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- Newsgroups: sci.crypt
- Path: sparky!uunet!zaphod.mps.ohio-state.edu!cs.utexas.edu!milano!cactus.org!ritter
- From: ritter@cactus.org (Terry Ritter)
- Subject: Re: Demons and Ogres
- Message-ID: <1992Nov22.075548.19378@cactus.org>
- Organization: Capital Area Central Texas UNIX Society, Austin, Tx
- References: <1455.517.uupcb@grapevine.lrk.ar.us>
- Date: Sun, 22 Nov 1992 07:55:48 GMT
- Lines: 26
-
-
- In <1455.517.uupcb@grapevine.lrk.ar.us>
- john.eichler@grapevine.lrk.ar.us (John Eichler) writes:
-
-
- >>In <1992Nov17.065526.15487@cactus.org> Terry Ritter states:
-
- >> Nonsense. My proposal is that, given the ciphertext, the user
- >> would be required to make it plain. This means that there would
- >> be a responsibility to log old *keys*, not conversations.
-
- >I must be missing something here. I agree with what Terry says but if I
- >were to have a copy of a plaintext message to Terry and were to encrypt it
- >with his public key, just how would I go about making such plaintext plain
- >again WITHOUT his secret key even if I wanted to for any purpose.
-
-
- RSA gives public-key capability, but is slow. Typically, a
- "public key" cryptosystem will only pass a session key under RSA,
- and then use a faster private-key system to encipher the data.
- Logging the session key would give the ability to recover the
- plaintext at a later date.
-
- ---
- Terry Ritter ritter@cactus.org
-
-