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- Newsgroups: sci.crypt
- Path: sparky!uunet!gatech!rpi!newsserver.pixel.kodak.com!laidbak!tellab5!chinet!schneier
- From: schneier@chinet.chi.il.us (Bruce Schneier)
- Subject: Re: Opinions on RSA's RC2 and RC4?
- Message-ID: <Bzq9oM.KH@chinet.chi.il.us>
- Organization: Chinet - Public Access UNIX
- References: <1992Dec22.202631.25004@gallant.apple.com> <1992Dec22.213023.6850@qualcomm.com> <bontchev.725111504@fbihh>
- Date: Wed, 23 Dec 1992 19:48:21 GMT
- Lines: 41
-
- In article <bontchev.725111504@fbihh> bontchev@fbihh.informatik.uni-hamburg.de writes:
- >karn@servo.qualcomm.com (Phil Karn) writes:
- >
- >> >Does anyone have an opinion on the technical merits of RC2 and RC4?
- >
- >> Yeah. If NSA will let them out of the country, then they can't be very
- >> good at all. It's as simple as that.
- >
- >Hmm... I've heard (rumours, rumours...) that thre is an exportable
- >version of MailSafe, which is limited to 512 (or was it 540?) bit keys
- >(or was it moduli?)... Does that mean that NSA can factor such
- >numbers?... Would be a pretty serous advancement in mathematics, not
- >just in cryptography... It would also mean that they find cracking the
- >key easier than the other forms of attack... Could somebody in the USA
- >check that there is indeed an exportable version of MailSafe and see
- >what the max key size is?
- >
- I have a copy of the MailSafe manual sitting in front of me. It's the U.S.
- domestic version--and it says that the modulus size is 400 bits. Also, "you
- can purchase...files for generating larger keys from RSA Data Security...."
- I have no idea about the exportable version.
-
- Regarding RC2 and RC4, their primary claim to fame is that they accept
- variable-length keys. The NSA is willing to let them be exported as long as
- the key length is less than 40 bits (or maybe it's 40 bits or less--I forget).
- Some simple calculations should convince you that this key length is very
- succeptible to a brute-force attack.
-
- Some literature from RSADS counters that the key generation for RC2 and RC4
- are very lengthy. This doesn't mean much for encrypting large files--you do
- the key generation once in the beginning, and then encrypt successive data
- blocks. However, if you are trying one key after another, this will greatly
- increase the time required for a brute-force attack. To me this is a red
- herring. It would be very easy to encrypt a commonly used block in every
- possible key, and then store all the ciphertexts on a dozen or so magnetic
- tape cartridges. After that, a chosen-ciphertext attack with one ciphertext
- block goes as fast as the tape I/O.
-
- Bruce
-
-
-