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-
- On Solarisx86 2.5 I was able to connect to a unix domain socket,
- *regardless* of permissions. After posting about it on a solaris usenet
- group the only recommendation anyone gave me was to create it in an
- unreadable directory. So the attacker would have to guess its name.
- Still *anyone* could of connected to that domain socket, and fed my
- application bogus data.
-
- I had a look at any applications that use it. I found screen does, but
- luckily in its autoconfig it decides to use pipes.
-
- This behaviour is not present on other OSs I tested it on. (mostly BSD
- variants).
-
- ======================================================================
-
- same with sparc. Solaris uses a loopback device (/dev/ticotsord) and
- streams for emulating unix domain sockets.
-
- ======================================================================
-
- On my 2.5.1 test system a bind() to a UNIX domain named socket
- creates the file system object mode 0, and a connect() to a UNIX
- domain file system object with mode 0 is ECONNREFUSED. It appears
- the listener process must do a non-zero chmod() of the file system
- object after the bind has created it to allow another process to
- connect to it.
-
- Solaris 2.5 and 2.6 seem to create the UNIX file system object for
- a UNIX domain socket with non-zero mode bits.
-
-