the old "personhood" argument all over again.

I also think it's a poor choice of yardstick. The basis of "society" is
"social interaction", is it not? Is someone in a coma a "member of society"
then? How about someone who's catatonic? Or a newborn (shades of Holtsinger's
"all pro-choicers must support infanticide")? Now, you could argue legalities,
but then the argument starts to look VERY circular:

    Abortion should be legal because it's legally OK to destroy humans
    who aren't legally "a member of society"

=>    Abortion should be legal because it's legally OK to kill z/e/f's

Hardly a convincing argument at that point, eh? Arguing the abortion issue
from legality to legality almost always ends up in such circularities,
cf. "abortion isn't murder because it's legal". Personally, I prefer to
show that pro-choice should be LEGALLY recognized because it's morally right,
than to argue that it should be legally recognized because, well, it happens
to be legally recognized today (but what about tomorrow?)...

>[more deletions]
>
>>>There is _no_ sense of the word 'autonomy' that I can see applying
>>>to a fetus in utero.
>>
>>BODILY autonomy. The right to not have one's biological functions affected
>>to one's detriment, by the deliberate actions of another.
>>
>Where does this definition of bodily autonomy come from?

From the combination of the definitions of "bodily" and "autonomy",
respectively.

                                - Kevin