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- From: rich@pencil.cs.missouri.edu (Rich Winkel)
- Subject: CAUSA R: Venezuela's Alternative Left
- Message-ID: <1992Dec24.233413.2535@mont.cs.missouri.edu>
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- Organization: PACH
- Date: Thu, 24 Dec 1992 23:34:13 GMT
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-
- /** reg.samerica: 326.0 **/
- ** Topic: Venezuela's Alternative Left **
- ** Written 1:12 pm Dec 24, 1992 by dhellinger in cdp:reg.samerica **
- Venezuela's Alternative Left
- Interview by Daniel Hellinger
-
- Founded twenty years ago after the defeat of the leftist
- guerrilla movement in Venezuela, the CAUSA R political party
- embarked a strategy of organizing workers in the new industrial
- pole of in Ciudad Guayana, in eastern the eastern state of Bolivar.
- The CAUSA eschewed the democratic centralist form of organization
- of all other Venezuelan political parties, including the Movimiento
- al Socialismo, the largest leftist party. The party has held
- control since 1974 of the union in the giant, state owned
- Siderurgico de Orinoco (SIDOR) steel mill, despite massive firings
- and the illegal dismissal of the union's leader, Andres Velasquez.
- In the 1988 elections, the CAUSA burst out of its regional enclave
- and claimed fourth place, behind MAS, in the 1988 congressional
- elections. Then in 1989, former steel worker Andres Velasquez
- stunned the political establishment by winning the governorship in
- the State of Bolivar, formerly a stronghold of Accion Democratica
- [AD], the dominant party in Venezuelan politics for the past 50
- years.
-
- In the December 1992 elections, held just after a bloody,
- abortive coup, Velasquez won re-election with over 70 percent of
- the vote. Despite widespread reports of fraud, the party won
- control of both the mayoralty and city council of Caracas.
-
- This interview with Pablo Medina, Secretary General of the party,
- and Ali Rodriguez, part of CAUSA congressional delegation, took
- place in Caracas on July 16, 1990. Although it took place over two
- and one half years, it provides a look into the internal politics
- and philosophy of Venezuela's suddenly powerful leftist movement.
-
- DH: You define CAUSA R as a party of "radical democracy." Why do
- you not define yourselves as a "revolutionary" or "socialist"
- party?
-
- AR: Our reflections on Venezuelan history led us to conclude that
- a socialist revolution is in no way viable at present, but that
- indeed it is realistic to propose a very radical, profoundly
- democratic transformation, one that makes a reality of the phrase,
- "Of the people, by the people, and for the people." This is very
- far from the actual state of affairs in Venezuela because democracy
- is reduced to political rights, the right to vote and so called
- "freedom of speech." But when one studies how these rights are
- actually implemented, there really is no way of exercising them
- effectively.
-
- DH: The Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS) is probably the best known
- of the Venezuelan leftist parties. How is CAUSA R different from
- MAS?
-
- AR: We could point to several distinctions, but I think that one
- defines all of the others. CAUSA R puts its prime emphasis on the
- working class, and not only in unions but in social organizations.
- Departing from this thesis we put more emphasis on developing
- leaders through social struggles. Our emphasis is not on
- increasing the number of votes or the number of parliamentary
- representatives. We continue to try to accomplish this too, but it
- is not our principal work. As is evident, the MAS practices a
- politics that emphasizes votes, and it has lost its character as a
- social party.
-
- DH: Are there other parties in Latin America to which CAUSA R can
- be compared -- to the Workers Party (PT) of Brazil, for example?
-
- AR: There are certain differences that are determined in each
- country by specific circumstances that require parties to organize
- themselves for different types of work. CAUSA R has developed in
- a relatively democratic climate compared to the PT, which was born
- in a struggle against a dictatorship. But there is a resemblance
- among both of our parties in the emphasis on worker democracy, in
- the idea that the workers ought to govern. Just recently we
- received an invitation to an event organized by the PT in Brazil,
- and we intend to participate actively.
-
- DH: As CAUSA R expands, is there not a danger of opportunists
- joining?
-
- PM: Yes, and this has been a problem, but we do have mechanisms
- to limit it. CAUSA R functions by taskforces. We have many of
- the same kinds of party offices as other parties, but open meetings
- are held to discuss problems and from this process emerge leaders.
-
- Someone who arrives at the last minute is not allowed to run.
- There are norms of behavior that make it less likely that an
- opportunist would seek us out. For example, the fees that our
- union officials receive as a result of negotiating a contract do
- not go to the officers but to the union treasury. All 700,000
- bolivars ($14,000) that our Deputies received (the state subsidy to
- parties) was turned over to Matanceros (the Guayana workers
- movement) for their struggle.
-
- We deliberately avoid using the CAUSA R symbol to identify our
- slates in union elections. Candidates are chosen after a series of
- assemblies have been held in which the workers are invited to
- discuss the problems they face and to develop a program for the
- union. Our goals change, they are not fixed in advance. After
- several of these kinds of meetings, natural leaders begin to
- emerge, and they usually become candidates. Many times, these
- leaders join Causa R, but we do not insist on this and our slates
- are formed without respect to party affiliation. Our organization
- is dynamic and developing and not static.
-
- DH: Some say that your success can be attributed to your rejection
- of alliances with other parties.
-
- PM: This is a matter of suitability, not principle. In the past
- we have usually avoided alliances to make it clear to the workers
- that our candidates were workers' candidates. I have described the
- participatory process by which candidates and leaders emerge, and
- this is not closed to other parties.
-
- DH: What is the relationship between CAUSA R and the movement for
- union democracy, Nuevo Sindicalismo, in Venezuela?
-
-
- PM: Nuevo Sindicalismo is a project of CAUSA R, but it is broader
- than the CAUSA. It is based on expansion of democracy to fight
- corruption, on honesty, and on political realism. This last point
- is extremely important. Right now the neoliberal policies of
- President Carlos Andres Perez directly contradicts the program of
- his own party [Accion Democratica], they even contradict his own
- policies from his first administration [1974-78]. His first term
- was characterized by nationalization, now he seeks to denationalize
- what was built during the petroleum boom. Many of his plans, like
- privatization and participation of foreign capital in basic
- industries, conflicts with the Constitution. At this time, he
- prefers political instability in order to dilute the power of his
- own party in congress. He wants decisions to be concentrated at
- the executive level so that he can impose unconstitutional acts by
- decree. For this he needs political instability, and we do not
- want to play into his hands.
-
- DH: Why do you believe the Perez's policies contradict his own
- party's principles?
-
- AR: If one reads the original founding documents of Accion
- Democratica, from the Plan of Barranquilla written by Romulo
- Betancourt in 1931 until the last of his programs [as President] in
- 1965, one finds that this project revolved around the distribution
- of petroleum income. This was used to develop what we might call
- popular capitalism. Effectively the oil income was directed, as
- Betancourt himself put it, toward capitalising human capability,
- that is, to improve the quality of life for most Venezuelans in
- regard to literacy, health, nutrition, etc. This entire strategy
- of capitalization of the human factor of production, from 1931
- until the 1980s -- for example the rise of life expectancy [from
- 38] to 71 years -- was based on expansion of consumption more than
- on increasing production. Venezuela was privileged with a
- relatively high salaries compared to those of other countries of
- Latin America.
-
- PM: The Eighth National Plan, which embodies the neoliberal
- thesis, has changed the entire direction of policy away from
- expanding consumption to expanding production, principally for
- export. This requires an enormous adjustment that imposes grave
- social costs on the population.
-
- DH: Perez says that the economic package required by the IMF is not
- an alternative, but the only alternative, given the fall of oil
- prices and the inefficiency of the state sector.
-
- AR: This is an ideological justification presented to the people,
- something not unique to Carlos Andres Perez. Wherever this thesis
- is adopted a similar public relations campaign is undertaken to
- convince the people that their is no other way forward. [However]
- the thesis that the private sector is a better manager than the
- public sector is false. SIDOR (the state steel company) renders
- major benefits to the state through the taxes that it pays. The
- deficit that SIDOR currently faces is the result of a mistaken
- decision when the state undertook [during Perez's first term] to
- expand overnight utilizing short term loans. Now we are paying the
- cost. Also, the majority of firms currently under state control
- are formerly private firms that were on the verge of bankruptcy.
- Their stockholders were well compensated when the state
- intervened, leaving the state with a large debt on its hands. This
- is a major problem for the public sector.
-
- PM: We have called for worker participation and measures to
- develop "aguas abajas" [production of capital and intermediate
- goods for domestic industry] and to combat corruption and
- inefficiency.
-
- This is the kind of movement and participation we want to encourage
- on the national level, and it represents the overall general
- approach. This is our alternative to neoliberalism, . . . one that
- will not be supported by big capital, but only by a movement for a
- radical kind of democracy on the part of workers, those who really
- produce the national wealth. Our proposal . . . is oriented to all
- workers, manual and intellectual, but we have concentrated
- principally on the industrial workers because they have developed
- a high degree of consciousness about what is happening to the
- country.
-
- DH: Why did you choose to concentrate fifteen years ago on the
- Guayana region?
-
- PM: The steel and other metallurgical industries located in the
- industrial zone of Guayana, is very special in this small country.
- The industrial development of this area has converted it into a
- magnetic pole attracting to it workers from all over the country,
- not just from that particular region. For this reason, what we
- have accomplished In Guayana has given us a national projection
- because of the links that workers have with their families all over
- the country.
-
- DH: CAUSA R has proposed that SIDOR contract with the Japanese to
- produce certain intermediate goods in chronically short supply.
- How do you reconcile this with opposition to privatization of basic
- industries?
-
- PM: Although we believe that we should develop our own Venezuelan
- technology as much as possible, we are not going to take the absurd
- position that we shouldn't take advantage of technologies developed
- in other parts of the world. Through international agreements, we
- should acquire those technologies that are needed, but maintaining
- certain guarantees of national sovereignty.
-
- DH: One of the first things that Velasquez said after being elected
- governor was that he intended to run again for president. Is CAUSA
- R becoming electorally oriented?
-
- PM: Andres said that the aspiration of the workers was to arrive
-
- in Miraflores [the Presidential Palace]. This is made especially
- clear in the speech that he made at his inauguration. Since
- becoming governor, from the first day, he has made it a practice to
- meet continually with people in factories, neighborhood councils,
- with the indigenous population, holding meetings in which people
- are encouraged to speak out. The goal is to expand democratic
- participation in order to fight against corruption, which is one of
- the principal reasons why people voted for us.
-
- We cannot do away with corruption by ourselves. People must know
- that they are free do criticize and denounce corrupt practices.
- Although we have to deal with Leopoldo Sucre Figarella [President
- of the Corporacion Venezolana de Guayana, which owns SIDOR] in
- institutionalized relationships, we have not been afraid to
- criticize him directly. In his presence we have denounced
- corruption and also criticized the way that SIDOR and other
- enterprises have been managed.
-
- DH: CAUSA R has warned workers in Guayana to exercise care in
- utilizing the strike in response to the announcement of 3000
- dismissals at SIDOR. Would you lead a strike if necessary to
- protect these jobs?
-
- AD: We believe that a strike can be a very effective weapon but
- is a very delicate one. It is the instrument of last resort that
- we should use to defend the workers or accomplish their demands.
- The economic crisis has contributed to increased of unemployment,
- stimulating extensive competition among workers for jobs. So one
- can't just freely play the strike card. In case of the steel
- industry, they have announced a reduction of 3000 jobs, but
- according to our own investigation this number could amount to 8000
- to 9000, which would produce virtual anarchy in the entire state.
- So we are organizing beyond the plant itself. Workers in other
- unions have become more militant. There is a collective interest
- among all of the workers and their families in saving this
- enterprise. This explains why instead of a simple strike we have
- resorted to a civic strike (paro civico) in which all sectors of
- the society can participate.
-
- [Note: The company and the unions reached an accord to allow the
- workforce to be reduced, but providing for retraining and a welfare
- net for laid-off workers. DH, Dec. 1992]
-
- DH: You have developed bases in working class neighborhoods in
- western Caracas, yet you have resisted the call of FACUR, the
- largest federation of neighborhood associations, for single member
- district (uninominal) representation, especially at the municipal
- level. Just about everyone agrees that proportional representation
- has failed to keep elected officials responsive to voters because
- the electorate has no influence over who appears on the party
- slates.
-
- AR: In places where popular leaders are already well known to the
- people, this reform could have a significant impact, but if the
- power of the non-elected forces of this country are not reduced,
- uninomalism is a deceptive solution. The large parties have
- resources for enormous campaigns on radio and television and in the
- papers, etc.
-
- Those more closely linked to social movements do not have access to
- these resources and as a consequence cannot hope to compete for
- votes. FACUR carries out some important work, and we share the
- desire to eliminate the oligarchy of the parties, but we want to
- politicize the population, but depoliticize them. This means
- resisting the oligarchy of the parties and developing a
- participatory process in local government similar to what has
- developed in the unions. The idea, then is the "municipalize
- democracy," not just democratize municipal government.
-
- [Note: In the December 1992 elections, the CAUSA overcame the
- disadvantages of uninominal representation to win control of the
- Caracas city council]
-
- PM: In Caracas with five million people the City Council meets
- at noon everyday, but for what purpose? Likewise with he local
- councils that are controlled by the parties. Mayors hold all the
- real power, and the councils do very little. We propose to change
- the process as follows. We propose that the 27 Juntas Parroquiales
- 27 in Caracas be elected directly. These would form in turn elect
- a Caracas Council. The juntas and the new council would have the
- power to raise revenues through taxation and would control the
- local police. FACUR is not in agreement with this. They are more
- focused on issues like environmental problems, which are important,
- but more reflective of its middle class origins. FACUR says they
- want to "elect," we say that we want to "govern."
-
- DH: Now that CAUSA R has won the governorship and made significant
- additional advances in the unions, what are plans for the future?
-
- AR: Basically to continue practicing the same politics that we
- have for many years, but we are seeking a greater national
- projection now that we have visible spokesman like Andres
- Velasquez, governor of the State of Bolivar. We want to
- incorporate intellectuals and all who are effected by the crisis,
- including certain entrepreneurial sectors as well. We want to
- convert this governorship into a model of how things could be done
- differently in Venezuela, of how workers and social movements can
- participate in government, so that people can see that the
- propositions of a radical democracy are relevant to all
- citizens of Venezuela.
-
- Daniel Hellinger is Professor of Political Science, Webster
- University, St. Louis, Missouri and author of Venezuela: Tarnished
- Democracy (Westview).
-
- ** End of text from cdp:reg.samerica **
-
-