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-
- NAME
- UULIB:userfile
-
- SYNOPSIS
- -
-
- DESCRIPTION
- The UULIB:userfile file provides a means of minimize the vul-
- nerability against break-ins, especially if you have an anon
- uucp account.
-
- The magic behind userfile:
-
- The userfile is used for mapping hostnames to login names.
- Only the loginname/hostname pair is used for the purpose of autosys,
- which uses the loginname to check the given password against the
- password file.
-
- Example file follows:
- ---8<---
- # UULIB:userfile
- #
- # username,system callback pathnames
- #
- ueumelos,eumelos UUPUB:
- udanix,danubix UUPUB:
- nuucp, UUPUB:
- uucp, UUPUB:
- , UUPUB:
- --->8---
-
- uucico utilizes this file automagically if it exists by taking
- the local variable $USER to find an entry in the userfile. If
- a matching username is found, it's corresponding system parameter
- is checked against the hostname with which the calling system
- identifies itself. Sound a little bit wierd, eh? ;) Ok, let's try
- to build an example:
-
- Let's assume that the some machine logged in as `udanix' with the
- propper password; this is checked by getty which then starts the
- appropriate command (uucico in our case).
-
- (Note that your getty MUST set the local variable $USER to `udanix'
- to make the following work!)
-
- Our uucico now says "I'm here, my name is my_name, who are you?".
- The calling cico answers with "I'm danubix ...", and here's where
- the userfile stuff hits the scene:
-
- uucico now compares the system part of udanix' userfile entry
- ("udanix,danubix UUPUB:") with the name the remote uucico has given
- ours. In the example above, userfile's `danubix' matches uucicos
- `danubix', everthing is fine, access as system `danubix' is granted
- (with all access restrictions).
-
- Now let's assume you do have an open uucp account (anonymous uucp,
- usually with login uucp and password uucp) and you DON'T have the
- usefile ability. In this case, anyone could log in with the publi-
- cally know login and password and start a uucico. BUT, being con-
- nected now, that remote uucico could tell our uucico "I'm danubix"
- even if this isn't true. Well, at least up to AmigaUUCP 1.16, our
- uucico would accept this and gladly transmit ANY data queued for
- danubix to that intruder!
- Well, fortunately, wUUCP offers this userfile check, finds out that
- the system `danubix' does use the login `udanix'áinstead of `uucp'
- and hence drops the connection immediately (telling the remote cico
- that it used the wrong login name).
-
- BUGS
- This has been tested quite far, but I DO NOT guarantee that this
- mechanism does prevent any attacks. You have been warned ;)
- At least, it's much better than the old way without any checks.
-
- The pathnames filed must be non empty but is not really used by now;
- it might replace the uulib:Security file(s) in the future. Comments
- appreciated!
-
- ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
- Got Initial code from Martin Brenner <martin@deepth.tue.sub.org>.
- Thanks, Martin!
-
- AUTHOR
- Martin Brenner <martin@deepth.tue.sub.org>.
- Adopted for wUUCP by Kai 'wusel' Siering <wusel@hactar.hanse.de>.
-
- REFERENCES
- uucico, getty, uulib:security
-