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- Xref: sparky sci.cognitive:721 sci.philosophy.tech:4200 sci.lang:8130
- Newsgroups: sci.cognitive,sci.philosophy.tech,sci.lang
- Path: sparky!uunet!caen!rcj
- From: rcj@engin.umich.edu (R o d Johnson)
- Subject: Re: Theories of meaning not relying solely on sym
- Message-ID: <MxG=!XC@engin.umich.edu>
- Date: Fri, 20 Nov 92 15:36:32 EST
- Organization: Lost Tribes of Gazebo
- References: <1992Nov16.000040.19912@midway.uchicago.edu> <1992Nov16.120727.17500@husc3.harvard.edu> <erwin.722217539@trwacs>
- Nntp-Posting-Host: scottie.engin.umich.edu
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- In article <erwin.722217539@trwacs> erwin@trwacs.fp.trw.com (Harry Erwin) writes:
- >Unfortunately, the brain doesn't operate that way. Two statements are
- >considered equivalent if their processing generates the same activation in
- >the cerebral cortex (or a subset thereof).
-
- "Are considered" by who? Says who? Suppose I were to say "two
- statements are considered equivalent if they hold in exactly the same
- possible worlds." Why is my claim any less definitional than yours?
- (Note: this isn't about which one is *correct*; this isn't an
- empirical question.)
-
- --
- Rod Johnson * rcj@caen.engin.umich.edu * (313) 764-3103
-
- "What I do doesn't happen in a warehouse"
- --Jim Dickinson
-