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- The Computer Incident Advisory Capability
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- Information Bulletin
-
- Dir II Virus on MS DOS Computers
-
- October 18, 1991, 15:30 PDT Number C-2
-
- Critical Dir II Virus Facts
-
- Name: Dir II virus
- Aliases: Dir-2, MG series II, Creeping Death, DRIVER-1024, Cluster
- Virus Type: Directory infector with stealth characteristics
- Variants: Unsubstantiated reports exist for two variants
- Platform: MS-DOS computers
- Damage: May destroy all .EXE and .COM files and backup diskettes,
- crash some look-alike systems, CHKDSK /F destroys all
- executable files
- Symptoms: CHKDSK reports many cross-linked files and lost file
- chains can corrupt backups, copied files are only 1024
- bytes long, more (see below)
- First Discovered: May 1991 in Bulgaria
- Eradication: Perform a series of simple DOS commands (see below)
-
-
- The Dir II virus presents a new type of MS-DOS virus called a
- directory infector. This virus modifies entries in the directory
- structure, causing the computer to jump to the virus code before
- execution of a program begins. Also, this virus utilizes stealth
- techniques to hide its existence in memory.
-
- How Infection Occurs
-
- Initial hard disk infection occurs when a file with an infected
- directory is executed. The virus establishes itself in memory and
- puts a copy of itself on the last cluster of the disk. Once the
- virus is active in memory, executing any file (infected or not)
- will cause the virus to infect the directory entry of ALL .EXE and
- .COM files in the current directory and in the directories listed
- in the PATH variable. Additional detailed information on the
- infection technique is included in the appendix at the end of this
- bulletin.
-
- Potential Damage
-
- If there is currently information residing on the last cluster of
- the disk, this virus will overwrite it upon installation. Since
- most backup utilities fill diskettes to capacity, backups are prone
- to immediate corruption upon initial infection.
-
- The most damaging characteristic of this virus occurs if a user
- boots from a clean diskette and attempts to run a disk optimizer
- program such as CHKDSK /F, Norton Disk Doctor, or other similar
- utility programs. When such a program attempts to "fix" the disk,
- all infected executables will "become" the virus, effectively
- destroying the original file!
-
- Detection
-
- Although current versions of many common anti-viral utilities will
- not detect this virus and are unable to remove it, manual detection
- can be performed using the following methods:
-
- 1. Boot from the suspect infected hard disk. With the suspected
- virus active in memory, execute the command CHKDSK with NO
- arguments. Then reboot from a clean, write protected diskette
- (such as the original DOS diskette), and execute the command
- CHKDSK with no arguments again. If many cross-linked files
- and lost file chains are reported during the second CHKDSK and
- not the first, it is an indication of infection.
-
- 2. Boot from the suspected infected hard disk. With the
- suspected virus active in memory, use the COPY command to copy
- suspect files with the extension .EXE or .COM. Examine the
- file length of these copied files by using the DIR command,
- then reboot from a clean, write protected diskette and perform
- the same copy command(s). If the file length of the second
- copy is very small (around 1K) but the file length of the
- first copy is much larger, you may be infected with the Dir II
- virus.
-
- Eradication
-
- To manually eradicate this virus, follow these steps for every
- infected disk and diskette:
-
- 1. While Dir II is active in memory, use the COPY command to copy
- all .EXE and .COM files to files with a different extension.
-
- Example: COPY filename.com filename.vom
-
- 2. Reboot system from a clean, write protected diskette to ensure
- the system does not have the virus in memory.
-
- 3. Delete all files with extensions of .EXE and .COM. This will
- remove all pointers to the virus.
-
- 4. Rename all executables to their original names.
- Example: RENAME filename.vom filename.com
-
- 5. Examine all these executables you have just restored. If any
- are 1K in length, they probably are a copy of the virus.
- Destroy any executables of this size.
-
- For additional information or assistance, please contact CIAC:
-
- Karyn Pichnarczyk
- (510) 422-1779 **or (FTS) 532-1779
- karyn@cheetah.llnl.gov
-
- Send e-mail to ciac@llnl.gov or call CIAC at
- (510) 422-8193**/(FTS)532-8193.
-
- **Note area code has changed from 415, although the 415 area code
- will work until Jan. 1992.
-
- CIAC would like to thank Bill Kenny of DDI for his help with this
- bulletin. Neither the United States Government nor the University
- of California nor any of their employees, makes any warranty,
- expressed or implied, or assumes any legal liability or
- responsibility for the accuracy, completeness, or usefulness of any
- information, product, or process disclosed, or represents that its
- use would not infringe privately owned rights. Reference herein to
- any specific commercial products, process, or service by trade
- name, trademark manufacturer, or otherwise, does not necessarily
- constitute or imply its endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by
- the United States Government or the University of California. The
- views and opinions of authors expressed herein do not necessarily
- state or reflect those of the United States Government nor the
- University of California, and shall not be used for advertising or
- product endorsement purposes.
-
-
- Appendix: Detailed DIR II Information
-
- The DOS directory structure contains the following entries:
- filename, extension, attribute, time, date, cluster, file size, and
- an unused area; the cluster entry is the pointer to where the
- actual file exists on the disk. Dir II infects the directory
- structure by scrambling the original cluster entry and storing it
- in part of the unused area, then placing a pointer to the viral
- code in the cluster entry. Thus when a program is executed, the
- computer executes the viral code, the virus decrypts the original
- cluster entry, then the virus allows the original program to
- proceed.
-
- Upon initial infection, the virus links itself into the device
- driver chain, copying itself to the last cluster (or last two
- clusters, if cluster size is less than 1024 bytes) on the disk and
- infects the directory structure of all .EXE and .COM files residing
- in the current directory and all directories defined in the path.
- The virus infects all files with .EXE or .COM as an extension
- whether or not they are executable, EXCEPT if the size of the file
- is less than 2K, larger than 256K, or has an attribute of System,
- Volume, or Directory set. Therefore it does not infect the two
- hidden system files, but it DOES infect command.com.
-
- Following the supplied eradication steps will simply remove all
- "live"pointers to the viral code. After eradication you may wish
- to use a direct disk access utility (such as Norton Utilities) to
- directly access the viral code existing on the last cluster on the
- disk and overwrite it with blanks. Another recommended final
- clean-up entails running a disk optimizer program that will clean
- out all unnecessary deleted files. It is important to remember
- that this virus has infected all .COM and .EXE files, even if they
- are tagged as deleted. Therefore if an undelete utility is used on
- these files, the virus can resurface.
-
- Other Facts About Dir II
-
- - Using CHKDSK to detect this virus from a clean boot will only
- work if there is more than one infected executable on a disk.
-
- - Dir II does not infect partitions that are accessed through a
- loadable device driver.
-
- - Due to the stealth characteristics of Dir II, while the virus
- is memory-resident all file accesses, backups, deletes,
- copies, etc are accomplished with no discernable problems.
- Also, errors resulting from execution of Dir II (such as an
- attempt to infect a write-protected diskette) are suppressed
- by the virus.
-
- - The first execution of a file causes the virus to become
- memory resident. Before it is resident, if a file is copied
- from an infected disk to an uninfected disk all that will copy
- will be a 1K length file containing the virus. After
- eradication procedures this copied file will still be a copy
- of the virus. Such files can be a very good clue to track
- where the virus originated.
-
- - If the virus is not active in memory, interaction with
- infected files produces unusual results. Copying an infected
- file will copy a file only 1K long (the virus itself).
- Deleting a file will mark it as deleted, not but does not
- affect the virus.
-
- - With the virus active in memory, formatting a disk will
- produce the virus in the last cluster.
-
- - Because this virus uses a new type of attack scheme, versions
- of most anti-viral utilities prior to October, 1991 utilities
- will not detect it, and cannot clean it. Since Dir II
- associates itself with the device drivers, programs which
- detect unauthorized requests to become memory resident do not
- detect this virus.
-
- - This virus is not compatible with all non IBM MS-DOS machine
- ROMS and will crash some hard disk systems immediately upon
- initial infection.
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