NetNews Usenet Archive 1992 #27/NN_1992_27.iso/spool/talk/abortion/48013

Internet Message Format | 1992-11-15 | 7.5 KB

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From: [e-mail] (Stephen J. Mezias)
Newsgroups: talk.abortion
Subject: Re: Jim reiterates the chastity belt theory of forced pregnancy!
Message-ID: <[e-mail]>
Date: 15 Nov 92 15:45:58 GMT
References: <[e-mail]> <[e-mail]> <[e-mail]>
Organization: NYU Stern School of Business
Lines: 136

In article <[e-mail]> [e-mail] (Jim Kalb) writes:

>Yes.  The obligation of support.  (If you don't find that commensurate
>I can't help you.  Each of us can only do what he can, and fathers
>aren't capable of carrying the z/e/f.)

I don't want you to help me, Jim; I just want you to be explicit about
what you are assuming.  So, to accept your argument we have to buy all
of the assumptions implicit in equating child support payments and
forced pregnancy.  I have some problems with that: (1) the mortality
rate from forced pregnancy is higher than the mortality rate from
support payments.  (2) it is my speculation that failure to fulfill
responsibility rates, extrapolating from current experience, is much
higher for child support (e.g., deadbeat parents) than for carrying to
term, (e.g., crack mothers).  (3) the rate of permanent injury from
child support payments is much lower from forced pregnancy than from
support payments.  (4) the lost job time associated with forced
pregnancy is much higher than the rate of lost job time associated
with support payments.  Given these pertinent differences, I need to
know why you want to assume that the two impositions are equivalent?

>>Do parents have to donate kidneys to children since their act is
>>responsible for bringing the child into the world?
>
>Is the child's need for a kidney a reasonably forseeable consequence
>of the parents conduct?  It seems to me that the chain of causation
>eventually dissipates.

Let's discuss the strength of links between several outcomes in a
chain of events.  Link 1: Sex and pregnancy.  Link 2: Live birth and
need for kidney transplant.  You seem to be assuming that the first
link is so strong as to require a legal protection for the /z/e/f.
For this reason, you want to force all women who become pregnant to
have their bodies used to sustain the life of a /z/e/f/.  Does not the
same reasoning suggest that all parents who become parents from
consensual sex should be forced to use their bodies to sustain their
children?

>To add a few facts -- if the parents had some genetic abnormality that
>they knew about and that they knew would make it likely that the kid
>would need one of their kidneys in order to survive, then it wouldn't
>strike me as unjust to require them to give the kid a kidney.  I don't
>have strong views on the subject, though.

This is not just a question about justice, especially no justice in
the abstract.  It is a question of the implications of governmental
intervention for the rights of various entities.  Why is it that you
think /z/e/f/s merit state protection of their right to use their
mother's body while children do not merit the right to use their
parents' bodies?

>One way in which the abortion situation differs from the kidney
>donation situation is that people have sex all the time, people get
>pregnant all the time and people get born all the time.  All those
>things and their interconnections are part of all our lives and have
>been part of everyone's life for a very long time.  So if the process
>gives rise to obligations we didn't intend (like carrying a pregnancy
>to term or supporting an unintended child to maturity) we shouldn't be
>shocked.  In a healthy society we would grow up knowing that such
>things happen and when they do we just have to deal with them.  The
>situation as to kidney donations seems rather different to me.

(1) You assume that sex, pregnancy, and birth part of our lives but
grave medical difficulties for the children that result are not.
Should we contact all the institutions and organizations that focus on
children's illnesses and let them know about this?

(2) I have changed the example given in the close of your statement:

So if the process gives rise to obligations we didn't intend (like a
child that needs an organ, tissue, or blood donation) we shouldn't be
shocked.  In a healthy society we would grow up knowing that such
things happen and when they do we just have to deal with them.

Please explain how the abortion situation is different.

>The relevance of the preceding paragraph is that the obligations that
>are legally enforced ought to be consistent with commonly accepted
>moral views as well as abstract moral reasoning.

I have no problem with this, but then you continue and I disagree:

>It's true (judging
>from discussions in t.a.) that many people don't feel that sex and
>pregnancy give rise to obligations that they ought to recognize
>regardless of how they fit into their previous intentions.  To me,
>though, that's a sign that there's something amiss in the way we live
>today and arguing for restrictions on abortion is among other things a
>way of raising and dramatizing the relevant issues.

What abortion tells me about the way we live is that many people have
sex without intending to procreate.  Some of these people are probably
negligent in acting to prevent what they subsequently do not desire.
I would also guess that some of these people are not at all negligent
and acted in good faith to prevent pregnancy.  Why is it that you want
to interfere in the lives of women by forcing them to engage in bodily
servitude to a /z/e/f/ they do not want?

You illustrate here the two central assumptions in what I have termed
the chastity belt theory of forced pregnancy: (1) women who have
consensual sex should be forced to engage in bodily servitude to a
/z/e/f/, (2) the associated contention that male support payments,
which are frequently avoided in real life, are a commensurate burden.
I see a draconinan difference between compelling financial and bodily
support.  There is no other moral, legal, or ethical situation where
financial and bodily support are deemed equivalent.  The only possible
explanation I can come up with for someone believing these two are
equivalent in this situation is that there is a subconscious notion of
punishment for women: punish the sluts for having sex.

>>If I smoke cigarettes, should I be denied medical treatment for lung
>>cancer?
>
>No.  Here you've put your finger on the key to the entire abortion
>dispute.  Pro-lifers think that there is a very important difference
>between the z/e/f and cancerous lung tissue, so they think that even
>though it is good to destroy cancerous lung tissue it is bad to
>destroy the z/e/f.

You feel that all women should want a pregnancy more than they they
want malignant lung tissue; you are entitled to your opinion.  I am
sure that some women would rather smoke than become pregnant.  Would
you allow them to have abortions?

>(As to your particular example, I should also point out that
>pro-lifers would accept abortion when the z/e/f poses the same threat
>to the mother's well-being that cancerous lung tissue does.)

Does anyone know know the exact comparison between female mortality
rates attributable to pregnancy and lung cancer?  My guess is that
pregnancy is higher.  It seems odd to imply that if the two cannot be
statistically distinguished, then one would support abortion rights.
However, I long ago became accustomed to the twists of logic required
to support a pro-forced pregnancy stance.

SJM