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- X-Digest: RISKS DIGEST 17.77
- From: Drew Dean <ddean@CS.Princeton.EDU>
- Subject: Java security problems
- Date: Sun, 18 Feb 1996 23:57:02 -0500
-
- We have discovered a serious security problem with Netscape Navigator's 2.0
- Java implementation. (The problem is also present in the 1.0 release of the
- Java Development Kit from Sun.) An applet is normally allowed to connect
- only to the host from which it was loaded. However, this restriction is not
- properly enforced. A malicious applet can open a connection to an arbitrary
- host on the Internet. At this point, bugs in any TCP/IP-based network
- service can be exploited. We have implemented (as a proof of concept) an
- exploitation of an old sendmail bug.
-
- If the user viewing the applet is behind a firewall, this attack can
- be used against any other machine behind the same firewall. The
- firewall will fail to defend against attacks on internal networks,
- because the attack originates behind the firewall.
-
- The immediate fix for this problem is to disable Java from Netscape's
- "Security Preferences" dialog. An HTTP proxy server could also
- disable Java applets by refusing to fetch Java ".class" files. We've
- sent a more detailed description of this bug to CERT, Sun, and
- Netscape.
-
- A second, also serious, bug exists in javap, the bytecode
- disassembler. An overly long method name can overflow a stack
- allocated buffer, potentially causing arbitrary native code to be
- executed. The problem is an unchecked sprintf() call, just like the
- syslog(3) problem last year. Many such bugs were in the alpha 3
- release's runtime, but were carefully fixed in the beta release. The
- disassembler bug apparently slipped through. This attack only works
- on users who disassemble applets. The fix is to not run javap until
- Sun releases a patch.
-
- Note that we've only had success in exploiting the first flaw on an SGI.
- Windows 95 and DEC Alpha versions of Netscape have other bugs in their
- socket implementations that make it harder (although not necessarily
- impossible) to exploit the problem. This is the second time that unrelated
- implementation bugs have prevented us from demonstrating security problems
- in Java.
-
- http://www.cs.princeton.edu/~ddean/java will contain more information
- soon, including a revised version of our paper, to appear in the 1996
- IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy.
-
- Drew Dean <ddean@cs.princeton.edu>
- Ed Felten <felten@cs.princeton.edu>
- Dan Wallach <dwallach@cs.princeton.edu>
- Department of Computer Science, Princeton University
-
- For more information, please contact Ed Felten, 609-258-5906, FAX 609-258-1771.
-
-