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- COMPUTER SECURITY
- -----------------
-
- Notes of the presentation to
- The Institution of Production Engineers
- March 21, 1990 by
-
- E.A.Bedwell, E.D.P. Specialist
- ORTECH International (NRC/IRAP)
- 2395 Speakman Dr., Mississauga L5K 1B3
- (416) 822-4111, Ext. 261
-
-
- The writer wishes to thank the Institution of Production Engineers and
- it's President for the invitation to make this presentation, and to
- express sincere appreciation to David Stang, Ph.D., Director of Research,
- National Computer Security Association, for his contribution both to this
- paper and to computer security in general. And I would be very remiss if
- I neglected to mention the professional secretarial assistance provided by
- Jane Templeman, who makes our whole team tick like the NRC official time
- clock - the one that gives the CBC time signal.
-
- This document is, hopefully, written softly: after all, it might be
- easier to digest if I have to eat my words. I do not profess to be "the
- expert" in the field of computer security; an expert is someone who knows
- more and more about less and less until s/he knows absolutely everything
- about nothing. I hope never to stop learning, which means (thankfully)
- I'll never be an expert.
-
- INDEX PAGE
- ----- ----
- 1. Definition/Scope of "COMPUTER SECURITY" 2
- 2. Why Should You Be Concerned? 2
- 3. Types of Security Breaches 3
- 4. Reasons for Exposure 7
- 5. General Security Rules (all computer systems) 8
- 6. Viruses: 9
- 6.1 History 9
- 6.2 Effect 10
- 6.3 Why do people do it? 10
- 6.4 Symptoms 10
- 6.5 Concerns 11
- 6.6 Known Virus Software (1) 11
- 6.7 Quick Guide to Virus Names (1) 12
- 6.8 Table of Virus Effects 16
- 6.9 Virus Detector/Antidote software 19
- 6.10 Trojan Horses 20
- 7. PC Rules of Thumb 22
- 8. Easy Tricks for PC Security 23
- 9. So You're Infected (Cure) 24
- 10. Summary: What Can You Do? 25
- 11. Security Policy: Points for Consideration 26
- 12. To run SCAN (included on this diskette) 29
-
- (1) David Stang, Ph.D, "Network Security in the Federal Government,",
- January, 1990, p.168-169 (updated by E.A.Bedwell, March, 1990)
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
- - 2 -
- Tonight's topic is "Computer Security," a subject near and dear to my
- heart after catching fraud a few times, and cracking system security a
- few times. The only unfortunate part of this evening is that I have
- enough material to cover an intensive 2 or 3 day seminar and I only have
- something over an hour, so in addition to extensive notes from this
- presentation, I've put an article on viruses, and a PC virus detector
- program on diskette for you.
-
-
- 1. SCOPE OF COMPUTER SECURITY
-
- Computer security relates to any potential loss of information or your
- ability to operate, regardless of the source of the problem. Of course,
- all the publicity about computer security is going to the virus
- situation. I don't want to dissuade anyone from their concerns about
- viruses, because it's definitely a growing problem, and if you get hit,
- you'll be sorry you ever laid eyes on a computer. But, current estimates
- indicate that viruses represent only 3% of all the computer problems now
- occurring. Of course, if you're one of the 3%, like CNIB or Barclay's
- Bank Canada were last fall, you'll feel like you're the only one on
- earth. The difference between viruses and other computer security issues
- is apparently one of control: I hope to convince you that you have as
- much control over viruses and as little control over the other 97% of
- problems as to make them equal threats to the safety of your computer.
-
- I'm going to get to viruses later, their prevention, detection and cure,
- but I'd like first like to cover the other major problems that affect
- computer security - the other 97% - and I'd like to start with reasons
- why you should be concerned about security.
-
-
- 2. WHY SHOULD YOU BE CONCERNED?
-
- Your data is a valuable asset, just like premises, equipment, raw
- materials and inventory. Because so much of modern business depends on
- computers - financial systems, engineering design, medical diagnosis,
- production and safety control - the destructive potential is greater
- every year. There has been more than one company that's suffered great
- losses, and even gone under because of the loss of things like their
- accounts receivable records: no one is going to pay you if you don't
- send them a bill, and if they get word of your inability to invoice them,
- their darned unlikely to volunteer payment - so you're in a financial
- mess. The same goes for your design information, production data, the
- consequences if safety control systems malfunction, or even the simple
- loss of your customer list.
-
- Another reason why you should be concerned is, too often, people don't
- think about computer security until it's too late. There's a saying in
- my industry that, "He who laughs last probably made a backup." Another
- saying is, "Experience is something you don't get until just after you
- needed it the most." Well, if it means the life of your company, or the
- loss of potentially millions of dollars, or even just the information on
- your home computer, it might be wise to get at least some basic knowledge
- before the disaster strikes.
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
- - 3 -
-
- 3. TYPES OF SECURITY BREACHES
-
- Now that the 'why' is out of the way, let's break down the 97% of
- problems. These are not in a specific order, but just as they came to
- me. Nor have I attempted to attach percentages to each type of risk,
- because very few computer crimes are actually reported, so any figures
- that anyone could estimate would not be realistic:
-
-
- FRAUD/THEFT
- By far the biggest problem is fraud or theft. Some examples of this are:
-
- CHAOS - 1987 - Hamburg -> NASA data bank info sold to USSR
-
- Foreign exchange } famous because of big $
- Electronic Funds Transfer } amounts, and because of the
- Insider Trading } publicity they've received
-
- Most common: Cookie jar technique - e.g., interest, income tax
- (aka 'Salami' technique - take a little and no one
- will notice)
-
- Specific examples I've caught were in Payroll (no crash on < or =),
- Accounts Payable (dummy companies), Purchasing (failed reasonableness
- test), and Accounts Receivable (failed balance routine). These were all
- thefts of money.
-
- Another example of theft which is very interesting is the 28-year-old
- Canadian who was arrested at UNISYS in Pittsburgh on Dec. 13/89 - what he
- is alleged to have stolen was NCR's trade secrets - to the tune of
- US$68M, which comes under a different Canadian law from monetary theft.
-
-
-
- MALICIOUS DAMAGE / VANDALISM
- The next major type of computer security breach is the disgruntled
- employee syndrome. Their favourite is the logic bomb or time bomb: on a
- certain date or condition after they leave the company, something's going
- to happen, such as at the health centre in LA where all prescriptions
- suddenly multiplied by 2. That's really serious, even compared to the
- logic bomb that superzaps all your files off the face of the earth,
- because someone could die. At least with a superzap, you can recover if
- you've been backing up and have a disaster recovery plan in effect. Pure
- physical vandalism occurs more often at educational institutions, but is
- still a serious threat. I wouldn't let me near your machine if I was
- angry with you - my vandalism would be difficult to detect (and expensive
- to repair). A simple application of a magnetized screwdriver ......
-
-
-
- LACK OF SECURITY PLANNING IN SYSTEM DESIGN STAGE
- One of the biggest logic bombs that's going to occur is on January 1/2000.
-
- Do you know how many computer systems use a 2 digit number for the year?
- Do you know how much work it's going to be to adapt systems to recognize
- 00 as being greater than 99? My grandmother was born in 1886, and most
- systems show her birth year as 99. If she lives to the year 1999, I
- wonder if they'll start sending her the baby bonus. This time bomb is not
- malicious damage, it's pure lack of planning at the system design stage.
-
-
-
-
-
-
- - 4 -
-
- (Lack of Security Planning - continued)
-
- Things like balance checks and reasonableness tests are not built into the
- system from the beginning, and it's not easy to put them in later. Users
- must participate at the system design stage, because only they know what's
- reasonable and what can be balanced. Don't expect a computer technician
- to know everything there is to know about your job.
-
-
-
-
- DISTORTED SENSE OF HUMOUR
- Then there's the practical joker - the one who thinks it's funny to break
- into the system to see what he can change, or create some dumb message to
- appear on your screen. That's what happened at IBM when the infamous
- Christmas tree appeared 2 years ago (1987). The joke was three-fold -
- first it analyzed your electronic mail distribution lists and reproduced
- itself to send to everyone you normally send messages to - this clogged
- the system up with people reading more messages than normal. The second
- part was a little more technical - everyone who read the message caused a
- separate load of the offending program to take up space in memory, unlike
- most systems where two or more people who are doing the same thing are
- sharing one load of the software. This clogged memory up so that nothing
- else could run. There was one more part to this: there were delay timers
- built into the program so it deliberately ran very slowly. The result was
- that the largest computer network in the world was shut down for 4 hours.
- Someone must have had a great need for a power trip.
-
-
-
- MISTAKE
- Next, there's fumble fingers: you know, the one who keys the formula in
- as 600 grams instead of 60 grams, or the estimated production time of 2
- hours instead of 2 days. Or the one who almost took me into court when
- he blamed "the computer" for a mistake. Without going into details about
- that incident, I can say that going through the grilling by several
- lawyers in a preliminary investigation was not the high point of my
- career. What saved the situation (for me and the organization) was audit
- trailing: every time a transaction was entered, the system recorded the
- terminal i.d., the user i.d., the date and the time. It also saved a copy
- of the record as it existed prior to the transaction taking place. A more
- common mistake, though, is to unlatch a diskette door before the light
- goes out. Few people realize that the FAT (file attributes table) is the
- last thing written on a disk, and you can corrupt the FAT by removing the
- disk too early.
-
-
- "EVERYONE DOES IT" SYNDROME
- Then there's everyone's favourite: copying software. Believe it or not,
- in Canada, that falls under the Copyright law, not under theft, but it
- has been successfully prosecuted. Even if you reverse engineer it and
- make some minor changes, it will come under the "look and feel" test of
- the Copyright law - if it looks and feels the same as the original, you
- can be prosecuted. Copying software is illegal, and your company as the
- registered owner could be held liable if it is detected.
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
- - 5 -
-
- ILLEGAL ACCESS
- Many major computer crimes are perpetrated by illegal access: the 14-
- year old who broke into NASA from his basement computer room is just one
- example. There is password software on all larger machines, and it's not
- difficult to put it on PCs. On the larger machines, one of the major
- problems is not changing the standard passwords that are set when the
- machine is delivered: the standard user-level password may be USER, the
- standard operator password may be OPERATOR, and the standard field repair
- person's password may be REPAIR, and so on. Guess how I've cracked
- security a couple of times. In a 1988 article by Dr. Cliff Stoll in
- "Computers and Security,", he reported that in 10 months of systematic
- testing on computers attached to the US Defense Data Network (Milnet),
- access was gained in 13% of the attempts simply by guessing at passwords!
-
- There should be some rules applied to passwords: not less than 7 or 8
- characters, must be changed at least every 60 days, don't use common
- things like names (another way I've broken security), don't share it
- under any circumstances and, for heaven's sake, don't post it on the
- front of your machine or leave it where someone can find it. It's your
- personal PIN - just like the money machine - and the information you're
- dealing with is worth money. Some of the most difficult passwords to
- break (take it from me) are "two words reversed" (e.g., boardwall,
- hornshoe, cuptea), or foreign language words (e.g., coupdegrace,
- millegrazie, caliente). Nonsense is good, too: geebleurql is nice.
-
- If you're installing password security on a PC, consider whether you
- should have it so tight that there is no recourse to the DOS level or no
- ability to boot from the A: drive. You'd need really good password
- software (or a good technician on staff) if you have both of these
- facilities - otherwise you can lock yourself out - but it's my preference
- (especially for the guy who's wiped his root directory twice).
-
-
- PHYSICAL SECURITY
- Finally, another area that affects computer security or your ability to
- carry on computer operations, and one that is often overlooked, is simple
- physical security: keys, thermal shock, vibration, dirt, water, fire,
- visibility of information, steady power supply, discharge of static
- electricity, magnetic fields, are all relevant to security. We have one
- man in our network who should have (a) cabling bolted to his computer and
- the floor, (b) a key to his unit, and (c) dust protectors (as well as
- password access only without recourse to the DOS level).
-
- When it comes to thermal shock, if you work in an area where the heat is
- reduced on winter weekends, I strongly recommend you leave your unit
- running over the weekend - just lock the keyboard. If the air
- conditioning is shut down, turn your unit off, and don't turn it on until
- the temperature is 23C or less. And please don't leave your machine
- sitting in the sun, or in front of an open window to attract dust. The
- internal temperature raises within 20 mins. or so to >30C, and the effects
- of thermal shock are such that it can, first, rock memory chips out of
- their sockets, and, worse, misalign the read heads on your disk drive so
- that nothing can be read.
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
- - 6 -
-
- (Physical Security - continued)
-
- Vibration, too, is a source of problems, especially for drives. The read
- heads actually float over the surface of drives, not on them the way a
- record player needle does, and the space tolerance between is measured in
- Angstroms (metric version of microinches). Vibration can cause the head
- to hit the drive, and you can say goodbye to whatever was written there.
-
- If you're in a particularly sensitive field, and your information is what
- might be called top secret to your company, you might also want to look
- at two protection devices: one is encryption, and the other is Tempest
- hardware or shielding. Encryption involves translating your data using
- algorithms to something unreadable, and de-coding it when you need it. It
- uses a "key" to choose the algorithm - dont' lose the key! It comes in a
- few forms: software controlled encryption, hardware based encryption, or
- a combination of the two. Most encryptors work with standard algorithms,
- but defense departments and other high-security installations prefer
- random algorithms. Tempest hardware, or shielding, protects against
- sniffing of signals. ( Signal emanation surveillance is called
- "sniffing.") I don't have a computer here to demonstrate this, but if
- you take an old battery-operated transistor radio and set the dial to the
- bottom of the AM band around 520, try passing it within a foot of your
- computer. Your ear might not pick up the individual signals, but I assure
- you there's equipment that does. That's why the US Army was blasting rock
- music around the Vatican Embassy when Noriega was there - to mask signals.
-
- More important to the average user, though, is avoidance of electro-
- magnetic fields (such as ringing phones near a disk or disk drive), and
- having an automatic disk head 'parker' that moves the heads to a safe zone
- every few seconds. That way, something like a brief power failure is less
- likely to cause a "head crash" on the disk.
-
- Simple visibility of information is a risk. Recently I went to a bank
- with a court order in hand to give me access to an account. The clerk
- simply turned the terminal toward me and, if I'd wanted to bother, I could
- have had the account numbers of two other people with identical names.
- There is screen saving software that will blank your screen after an
- inactivity duration you choose, and personnel should be made conscious
- that unauthorized viewing of information is a security risk. And watch
- what your staff throw out on paper, too.
-
- When it comes to fire and water, there are two basic rules that everyone
- can follow: first, don't smoke around the PC, and second, don't feed the
- PC coffee and donuts. You might be able to save a keyboard or some parts
- with a bath in distilled water, possibly followed by drying with a warm
- hair dryer, but there's no guarantee. I prefer pure isopropyl alcohol -
- without the hairdryer so I don't get fried in the process. Don't blast a
- computer with a fire extinguisher if you can avoid it. If you do have a
- fire or a flood, though, you'd better have a tested disaster recovery
- plan, and your backups stored off-site.
-
-
- All of these issues are reasonably within your control: fraud, theft,
- disgruntled employees, practical jokers, fumble fingers, software copying
- and physical security, at least as much as the infamous viruses that are
- around, but let's take a look at why you're at risk.
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
- - 7 -
-
- 4. REASONS FOR EXPOSURE
-
- Concentration of data in one place
-
- Instantaneous adjustment
-
- Alteration without a trace
-
- Lack of visible records
-
- Complexity of the system
-
- Networking
-
- Technical persons can befuddle
-
- General ignorance by non-techie and management
-
- Detection problems
-
- Lack of training
-
- Security checks in programs not specified
-
- Systems not documented
-
- Limited staff resource for programming/management
-
- No separation of duties
-
- Possibility of enormous losses remaining undetected
-
- Reluctance to report - Embarrassment
- Lack of sufficient evidence to prosecute
- Cost to prosecute outweighs recovery
- Company policy ("Press would have a field day")
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
- - 8 -
-
- 5. GENERAL SECURITY RULES (All Systems, big and small)
-
- Disaster Recovery } Backup Backup Backup
- Plan } Restore (test it to make sure it works)
-
- Store your backup off-site (not in your car!)
-
- Physical security
-
- Password for access control (don't stick your password on
- the front of your machine!)
-
- Access to menu only - not to system control level
-
- Reasonableness tests
-
- Balance checks (rounding: up, down, (out?); cross-calculations
-
- Audit trails - all records (terminal i.d., user i.d., date and
- time stamping, history record retention)
-
- Fall-through coding (if it doesn't meet a condition, does it go to limbo)
-
- Payroll/Accounts payable: don't pay the same # twice
-
- Fault tolerance level supported (user friendly/hostile -
- balance between fault tolerance & productivity)
-
- Call back or no answer on dial-up systems
-
- UPS (Uninterrupted Power Supply, or allowance for graceful
- degradation) - or at least an automatic head parker
-
- Logical view rights (your user 'privileges' allows access only to the
- data you need to see, e.g., accounting clerks don't need to see
- production formulae)
-
- Multi-user environment: protection against deadly embrace
-
- Automatic logoff on inactivity timer / Screen saver
-
- Policy statement re purchasing/use/theft/illegal
- software, etc.
-
- Encryption (?) - don't lose the key!
-
- Shielding ("Tempest" hardware for secure systems)
-
- Educate users
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
- - 9 -
-
- 6. VIRUSES
-
- As in medicine, a virus needs an 'organism' to which it may attach itself,
- and a virus is 'contagious'.
-
- In the case of computers, a virus is usually a destructive piece of code
- which attaches to a working program, such as your word processor,
- spreadsheet or CAD/CAM software. Viruses are usually written to detect
- any load of a computer file that has an extension of .EXE, .COM, .OVL,
- .BIN - such extensions representing executable programs. Often, the
- virus loads itself into memory, then loads the program you just called, so
- the virus is sitting at the front. Then when you exit the program, the
- virus code calls for the re-writing of the program back onto the disk -
- with the virus still sitting at the front. Other viruses simply go
- straight into your boot sector, so they get loaded every time you turn on
- your machine. Some do both.
-
- However they 'hide', and whatever they attach to, they got to your machine
- on an infected diskette. If you are infected and then copy your software
- to use on another machine, guess what happens? Right! That's where the
- 'contagious' element comes in.
-
- In 1989, more viruses were discovered than in all previous years. There
- were over 110 at the end of the year, and 7 were discovered in December
- alone. Sources have been from as far away as Pakistan and Bulgaria.
-
- Only .004% have reported infections, but most are not reported. Consider
- this: if only 1% were infected, that would be 1/2 million units in the
- U.S. alone. At a cost ranging from $300 to $3,000 per unit to recover,
- the problem starts to impact the economy as well as the productivity of
- staff at your organization. It cost one Texas company US$10M to shut
- down their 3,000-unit network for 4 days to find 35 infected units.
-
- One of the major problems with viruses is that 90% of the users who
- recover are re-infected within 30 days. One person at my organization
- was re-infected 7 times in 2 months! Most reinfections occur for one of
- two reasons (not necessarily in this order): your back-up was infected,
- or it was a virus that hid in the boot sector on track 0, and track 0 is
- not re-written by the standard "FORMAT" command (only a low-level format
- will get rid of a track 0 virus). Be careful of some new software as
- well: there has been more than one instance of shrink-wrapped software
- being infected (software companies have disgruntled employees, too, it
- seems).
-
-
-
- 6.1 HISTORY
-
- 1959 - Scientific American article about 'worms'
- 1963 - caught my first two frauds (Payroll & Accounts Payable)
- 1970 - Palo Alto lab - worm which directed activities
- 1982 - Anonymous Apple II worm
- 1984 - Scientific American CoreWare Series: held contest to
- find the most clever/difficult to detect 'bug'
- 1987 - Apparent change from intellectual exercise to
- dangerous activity.
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
- - 10 -
-
- 6.2 EFFECT
-
- Massive destruction: Reformatting
- Programs erased
- Data file(s) modified/erased
-
- Partial/Selective destruction: Modification of data/disk space
- File allocation tables altered
- Bad sectors created
- If match with event, alter or delete
-
- Random havoc: Altering keystroke values
- Directories wiped out
- Disk assignments modified
- Data written to wrong disk
-
- Annoyance: Message
- Execution of RAM resident programs
- suppressed
- System suspension
-
-
-
-
-
- 6.3 WHY DO PEOPLE DO IT?
-
- Financial gain
- Publicity
- Intellectual exercise
- Terrorism/Fanaticism/Vandalism
- Revenge
- Just plain wierd
-
-
-
-
-
- 6.4 SYMPTOMS
-
- Change in file size (Usually on .COM, .EXE
- .OVL, .BIN, .SYS or .BAT files)
- Change in update time or date
- Common update time or date
- Decrease in available disk or memory space
- Unexpected disk access
- Printing and access problems
- Unexpected system crashes
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
- - 11 -
-
-
- 6.5 CONCERNS
-
- Variety: Virus vs Bug vs Worm vs Trojan Horse vs Superzapper
- vs Trap Doors vs Piggybacking vs Impersonation
- vs Wiretapping vs Emulation
- Strains / Complexity / Growing Sophistication
- Bulletin board use and free software
- Largest threats from taking computer work home
- Kids using same machine at home
- Networked mainframe systems
- Travel/airline computers (AA wiped out early 1989)
- Work message systems (E-Mail)
- POS terminals
- Banking / Credit Cards / Money Machines
- Income Tax records
- Health records
-
-
- **************************************************************
- * Global disaster may be on the way *
- * No specific laws to deal with malicious programming *
- * No single national centre to gather data on infections *
- **************************************************************
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
- 6.6 KNOWN VIRUS SOFTWARE
-
- 12 viruses (and their strains) account for 90% of all PC infections:
- _
- |_| Pakistani Brain
- |_| Jerusalem
- |_| Alameda
- |_| Cascade (1701/1704)
- |_| Ping Pong
- |_| Stoned
- |_| Lehigh
- |_| Den Zuk
- |_| Datacrime (1280/1168)
- |_| Fu Manchu
- |_| Vienna (DOS 62)
- |_| April First
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
- - 12 -
-
- 6.7 QUICK GUIDE TO VIRUS NAMES (Cross referenced)
-
- Name Synonym-1 Synonym-2 Synonym-3 Synonym-4
-
- 1168 Datacrime-B
- 1184 Datacrime II
- 1280 Datacrime Columbus Day October 12th Friday 13th
- 1536 Zero Bug
- 1701/1704 Cascade Falling Letters Falling Tears Autumn Leaves
- 1704 Cascade
- 1704 Cascade-B
- 1704 Cascade-C
- 1704 Cascade-D
- 1704 Format 1704 Blackjack Falling Letters
- 1704 Blackjack 1704 Format Falling Letters
- 1808 Jerusalem Black Box/Hole Israeli PLO 1808/1813
- 1813 Jerusalem Black Box/Hole Israeli PLO 1808/1813
- 2086 Fu Manchu
- 2930
- 3066 Traceback
- 3551 Syslock
- 3555
- 123nhalf
- 405
- 500 Virus Golden Gate
- 512 Virus Friday 13th COM virus
- 648 Vienna DOS 62 DOS 68 Austrian
- AIDS VGA2CGA Taunt
- AIDS Info Disk
- Alabama
- Alameda Virus Yale Merritt Peking Seoul
- Alameda-B Sacramento Yale C
- Alameda-C
- Amstrad
- Anti
- Apple II GS LodeRunner
- April 1st SURIV01 SURIV02
- April 1st-B
- Ashar
- Austrian 648 Vienna DOS 62 DOS 68
- Australian Stoned New Zealand Marijuana
- Autumn Leaves Cascade 1701/1704 Falling Letters Falling Tears
- Basit virus Brain Pakistani Brain Lehore
- Black Box Jerusalem Israeli Black Hole 1808/1803 PLO
- Black Hole Jerusalem Black Box Israeli 1808/1813 PLO
- Black Hole Russian
- Blackjack 1704 1704 Format Falling Letters
- Bouncing Ball Vera Cruz Ping Pong Bouncing Dot Italian virus
- Bouncing Dot Italian virus Bouncing Ball Vera Cruz Ping Pong
- Brain-B Brain-HD Harddisk Brain Houston virus
- Brain-C
- Brain-HD Harddisk Brain Houston virus Brain-B
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
- - 13 -
-
- Brain Pakistani Brain Basit virus Lehore
- Cascade 1701/1704 Falling Letters Falling Tears Autumn Leaves
- Cascade(-B-C-D) 1704
- Century Oregon Jan.1, 2000
- Century-B
- Chroma
- Clone
- Clone-B
- Columbus Day 1280/Datacrime October 12th Friday 13th
- COM virus 512 virus Friday 13th
- COM-B Friday 13th-B
- COM-C Friday 13th-C
- Cookie virus Sesame Street
- Dark Avenger
- Datacrime 1280
- Datacrime-B 1168
- Datacrime-II 1184
- dBASE virus
- Den Zuk Search Venezuelan
- Disk Killer Ogre
- Do-Nothing (don't believe it!)
- DOS-62 Vienna DOS-68 648 Austrian
- DOS-68 Vienna DOS-62 648 Austrian
- DOS-62 UNESCO
- DOS-62-B
- Falling Tears Cascade 1701/1704 Falling Letters Autumn Leaves
- Falling Letters 1704 Blackjack 1704 Format
- Falling Letters Cascade 1701/1704 Falling Tears Autumn Leaves
- Falling Letters-Boot Ping Pong B
- Fat 12 Swap Israeli Boot
- FluShot4 (a corrupted version of a virus detector - use FluShot4+)
- Friday 13th 1280/Datacrime Columbus Day October 12th COM
- Friday 13th-B COM-B 512
- Friday 13th-C COM-C
- Fumble Type
- Fu Manchu 2086
- Ghost-Boot
- Ghost-COM
- Golden Gate 500 Virus
- Golden Gate -B
- Golden Gate-C Mazatlan
- Golden Gate-D
- Harddisk Brain Brain-B Brain-HD Houston virus
- Holland Girl Sylvia
- Houston virus Brain-B Brain-HD Harddisk Brain
- Icelandic Disk-Crunching-virus Saratoga 2
- Icelandic 1 Saratoga 1
- Icelandic 2 System virus
- INIT29
- IRQ v. 41
- Israeli Friday13 Jerusalem Black Box/Hole 1808/1813 PLO
- Israeli Boot Swap Fat 12
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
- - 14 -
-
- Italian virus Bouncing Ball Vera Cruz Ping Pong Bouncing Dot
- Jan.1, 2000 Century Oregon
- Jerusalem Israeli Black Box/Hole 1808/1813 PLO Friday 13th
- Jerusalem-B New Jerusalem
- Jerusalem-C
- Jerusalem-D
- Jerusalem-E
- Jork
- Key
- Lehigh
- Lehigh-2
- Lehore Brain Pakistani Brain Basit
- Lisbon
- LodeRunner Apple II GS
- MacMag Peace virus
- Madonna (while the nice music plays, your hard disk is being destroyed)
- Mailson
- Marijuana New Zealand Stoned
- Mazatlan Golden Gate-C
- Merritt Alameda virus Yale Peking Seoul
- Mix1
- Music virus Oropax virus
- New Jerusalem Jerusalem-C
- New Zealand Stoned Marijuana Australian
- New Zealand-B Stoned-B
- New Zealand-C Stoned-C
- nVIR
- October 12th 1280/Datacrime Columbus Day Friday 13th
- Ohio
- Ogre Disk Killer
- Oregon Century
- Oropax virus Music virus
- Pakistani Brain Lehore Basit Brain
- Palette Zero Bug
- Payday
- Peace Virus MacMag
- Pearson
- Peking Alameda virus Yale Merritt Seoul
- Pentagon
- Ping Pong Bouncing Dot Italian virus Bouncing Ball Vera Cruz
- Ping Pong-B Falling Letters-Boot
- PLO Jerusalem Friday 13th 1808/1813 Israeli
- Russian Black Hole
- Sacramento Alameda-B Yale C
- Saratoga 1 Icelandic 1
- Saratoga 2 Icelandic Disk-Crunching-virus
- Scores
- Search Den Zuk Venezuelan
- Seoul Alameda virus Yale Merritt Peking
- Sesame Street Cookie virus
- SF virus
- Shoe virus UIUC virus (see also Terse Shoe)
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
- - 15 -
-
- Shoe virus-B
- Stoned New Zealand Marijuana Australian
- Stoned-B New Zealand-B
- Stoned-C New Zealand-C
- SUMDOS
- Sunday
- SRI (destroys anti-viral programs before it damages your system)
- SURIV01 April 1st
- SURIV02 April 1st
- SURIV03
- Swap Israeli Boot Fat 12
- Sylvia Holland Girl
- SYS
- Syslock 3551
- System virus Icelandic 2
- Taunt AIDS VGA2CGA
- Terse Shoe (see also Shoe virus)
- TP04VIR Vacsina
- TP25VIR Yankee Doodle
- TP33VIR Yankee Doodle
- TP34VIR Yankee Doodle
- TP38VIR Yankee Doodle
- TP42VIR Yankee Doodle
- TP44VIR Yankee Doodle
- TP46VIR Yankee Doodle
- Traceback 3066
- Typo (boot)
- Typo (COM) Fumble
- UIUC virus Shoe virus
- UNESCO DOS-62
- Venezuelan Den Zuk Search
- Vera Cruz Ping Pong Bouncing Dot Italian Virus Bouncing Ball
- Vacsina TP04VIR
- VGA2CGA AIDS Taunt
- Vienna DOS-62 DOS-68 648 Austrian
- Vienna-B
- Yale Alameda virus Merritt Peking Seoul
- Yale C Alameda-B Sacramento
- Yankee Doodle TP25VIR
- Yankee Doodle TP33VIR
- Yankee Doodle TP34VIR
- Yankee Doodle TP38VIR
- Yankee Doodle TP42VIR
- Yankee Doodle TP44VIR
- Yankee Doodle TP46VIR
- Zero Bug 1536
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
- - 16 -
-
- 6.8 TABLE OF VIRUS EFFECTS (by virus name)
-
- This information is a reformatted version of that which was made
- available to the writer by the National Computer Security Association,
- Suite 309, 4401-A Connecticut Ave. NW, Washington, D.C., 20008.
-
- This list is not as complete as the list of names preceding. Since
- viruses must be created and caught before they can be analyzed for the
- type of information that follows, this list will never be as complete as
- the list of names. In some instances, you may have been infected with a
- variation of the name. You might wish to check this list for all
- possible variations of a name you've found on the list of synonyms.
-
- Explanation of codes used under "What it does", and analysis of frequency
- of occurrence of each effect:
-
- EFFECT # OCCURRENCES %
- ------ - ----------- -
- 1. Virus uses self-encryption 13 12
- 2. Virus remains resident 83 74
- 3. Infects COMMAND.COM 8 7
- 4. Infects .COM files 62 55
- 5. Infects .EXE files 41 37
- 6. Infects .OVL files 15 13
- 7. Infects floppy disk boot sector 36 32
- 8. Infects hard disk boot sector 14 13
- 9. Infects partition table 1 1
- 10. Corrupts or overwrites boot sector 31 28
- 11. Affects system run-time operation 53 47
- 12. Corrupts program or overlay files 57 51
- 13. Corrupts data files 4 4
- 14. Formats or erases all/part of the disk 17 15
- 15. Corrupts file linkage (FAT) 9 8
- 16. Overwrites program 4 4
- 17. Mac virus (as opposed to PC virus) 2 2
-
-
- Increase in Disinfector
- VIRUS NAME Prog'm size that works What it does
- ---------- ----------- ----------- ------------
-
- 1168/Datacrime B 1168 SCAN/D 1, 4, 12, 14
- 1184/Datacrime 2 1184 1, 4, 5, 12, 14
- 123nhalf 3907 2, 5, 11, 13
- 1280/Datacrime 1280 SCAN/D 1, 4, 12, 14
- 1514/Datacrime II 1514 SCAN/D 1, 4, 5, 12, 14
- 1536/Zero Bug 1536 SCAN/D 2, 4, 11, 12
- 1701/Cascade 1701 M-1704 1, 2, 4, 11, 12
- 1704/Format 1704 M-1704 1, 2, 4, 11, 12, 14
- 1704/Cascade 1704 M-1704 1, 2, 4, 11, 12
- 1704/Cascade-B 1704 M-1704 1, 2, 4, 11, 12
- 1704/Cascade-C 1704 1, 2, 4, 11, 12
- 1704/Cascade-D 1704 1, 2, 4, 11, 12
- 2930 2930 SCAN/D 2, 4, 5, 12
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
- - 17 -
-
- 3066/Traceback 3066 M-3066 2, 4, 5, 12
- 3551/Syslock 3551 SCAN/D 1, 4, 5, 12, 13
- 3555 3555 1, 3, 4
- 405 SCAN/D 4, 16
- AIDS SCAN/D 4, 16
- AIDS Info Disk 0 AIDSOUT 11
- Alabama 1560 SCAN/D 2, 5, 11, 12, 15
- Alameda-B 2, 7, 10
- Alameda-C 2, 7, 10
- Alameda/Yale MDISK 2, 7, 10
- Amstrad 847 SCAN/D 4, 12
- April 1st 2, 4, 11
- April 1st-B 2, 5, 11
- Ashar MDISK 2, 7, 10
- Black Hole 1808 2, 4, 5, 6, 11, 12, 15
- Brain-B 2, 7, 8, 10
- Brain-C 2, 7, 8, 10
- Century 2, 4, 5, 6, 11, 12, 14, 15
- Century-B 2, 4, 5, 6, 11, 12, 14, 15
- Clone-B 2, 7, 10, 15
- Clone virus 2, 7, 8, 10
- dBASE 1864 SCAN/D 2, 4, 11, 12, 13
- DOS-62-B 3, 4, 11
- DOS-62-UNESCO 650 3, 4, 11
- Dark Avenger 1800 M-DAV 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 11, 12, 15
- Datacrime II-B 1917 SCAN/D 1, 3, 4, 5, 12, 14
- Disk Killer MDISK 2, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14
- Do-Nothing 608 SCAN/D 4, 12
- Fri 13th COM 512 SCAN/D 4, 12
- Fri 13th COM-B 512 4, 12
- Fri 13th COM-C 512 4, 12
- Fu Manchu 2086 SCAN/D 2, 4, 5, 6, 11, 12
- Ghost-Boot ver. MDISK 2, 7, 8, 10, 11
- Ghost-COM ver. 2351 SCAN/D 4, 10, 12
- Golden Gate 2, 7, 10, 14
- Golden Gate-B 2, 7, 10, 14
- Golden Gate-C 2, 7, 10, 14
- Golden Gate-D 2, 7, 10, 14
- IRQ v. 41 4, 5, 11
- Icelandic I 642 SCAN/D 2, 5, 11, 12
- Icelandic II 661 SCAN/D 2, 5, 11, 12
- Italian/Ping Pong MDISK 2, 7, 10, 11
- Italian-B MDISK 2, 7, 8, 10, 11
- Jerusalem 1808 SCAN/D/A 2, 4, 5, 6, 11, 12
- Jerusalem-B 1808 M-JERUSLM 2, 4, 5, 6, 11, 12
- Jerusalem-C 1808 2, 4, 5, 6, 11, 12
- Jerusalem-D 1808 2, 4, 5, 6, 11, 12
- Jerusalem-E 1808 2, 4, 5, 6, 11, 12, 15
- Jork 2, 7, 10
- Lehigh SCAN/D 2, 3, 12, 14, 16
- Lehigh-2 2, 3, 12, 14, 15, 16
- Lisbon 648 SCAN/D 4, 12
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
- - 18 -
-
- MIX1 1618 SCAN/D 2, 5, 11, 12
- New Jerusalem 1808 M-JERUSLM 2, 4, 5, 6, 11, 12
- New Zealand MD 7
- New Zealand-B 7, 8
- New Zealand-C 7, 8
- nVIR 11, 17
- Ohio MDISK 2, 7, 10
- Oropax 2, 4
- Pakistani Brain MDISK 2, 7, 10
- Palette/Zero Bug 1536 2, 3, 4,
- Payday 1808 M-JERUSLM 2, 4, 5, 6, 12
- Pentagon MDISK 7, 10
- SF Virus 2, 7, 11, 14
- SRI 1808 2, 4, 5, 6, 11, 12
- SURIV01 897 SCAN/D 2, 4, 11, 12
- SURIV02 1488 SCAN/D 2, 5, 11, 12
- SURIV03 SCAN/D 2, 4, 5, 6, 11, 12
- SYS 2, 7, 8, 11, 12
- SYS-B 2, 7, 8, 11, 12
- SYS-C 2, 7, 8, 11, 12
- Saratoga 632 SCAN/D 2, 5, 11, 12
- Saratoga-2 2, 5, 11, 12
- Scores 11, 17
- Search HD 2, 7, 8, 10, 11
- Search-B 2, 7, 10, 11
- Search/Den Zuk MDISK 2, 7, 10, 11
- Shoe virus 2, 7, 8, 10
- Shoe virus-B 2, 7, 10
- Stoned/Marijuana MDISK/P 2, 7, 9, 10, 11, 15
- SumDOS 1500 4, 5, 14
- Sunday 1636 SCAN/D 2, 4, 5, 6, 11, 12
- Swap/Israeli Boot MDISK 2, 7, 10
- Sylvia/Holland 1332 SCAN/D 2, 4, 12
- Terse Shoe virus 2, 7, 10
- Typo (Boot) MDISK 2, 7, 8, 10, 11
- Typo/Fumble (COM) 867 SCAN/D 2, 4, 11, 12
- Vacsina/TP04VIR 2, 4, 5
- Vienna-B 648 SCAN/D 2, 4, 5, 12
- Vienna/648 648 M-VIENNA 4, 12
- Yankee Doodle 2855 SCAN/D 2, 4, 5, 11, 12
- Yankee Doodle/TP25VIR 2, 4, 5
- Yankee Doodle/TP33VIR 2, 4, 5
- Yankee Doodle/TP34VIR 2, 4, 5
- Yankee Doodle/TP38VIR 2, 4, 5
- Yankee Doodle/TP42VIR 2, 4, 5
- Yankee Doodle/TP44VIR 2, 4, 5
- Yankee Doodle/TP46VIR 2, 4, 5
-
-
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-
-
-
-
- - 19 -
-
- 6.9 VIRUS DETECTOR AND ANTIDOTE SOFTWARE
-
- *** None offer complete protection ***
-
- Some do NOT test for boot sector viruses, modification of the command
- interpreter, branching into the BIOS, etc., unconventional things that
- nasty viruses are known to do. This is not a comprehensive list, but
- you'll have an idea of what's available, either commercially or through
- public domain. Look for a product that will detect as many of the
- effects identified in the previous section as possible. Warning: some
- highly publicized virus detectors only search for ONE (1) virus! Others
- are more sophisticated, and may even act as a disinfector as well as a
- detector.
-
-
- Old virus symptoms vs file changes
- Antidote
- Antigen
-
- Bombsqad
- Canary
- Cylene-4
- C-4
- Disk Defender * recommended (add-on board - write-protects hard disk)
- Disk watcher
- Dr. Panda Utilities
- IBM - COMPare in DOS
- Mace vaccine
- Magic Bullets
- Syringe
- Sentry * recommended for systems booted regularly
- Vaccine
- Viraid
- Virus-Pro * recommended for large corporate environments
- Shareware: Novirus
- Flushot4+
- Virusck
- Viruscan
-
- Plus what's shown on preceding pages as a "Disinfector that works". I
- also have a list of over 100 shareware products that do everything from
- detect and/or disinfect to write-protecting the hard drive and requiring
- password access .... but my fingers are getting tired from typing at this
- point, and there are more important things to cover - after all, if
- you're careful, you won't need a list of detectors/disinfectors.
-
-
-
-
-
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-
-
-
-
-
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-
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-
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-
-
- - 20 -
-
- 6.10 TROJAN HORSES
-
- While a "virus" is something hidden within another program that is
- waiting to make your system really sick, and a "worm" may be something
- that lives on its own and usually transmits through networked computers,
- a "Trojan Horse" is a little of both, so I've included it with this virus
- section if only to warn you of its existence. It lives on its own as a
- program, and will bring you down like Helen of Troy's soldiers. "I
- wouldn't copy something like that," you say. Well, like Helen's horse,
- it comes disguised. It will purport to do something really neat, like
- compress files (so you have more disk space available), sort your
- directories (so you can find things more easily), or play chess or
- another game with you. In actuality, it's really just waiting to do the
- things that viruses do - trash your files, scramble your boot sector, fry
- your FAT, or erase your hard disk. It doesn't usually do anything it
- promises to do.
-
- The following are just a few examples of the known Trojan Horses, most
- of which come from bulletin boards. Please don't misunderstand me, most
- BB operators are honest people who are trying to help the computer
- industry as a whole, but they can't be held responsible for the people
- who might dial into their BB and leave a disaster waiting until the next
- caller(s).
-
-
- SCRNSAVE.COM: This is supposed to blank your screen after x seconds of
- inactivity, thus preventing image burn-in or apparently
- offering a sense of security; say goodbye to your files
- while it erases your harddisk.
-
- TSRMAP: For the 'sophisticated' user who uses Terminate and Stay
- Resident programs, it's sometimes handy to have a map of
- where these programs are loaded in memory, and be able to
- delete some if you're short of memory; hopefully this
- same 'sophisticated' user has a copy of track 0, because
- his was just sent to heaven ..... or elsewhere.
-
- DOS-HELP: Sounds great, doesn't it? This TSR program is supposed to
- give on-line help on DOS commands. Your hard disk was
- just formatted.
-
- ULTIMATE.EXE: This is supposed to be a DOS shell (if you've used
- Directory Scanner or some other software that allows you
- to move around directories and load programs easily, or
- even a menu system, then you know what a DOS shell is).
- While the "Loading..." message shows on your screen, the
- FAT (file allocation table) of your hard disk went to the
- trash bin.
-
- BARDTALE.ZIP This purports to be a commercial game from Electronic Arts
- (BARDTALE I) Someone reverse engineered this program, and
- wrote in a routine to format your hard disk upon
- invocation.
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
- - 21 -
-
- COMPRESS.ARC This is dated April 1 1987, is executed from a file named
- RUN-ME.BAT, and is advertised as "shareware from Borland"
- (Borland is a highly reputable company). It will not
- compress your files, but it will very competently destroy
- your FAT table.
-
-
- DANCERS.BAS You'll actually see some animated dancers in colour -
- while your FAT is being tromped on.
-
- DEFENDER.ARC Think you're going to get a copy of Atari's DEFENDER for
- nothing, huh? There's still no such thing as a free
- lunch, and this one will be particularly expensive: it
- not only formats your hard disk, but it writes itself to
- your ROM BIOS - the chip that holds the Basic Input Output
- System for your machine. Get your wallet out.
-
- SIDEWAYS.COM The good "SIDEWAYS.EXE" is about 30Kb, while this version
- is about 3Kb. The really big difference, though, is what
- happens to your hard drive - it's spun off into oblivion.
-
-
- These are only a few of the 70 or so Trojans I have listed at work, but
- I'm sure you've got the idea. These programs (a) stand alone, (b) often
- claim to do something useful, (c) may be hacked versions of good
- software, (d) may be named the same as good software, (e) may send you
- back to using a quill pen.
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
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-
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-
-
-
-
- - 22 -
-
- 7. PC RULES OF THUMB (Additional to Basic Rules of Thumb)
-
- Run virus check BEFORE backup
-
- Boot floppy systems from known, protected disks only
-
- Never work with masters - first make copies on a trusted machine
-
- Store data on floppy:
- set path in autoexec.bat, but load from A: to
- ensure data goes to floppy
-
- Save your data periodically while working
-
- Use write protect tabs
-
- Use write protect software on hard disk / backup track 0
-
- Never boot HD systems from floppies (unless known and
- protected)
-
- New/repaired hard disk? - run a virus detector
-
- Use protection package (practice safe hex)
-
- Avoid shareware / BB demos
- if you use a BB, set path to A: beforehand,
- download only to A:, poweroff immediately after,
- then powerup and do a virus scan on the floppy;
- always scan shareware
-
- Know the source of your software
-
- Don't use illegal copies
-
- If your data is truly confidential, don't depend on
- DELETE - you must use, e.g., Wipefile
-
- Autopark software
-
- Hardcards
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
- - 23 -
-
- 6. A FEW EASY TRICKS FOR PC SECURITY
-
-
- 1. Set Read only attributes on all files ending with .COM, .EXE, .SYS,
- . OVL, .BIN, .BAT
-
- e.g.: ATTRIB +R *.SYS
-
-
-
- 2. Use an undocumented trick in DOS of naming your data files ending
- with an ASCII blank or NUL character (ASCII 32 or 255): ***
-
- e.g.: COPY A:OLDFILE.TXT NEWFILECHR$(255).TXT
- or REN A:MYFILE.DAT MYFILECHR$(32).DAT
-
- *** Newer versions of DOS will give the ASCII blank or null by
- holding the [Alt] key and striking the numeric keypad numbers;
- e.g. COPY A:OLDFILE.TXT NEWFILE[Alt]255
-
-
-
- 3. Prevent inadvertent formatting of the hard disk:
-
- Rename FORMAT.EXE to (e.g.) DANGER.EXE
- Write a 1-line batch file called FORMAT.BAT:
- DANGER A: %1 %2 %3 %4 %5 %6
-
-
- 4. Have a batch program as a shutdown routine, to run:
-
- 1. Virus Check
- 2. Copy Track 0
- 3. Back up your data files
- 4. Park the heads
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
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-
-
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-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
- - 24 -
-
- 9. SO YOU'RE INFECTED
-
-
- Terminate all connections with other computers
-
- Record your last activities
-
- Determine the nature and extent of the damage
-
- Notify other users
-
- Contact the source of the carrier software
-
- _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
-
-
- Back up data files to new diskettes
-
- Erase infected disk (using high or low level format -
- low level is preferred to re-write track 0)
-
- Check master disks with detection program(s)
-
- Restore system files
-
- Restore data files
-
- Run detection program(s) again
-
- Be careful in future - think like a thief!
- ------------------
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
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-
-
-
- - 25 -
-
- 10. SUMMARY: WHAT CAN YOU DO?
-
- There are many aspects to computer security, none of which are totally
- within your control, but all of which are reasonably within your control.
- One of the major methods of getting control is to establish an
- enforceable security policy AND a disaster recovery plan. However, it's
- almost impossible to establish a plan unless you first know what the
- risks are.
-
- WHEN YOU GO BACK TO YOUR OFFICE
-
- Try putting some staff into two teams: "hackers" and "police" (or call
- them Blue Jays and Cardinals if you find that offensive). The role of
- the hackers is to try to dream up all the things they could get from or
- do to the company (or to a department) by breaking computer security.
- The role of the police is to respond with defenses. Then switch roles.
- List all the ideas, no matter how "far out" they seem, then use this for
- the basis of risk analysis and disaster recovery planning. The only rule
- to this game is that no idea is initially rejected.
-
- Now that you have some idea of the value of your data and the risks it is
- under, you can begin to work on a "Computer Security Policy" and a
- "Disaster Recovery Plan." While many suggestions have been made on the
- previous pages, recognize that not all risks/solutions apply to all
- organizations: you have to make some judgement calls based on your
- assessment of the risk. The judgement is based on how much loss you can
- comfortably sustain, yet remain in business. The level of security
- protection you require may not always be the same. It may vary with the
- value of the hardware, software or data under consideration; the
- security level, therefore, might be stated as "minimal," "discretionary,"
- "mandatory," or "verified." The point is, as long as it's been
- considered, you're closer to having a good security system than if you
- have no policy or a policy that's based on guesswork.
-
- You may find, after working on this for a while, that you may wish to
- develop a separate policy for the selection or development, change,
- testing and implementation of software. This might be stated as simply
- as, "No system shall be acquired, developed, changed or implemented
- without the prior approval of the Systems Steering Group." This might
- also go on to cover documentation; e.g., "Documentation must be complete
- for all systems prior to implementation, and must include sections on
- files used, access controls, security considerations and controls
- (etc.)."
-
- Some further points for consideration are included in the next section.
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
- - 26 -
-
- 11. COMPUTER SECURITY POLICY: POINTS FOR CONSIDERATION
-
- Any policy on computer security must be based on the premise that
- information is a valuable asset of the company, just like its premises,
- equipment, raw materials, inventory and so on. More than one company has
- gone under because they lost their accounts receivable data in a fire,
- flood, or from a simple hard disk failure. The value of your data should
- be subjected to a risk analysis, and all identifiable risks assessed. It
- is not until you identify the risks that you can plan for a disaster
- recovery.
-
- Your policy might include some of the many things addressed previously in
- this paper: e.g., storing data only on removable media (diskettes or
- tapes), limiting access to bulletin boards, establishing password
- controls, rules on physical security, use of immunization software, etc.
- There are, however, some other specific points not previously discussed:
-
- RESPONSIBILITY
- Recognize that security is a management issue, not a technological
- issue, and that setting policy is the responsibility of senior
- management. They must be 'on board' and understand why a security policy
- is needed to make it sensible and effective, and they must give overt
- support.
-
- Someone should be in charge of computer and network security. Without
- someone in charge, important security tasks may not get done. The duties
- of the security manager would include responsibility for limiting access
- to the network, securing the information that passes over it, overseeing
- password systems, and installing security packages that protect computers
- from illegal tampering once a user is on the network. Other duties might
- include analyzing the network for security weaknesses and helping users
- understand the security strengths and weaknesses of the network.
-
- The amount of time required of the system security specialist may depend
- on the size of the organization, and on the number and complexity of the
- systems in use or planned.
-
- Having one person in charge is probably the ideal security arrangement.
- The security specialist can become aware of all of the issues affecting
- computer/network security, can schedule and establish priority for
- actions, and can ensure that the actions are taken.
-
- This position in the organization requires some authority and autonomy.
- For instance, security is compromised if the boss shares his/her
- password. The security specialist needs to be able to change the boss's
- password if this happens, and gently but firmly discuss the problems
- which could result.
-
-
- In many organizations, putting two or more people in charge of something
- diffuses responsibility. Each can think that some security concern was
- the responsibility of the other. If two individuals are charged with
- network security, be certain that they work well together, communicate
-
-
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- - 27 -
-
- well, and will each put in their fair share of the analysis and work that
- is required for security.
-
- In some organizations, a "communications manager" is responsible for
- limiting access to the network (with dialback modems and encryption
- devices), while the network manager maintains password systems and
- installs security software.
-
- If someone is in charge of network security and you don't know about it,
- then they haven't been very obvious about it. They need not be. But if
- it is evident to you that security is lacking, then perhaps the issue of
- responsibility should be examined (or re-examined).
-
-
- BACKUPS
- Those who are most zealous about backups are those who've been affected
- in the past by a loss of data. If backups are performed every day, your
- computer or network is probably in good shape when the hard disk or file
- server goes to heaven. You will want to verify that this is the case,
- since most organizations (and individuals) put this off... and off...
- until it's too late.
-
- Backing a system up once a week is not enough, unless the system is
- rarely used. If your last backup was a week ago, and your hard disk or
- the hard disk in the file server crashes, all users of the network have
- lost one week's work.
-
- This cost is enormous. If you have 10 users who have lost 30 hours of
- work each, if each user is paid $20/hour, and overhead is 100%, then you
- have just lost 10 x 30 x 20 x 2 = $12,000. If you assume that backup
- takes one $20 hour with a tape drive, you could back the system up 600
- times for $12,000. That's nearly three years, if backups are done five
- times a week. Many hard disks will not run continuously for three years.
- Even if you're a 'stand alone' computer user, your time is valuable. You
- might consider a policy that, if recovery covers a period of more than
- 'x' days, it must be done on the employee's own time, and all deadlines
- must be met - tough, but it get's the point across!
-
- Irregular backups are a sign that backup is not taken as seriously as it
- should be. It is probably wisest to do the arithmetic, comparing the
- costs of backup with the costs of losing work for multiple users. The
- cost comparison in the commentary on the second answer doesn't even
- consider the possibility of losing irreplaceable files, such as those
- containing new accounts receivable entries or new prospects.
-
- Since file backup is a "private" activity, not knowing how often it
- occurs does not mean that it does not occur. But if you have a security
- concern, you should find out what the correct answer is. After all, if
- you use the network, and it is not backed up frequently, it is your work
- that is lost when the hard disk in the server crashes.
-
-
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-
- - 28 -
-
- BEWARE: backing up is NOT enough! You MUST periodically run your
- recovery procedure .... how else will you know it will work when you need
- it most?
-
-
- PURCHASING
- The policy should state the controls in place for purchase of both
- hardware and software, and it should be consistent and centralized.
- Unless you've seen what some software can do to destroy security, or how
- difficult it is to interconnect different equipment, this might seem to
- destroy some autonomous activities in your organization. Autonomy be
- darned, it's the company that's paying the bill.
-
-
- MAINTENANCE AGREEMENTS
- All warranty registrations must be mailed to the manufacturer, and
- records kept of purchase dates, expiry dates and repairs made under the
- warranty. Keeping accurate records has substantiated the complete
- replacement of more than one machine.
-
-
- SOFTWARE LOADING
- The checking, copying and loading of software should be the
- responsibility of one person or department. The 'penalty' for loading
- illegal/unauthorized software can range from a note in the personnel file
- to dismissal, depending on the organization. The opposite, copying the
- organization's software for loading in another location, should also be
- covered in the policy, because the company (as the registered owner)
- could be party to a lawsuit without the ability to plead ignorance.
-
-
-
-
-
- EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION
- In several organizations, when a person submits their resignation, their
- access to the computer system is immediately withdrawn. This, of course,
- requires a close liaison with the personnel department in large
- organizations. Many of these companies feel it's worth the salary cost
- to have the person leave the premises immediately (escorted), and simply
- pay out their notice period. If your company adopts such a policy, it
- should be made very clear that it is not an indication of trust in the
- person, but simply a means to reduce risk to the valuable resources of
- hardware, software and data. It must be administered consistently and
- equitably to avoid problems. There are problems with such a policy,
- not the least of which could be someone who gives a very lengthy notice
- period simply because they're aware of the policy - but you could
- transfer them to a clerical job for the interim (like the mail room) or
- to maintenance staff (washroom detail).
-
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
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- - 29 -
-
- 12. TO RUN SCAN (Virus detection software included on this diskette)
-
- SCAN looks for 42 viruses in software files, but not in data files. I
- know it works on Jerusalem-B because I used SCAN to detect that virus on
- a machine at work. This is NOT the latest version of SCAN, but then
- again, you're not likely to have the latest viruses (I hope).
-
- If you want to print the documentation, type: COPY A:SCAN.DOC PRN
- If you want to run SCAN, just type: A:SCAN [drive identifier]
- e.g., A:SCAN C:
-
-
- An article from the Washington Post, January 14, 1990, on Computer
- Viruses was added to the diskette after this paper was written.
-
- To read this article, key TYPE A:ARTICLE|MORE
- To print the article, key COPY A:ARTICLE PRN
-
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- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
-
-
- If you have found this presentation useful, either by attending or by
- reading or using the information on this diskette, then I am rewarded.
- If you found it useful, please feel free to copy this diskette or its
- contents and share it with others - I would ask that you don't change
- anything, though. (It was virus free at the time I made the original
- diskette - but if you trust that statement, you might just have made your
- first mistake.)
-
- If you'd like to make suggestions that would improve the information on
- this diskette, I would be very happy to hear from you. I'd also like to
- hear from you if you wish to discuss security issues, get a virus
- infection or hit by a Trojan Horse, or even just to comment on the
- contents of this paper. My address and phone number are on the first
- page of this document.
-
- If you would like to join the National Computer Security Association, a
- 'form' for application is on the next page. They provide benefits such
- as a Virus Self-Defense Kit that's more sophisticated than the software
- on this diskette, newsletters, a virus-free bulletin board with hundreds
- of security-related programs, discounts on software, books and
- conferences, and advice if you run into trouble.
-
- Happy (and safe) computing!
-
-
- E. A. (Liz) Bedwell
-
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-
-
- National Computer Association
- Suite 309
- 4401-A Connecticut Ave. NW
- Washington, DC
- USA 20008 Phone: (202) 364-8252
-
-
-
-
- [ ] I wish to join NCSA. Cheque enclosed for $45.00 (US funds)
-
- [ ] I wish to join NCSA. Please bill me for $45.00 (US funds)
-
-
- Name: _____________________________________________________
-
- Organization: _____________________________________________________
-
- Address: _____________________________________________________
-
- _____________________________________________________
-
- City, Prov.: ____________________________ Postal Code ____________
-
- Phone (with area code): ___________________________________________
-
-
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-
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