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- From: cklaus@iss.net (Christopher Klaus)
- Newsgroups: comp.security,alt.security,comp.security.misc,comp.security.unix,comp.unix.admin,comp.answers,alt.answers,news.answers,comp.sys.sun.admin,comp.sys.sgi.admin,misc.security,comp.os.ms-windows.nt.admin.misc,comp.os.ms-windows.nt.admin.networking
- Subject: computer-security/sniffers FAQ
- Supersedes: <secfaq.p3_842885343@iss.net>
- Followup-To: poster
- Date: 23 Oct 1996 15:53:19 GMT
- Organization: ISS, Inc.
- Lines: 496
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-
- Archive-name: computer-security/sniffers
- Posting-frequency: monthly
- Last-modified: 1996/7/15
- Version: 3.00
-
- Sniffer FAQ
-
- Version: 3.00
- ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
- This Security FAQ is a resource provided by:
-
- Internet Security Systems, Inc.
- Suite 660, 41 Perimeter Center East Tel: (770) 395-0150
- Atlanta, Georgia 30346 Fax: (770) 395-1972
-
- ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
- To get the newest updates of Security files check the following services:
-
- http://www.iss.net/
- ftp ftp.iss.net /pub/
-
- To subscibe to the update mailing list, Alert, send an e-mail to
- request-alert@iss.net and, in the text of your message (not the subject
- line), write:
-
- subscribe alert
-
- ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
- This Sniffer FAQ will hopefully give administrators a clear understanding of
- sniffing problems and hopefully possible solutions to follow up with.
- Sniffers is one of the main causes of mass break-ins on the Internet today.
-
- This FAQ will be broken down into:
-
- * What a sniffer is and how it works
- * Where are sniffers available
- * How to detect if a machine is being sniffed
- * Stopping sniffing attacks:
- o Active hubs
- o Encryption
- o Kerberos
- o One-time password technology
- o Non-promiscuous interfaces
-
- ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
- What a sniffer is and how it works
-
- Unlike telephone circuits, computer networks are shared communication
- channels. It is simply too expensive to dedicate local loops to the switch
- (hub) for each pair of communicating computers. Sharing means that computers
- can receive information that was intended for other machines. To capture the
- information going over the network is called sniffing.
-
- Most popular way of connecting computers is through ethernet. Ethernet
- protocol works by sending packet information to all the hosts on the same
- circuit. The packet header contains the proper address of the destination
- machine. Only the machine with the matching address is suppose to accept the
- packet. A machine that is accepting all packets, no matter what the packet
- header says, is said to be in promiscuous mode.
-
- Because, in a normal networking environment, account and password
- information is passed along ethernet in clear-text, it is not hard for an
- intruder once they obtain root to put a machine into promiscuous mode and by
- sniffing, compromise all the machines on the net.
-
- ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
- Where are sniffers available
-
- Sniffing is one of the most popular forms of attacks used by hackers. One
- special sniffer, called Esniff.c, is very small, designed to work on Sunos,
- and only captures the first 300 bytes of all telnet, ftp, and rlogin
- sessions. It was published in Phrack, one of the most widely read freely
- available underground hacking magazines. You can find Phrack on many FTP
- sites. Esniff.c is also available on many FTP sites such as
- coombs.anu.edu.au:/pub/net/log.
-
- You may want to run Esniff.c on an authorized network to quickly see how
- effective it is in compromising local machines.
-
- Other sniffers that are widely available which are intended to debug network
- problems are:
-
- * Etherfind on SunOs4.1.x
- * Snoop on Solaris 2.x and SunOs 4.1 (on ftp playground.sun.com)
- * Tcpdump 3.0 uses bpf for a multitude of platforms.
- * Packetman, Interman, Etherman, Loadman works on the following
- platforms:
- SunOS, Dec-Mips, SGI, Alpha, and Solaris. It is available on
- ftp.cs.curtin.edu.au:/pub/netman/[sun4c|dec-mips|sgi|alpha|solaris2]/
- [etherman-1.1a|interman-1.1|loadman-1.0|packetman-1.1].tar.Z
- Packetman was designed to capture packets, while Interman, Etherman,
- and Loadman monitor traffic of various kinds.
-
- DOS based sniffers
-
- * Gobbler for IBM DOS Machines
- * ethdump v1.03
- Available on ftp
- ftp.germany.eu.net:/pub/networking/inet/ethernet/ethdp103.zip
- * ethload v1.04
- Companion utility to a ethernet monitor. Available on ftp
- ftp.germany.eu.net:/pub/networking/monitoring/ethload/ethld104.zip
-
- Commercial Sniffers are available at:
-
- * Klos Technologies, Inc.
-
- PacketView - Low cost network protocol analyzer
-
- Phone: 603-424-8300
- BBS: 603-429-0032
-
- * Network General.
-
- Network General produces a number of products. The most
- important are the Expert Sniffer, which not only sniffs on
- the wire, but also runs the packet through a high-performance
- expert system, diagnosing problems for you. There is an
- extension onto this called the "Distributed Sniffer System"
- that allows you to put the console to the expert sniffer on
- you Unix workstation and to distribute the collection agents
- at remote sites.
-
- * Microsoft's Net Monitor
-
- " My commercial site runs many protocols on one wire -
- NetBeui, IPX/SPX, TCP/IP, 802.3 protocols of various flavors,
- most notably SNA. This posed a big problem when trying to
- find a sniffer to examine the network problems we were
- having, since I found that some sniffers that understood
- Ethernet II parse out some 802.3 traffic as bad packets, and
- vice versa. I found that the best protocol parser was in
- Microsoft's Net Monitor product, also known as Bloodhound in
- its earlier incarnations. It is able to correctly identify
- such oddities as NetWare control packets, NT NetBios name
- service broadcasts, etc, which etherfind on a Sun simply
- registered as type 0000 packet broadcasts. It requires MS
- Windows 3.1 and runs quite fast on a HP XP60 Pentium box. Top
- level monitoring provides network statistics and information
- on conversations by mac address (or hostname, if you bother
- with an ethers file). Looking at tcpdump style details is as
- simple as clicking on a conversation. The filter setup is
- also one of the easiest to implement that I've seen, just
- click in a dialog box on the hosts you want to monitor. The
- number of bad packets it reports on my network is a tiny
- fraction of that reported by other sniffers I've used. One of
- these other sniffers in particular was reporting a large
- number of bad packets with src mac addresses of
- aa:aa:aa:aa:aa:aa but I don't see them at all using the MS
- product. - Anonymous
-
- ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
- How to detect a sniffer running.
-
- To detect a sniffing device that only collects data and does not respond to
- any of the information, requires physically checking all your ethernet
- connections by walking around and checking the ethernet connections
- individually.
-
- It is also impossible to remotely check by sending a packet or ping if a
- machine is sniffing.
-
- A sniffer running on a machine puts the interface into promiscuous mode,
- which accepts all the packets. On some Unix boxes, it is possible to detect
- a promiscuous interface. It is possible to run a sniffer in non-promiscuous
- mode, but it will only capture sessions from the machine it is running on.
- It is also possible for the intruder to do similiar capture of sessions by
- trojaning many programs such as sh, telnet, rlogin, in.telnetd, and so on to
- write a log file of what the user did. They can easily watch the tty and
- kmem devices as well. These attacks will only compromise sessions coming
- from that one machine, while promiscuous sniffing compromises all sessions
- on the ethernet.
-
- For SunOs, NetBSD, and other possible BSD derived Unix systems, there is a
- command
-
- "ifconfig -a"
-
- that will tell you information about all the interfaces and if they are in
- promiscuous mode. DEC OSF/1 and IRIX and possible other OSes require the
- device to be specified. One way to find out what interface is on the system,
- you can execute:
-
- # netstat -r
- Routing tables
-
- Internet:
- Destination Gateway Flags Refs Use Interface
- default iss.net UG 1 24949 le0
- localhost localhost UH 2 83 lo0
-
- Then you can test for each interface by doing the following command:
-
- #ifconfig le0
- le0: flags=8863<UP,BROADCAST,NOTRAILERS,RUNNING,PROMISC,MULTICAST>
- inet 127.0.0.1 netmask 0xffffff00 broadcast 255.0.0.1
-
- Intruders often replace commands such as ifconfig to avoid detection. Make
- sure you verify its checksum.
-
- There is a program called cpm available on ftp.cert.org:/pub/tools/cpm that
- only works on Sunos and is suppose to check the interface for promiscuous
- flag.
-
- Ultrix can possibly detect someone running a sniffer by using the commands
- pfstat and pfconfig.
-
- pfconfig allows you to set who can run a sniffer
- pfstat shows you if the interface is in promiscuous mode.
-
- These commands only work if sniffing is enabled by linking it into the
- kernel. by default, the sniffer is not linked into the kernel. Most other
- Unix systems, such as Irix, Solaris, SCO, etc, do not have any flags
- indication whether they are in promiscuous mode or not, therefore an
- intruder could be sniffing your whole network and there is no way to detect
- it.
-
- Often a sniffer log becomes so large that the file space is all used up. On
- a high volume network, a sniffer will create a large load on the machine.
- These sometimes trigger enough alarms that the administrator will discover a
- sniffer. I highly suggest using lsof (LiSt Open Files) available from
- coast.cs.purdue.edu:/pub/Purdue/lsof for finding log files and finding
- programs that are accessing the packet device such as /dev/nit on SunOs.
-
- There is no commands I know of to detect a promiscuous IBM PC compatible
- machine, but they atleast usually do not allow command execution unless from
- the console, therefore remote intruders can not turn a PC machine into a
- sniffer without inside assistance.
-
- ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
- Stopping sniffing attacks
-
- Active hubs send to each system only packets intended for it rendering
- promiscuous sniffing useless. This is only effective for 10-Base T.
-
- The following vendors have available active hubs:
-
- * Cisco
- * 3Com
- * HP
-
- ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
- Encryption
-
- There are several packages out there that allow encryption between
- connections therefore an intruder could capture the data, but could not
- decypher it to make any use of it.
-
- Some packages available are:
-
- * ssh is available at http://www.cs.hut.fi/ssh/ssh-archive/ .
-
- * deslogin is one package available at ftp
- coast.cs.purdue.edu:/pub/tools/unix/deslogin .
-
- * swIPe is another package available at
- ftp.csua.berkeley.edu:/pub/cypherpunks/swIPe/
-
- * Netlock encrypts all (tcp, udp, and raw ip based) communications
- transparently. It has automatic (authenticated Diffie-Helman)
- distibuted key management mechanism for each host and runs on the SUN
- 4.1 and HP 9.x systems. The product comes with a Certification
- Authority Management application which generates host certificates
- (X.509) used for authentication between the hosts. and provides
- centralized control of each Hosts communications rules.
-
- The product is built by Hughes Aircraft and they can be reached at
- 800-825-LOCK or email at netlock@mls.hac.com.
-
- ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
- Kerberos
-
- Kerberos is another package that encrypts account information going over the
- network. Some of its draw backs are that all the account information is held
- on one host and if that machine is compromised, the whole network is
- vulnerable. It is has been reported a major difficulty to set up. Kerberos
- comes with a stream-encrypting rlogind, and stream-encrypting telnetd is
- available. This prevents intruders from capturing what you did after you
- logged in.
-
- There is a Kerberos FAQ at ftp at rtfm.mit.edu in
- /pub/usenet/comp.protocols/kerberos/Kerberos_Users__Frequently_Asked_Questions_1.11
- or try: ftp://aeneas.mit.edu/pub/kerberos/doc/KERBEROS.FAQ
-
- ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
- One time password technology
-
- S/key and other one time password technology makes sniffing account
- information almost useless. S/key concept is having your remote host already
- know a password that is not going to go over insecure channels and when you
- connect, you get a challenge. You take the challenge information and
- password and plug it into an algorithm which generates the response that
- should get the same answer if the password is the same on the both sides.
- Therefore the password never goes over the network, nor is the same
- challenge used twice. Unlike SecurID or SNK, with S/key you do not share a
- secret with the host. S/key is available on
- ftp:thumper.bellcore.com:/pub/nmh/skey
-
- OPIE is the successor of Skey and is available at
- ftp://ftp.nrl.navy.mil/pub/security/nrl-opie/
-
- Other one time password technology is card systems where each user gets a
- card that generates numbers that allow access to their account. Without the
- card, it is improbable to guess the numbers.
-
- The following are companies that offer solutions that are provide better
- password authenication (ie, handheld password devices):
-
- Secure Net Key (SNK)
-
- Digital Pathways, Inc.
- 201 Ravendale Dr. Mountainview, Ca.
- 97703-5216 USA
-
- Phone: 415-964-0707 Fax: (415) 961-7487
-
- SecurID
-
- Security Dynamics,
- One Alewife Center
- Cambridge, MA 02140-2312
- USA Phone: 617-547-7820
- Fax: (617) 354-8836
- SecurID uses time slots as authenication rather than challenge/response.
-
- ArKey and OneTime Pass
-
- Management Analytics
- PO Box 1480
- Hudson, OH 44236
- Email: fc@all.net
- Tel:US+216-686-0090 Fax: US+216-686-0092
-
- OneTime Pass (OTP):
- This program provides unrestricted one-time pass codes on a user by user
- basis without any need for cryptographic protocols or hardware devices. The
- user takes a list of usable pass codes and scratches out each one as it is
- used. The system tracks usage, removing each passcode from the available
- list when it is used. Comes with a very small and fast password tester and
- password and pass phrase generation systems.
-
- ArKey:
- This is the original Argued Key system that mutually authenticates users and
- systems to each other based on their common knowledge. No hardware
- necessary. Comes with a very small and fast password tester and password and
- pass phrase generation systems.
-
- WatchWord and WatchWord II
-
- Racal-Guardata
- 480 Spring Park Place
- Herndon, VA 22070
- 703-471-0892
- 1-800-521-6261 ext 217
-
- CRYPTOCard
-
- Arnold Consulting, Inc.
- 2530 Targhee Street, Madison, Wisconsin
- 53711-5491 U.S.A.
- Phone : 608-278-7700 Fax: 608-278-7701
- Email: Stephen.L.Arnold@Arnold.Com
- CRYPTOCard is a modern, SecureID-sized, SNK-compatible device.
-
- SafeWord
-
- Enigma Logic, Inc.
- 2151 Salvio #301
- Concord, CA 94520
- 510-827-5707 Fax: (510)827-2593
- For information about Enigma ftp to: ftp.netcom.com in directory
- /pub/sa/safeword
-
- Secure Computing Corporation:
-
- 2675 Long Lake Road
- Roseville, MN 55113
- Tel: (612) 628-2700
- Fax: (612) 628-2701
- debernar@sctc.com
-
- ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
- Non-promiscuous Interfaces
-
- You can try to make sure that most IBM DOS compatible machines have
- interfaces that will not allow sniffing. Here is a list of cards that do not
- support promiscuous mode:
-
- Test the interface for promiscuous mode by using the Gobbler. If you find a
- interface that does do promiscuous mode and it is listed here, please e-mail
- cklaus@iss.net so I can remove it ASAP.
-
- IBM Token-Ring Network PC Adapter
- IBM Token-Ring Network PC Adapter II (short card)
- IBM Token-Ring Network PC Adapter II (long card)
- IBM Token-Ring Network 16/4 Adapter
- IBM Token-Ring Network PC Adapter/A
- IBM Token-Ring Network 16/4 Adapter/A
- IBM Token-Ring Network 16/4 Busmaster Server Adapter/A
-
- The following cards are rumoured to be unable to go into promiscuous mode,
- but that the veracity of those rumours is doubtful.
-
- Microdyne (Excelan) EXOS 205
- Microdyne (Excelan) EXOS 205T
- Microdyne (Excelan) EXOS 205T/16
- Hewlett-Packard 27250A EtherTwist PC LAN Adapter Card/8
- Hewlett-Packard 27245A EtherTwist PC LAN Adapter Card/8
- Hewlett-Packard 27247A EtherTwist PC LAN Adapter Card/16
- Hewlett-Packard 27248A EtherTwist EISA PC LAN Adapter Card/32
- HP 27247B EtherTwist Adapter Card/16 TP Plus
- HP 27252A EtherTwist Adapter Card/16 TP Plus
- HP J2405A EtherTwist PC LAN Adapter NC/16 TP
-
- Adapters based upon the TROPIC chipset generally do not support promiscuous
- mode. The TROPIC chipset is used in IBM's Token Ring adapters such as the
- 16/4 adapter. Other vendors (notably 3Com) also supply TROPIC based
- adapters. TROPIC-based adapters do accept special EPROMs, however, that will
- allow them to go into promiscuous mode. However, when in promiscuous mode,
- these adapters will spit out a "Trace Tool Present" frame.
-
- ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
- Acknowledgements
-
- I would like to thank the following people for the contribution to this FAQ
- that has helped to update and shape it:
-
- * Padgett Peterson (padgett@tccslr.dnet.mmc.com)
- * Steven Bellovin (smb@research.att.com)
- * Wietse Venema (wietse@wzv.win.tue.nl)
- * Robert D. Graham (robg@NGC.COM)
- * Kevin Martinez (kevinm@beavis.qntm.com)
- * Frederick B. Cohen (fc@all.net)
- * James Bonfield (jkb@mrc-lmb.cam.ac.uk)
- * Marc Horowitz (marc@MIT.EDU)
- * Steve Edwards (steve@newline.com)
- * Andy Poling (Andy.Poling@jhu.edu)
- * Jeff Collyer (jeff@cnet-pnw.com)
- * Sara Gordon (sgordon@sun1.iusb.indiana.edu)
-
- ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
- Copyright
-
- This paper is Copyright (c) 1994, 1995, 1996
- by Christopher Klaus of Internet Security Systems, Inc.
-
- Permission is hereby granted to give away free copies electronically. You
- may distribute, transfer, or spread this paper electronically. You may not
- pretend that you wrote it. This copyright notice must be maintained in any
- copy made. If you wish to reprint the whole or any part of this paper in any
- other medium excluding electronic medium, please ask the author for
- permission.
-
- Disclaimer
-
- The information within this paper may change without notice. Use of this
- information constitutes acceptance for use in an AS IS condition. There are
- NO warranties with regard to this information. In no event shall the author
- be liable for any damages whatsoever arising out of or in connection with
- the use or spread of this information. Any use of this information is at the
- user's own risk.
-
- Address of Author
-
- Please send suggestions, updates, and comments to:
- Christopher Klaus <cklaus@iss.net> of Internet Security Systems, Inc.
- <iss@iss.net>
-
- Internet Security Systems, Inc.
-
- ISS is the leader in network security tools and technology through
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- --
- Christopher William Klaus Voice: (770)395-0150. Fax: (770)395-1972
- Internet Security Systems, Inc. "Internet Scanner finds
- Ste. 660,41 Perimeter Center East,Atlanta,GA 30346 your network security holes
- Web: http://www.iss.net/ Email: cklaus@iss.net before the hackers do."
-