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- Path: sparky!uunet!cis.ohio-state.edu!rutgers!igor.rutgers.edu!zodiac.rutgers.edu!leichter
- From: leichter@zodiac.rutgers.edu
- Newsgroups: sci.crypt
- Subject: Re: Triple DES
- Message-ID: <1992Nov19.150611.1@zodiac.rutgers.edu>
- Date: 19 Nov 92 20:06:11 GMT
- References: <921116133628.385022@DOCKMASTER.NCSC.MIL> <1eg516INNrrq@uniwa.uwa.edu.au> <1992Nov19.150019.19072@news.nd.edu>
- Sender: news@igor.rutgers.edu
- Organization: Rutgers University Department of Computer Science
- Lines: 53
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-
- In article <1992Nov19.150019.19072@news.nd.edu>, scharle@lukasiewicz.cc.nd.edu
- (scharle) writes:
- | || The recently demonstrated fact that DES is *not* a group indicates that
- | || a double encryption *is* stronger than single encryption.
- |
- | Excuse me, for I am really an amateur in this subject, but I
- | don't see the chain of reasoning here. If I am just being particularly
- | dense, please keeps the flames low, and I'll shut up.
- |
- | What has been shown is that iteration of DES with different keys
- | results, in general, in encryption which is different from DES. I
- | believe that that is different from showing that iteration results
- | in something _stronger_. As far as I can see, it is consistent
- | with someone discovering that two applications of DES could result
- | in a encryption which is in fact easier to break -- for example,
- | there could be some interaction between keys, that would result in
- | an easy cipher to break, so that there would have to be some care
- | in choosing keys. It is also consistent with it being discovered
- | that iterations of DES are _equally_ difficult to break as single
- | uses, perhaps just a different method has to be used.
-
- This situation provides an excellent way to demonstrate a fundamental
- approach for reasoning about cryptosystems.
-
- Can double DES encryption be weaker than single DES encryption? The
- answer is, in general, no - and I can prove this knowing nothing at all
- about DES.
-
- Suppose it were true that double encryption was weaker, and suppose I'm
- a cryptanalyst with access to E(C,k), where E is DES encryption, C is
- cleartext, and k is the unknown key. Rather than attack the "hard"
- problem of single DES encryption, I'd simply choose my own k' and do my
- own double encryption: I'd attack the "easier" encryption E(E(C,k),k').
- It cannot possibly hurt me that I *know* k'!
-
- Conclusion: While it may be that for SOME values of k', some kind of
- cancellation takes place, if they are at all common, then SINGLE DES
- encryption is *already* weak, since looking for such a k' would amount
- to an easy attack against it.
-
- General principle: Anything the cryptanalyst can already do for himself
- cannot weaken the cryptosystem significantly - since if it did, he WOULD
- do it for himself.
-
- Note that this approach cannot prove that double encryption is HARDER to
- break than single encryption - it can only show that it cannot be EASIER.
- Whether DES forms a group or not, it is possible that double encryption is
- stronger, and it's possible that double encryption is equally strong.
- Without further work, we just don't know. (Actually, "meet in the middle"
- attacks show that double encryption, done this way, cannot be MUCH stronger
- than single encryption - though it may be SOMEWHAT stronger.)
-
- -- Jerry
-