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- Path: sparky!uunet!zaphod.mps.ohio-state.edu!pacific.mps.ohio-state.edu!linac!att!ucbvax!TREMOR.MIT.EDU!krowitz
- From: krowitz@TREMOR.MIT.EDU (David Krowitz)
- Newsgroups: comp.sys.apollo
- Subject: HP security problem
- Message-ID: <9301251438.AA02499@srvr2.engin.umich.edu>
- Date: 25 Jan 93 14:38:54 GMT
- Sender: usenet@ucbvax.BERKELEY.EDU
- Organization: The Internet
- Lines: 166
-
-
- Our MIT campus networking offie just passed along this security
- alert pertaining to HP-UX machines. Since so many HP/Apollo users
- have mixed networks now, I thought I'd pass this along
-
-
- From hoffmann@MIT.EDU Sat Jan 23 10:30:16 1993
- Received: from MIT.EDU (MIT.MIT.EDU) by quake.mit.edu id AA03003g; Sat, 23 Jan 93 10:30:15 EST
- Received: from PADDINGTON.MIT.EDU by MIT.EDU with SMTP
- id AA22668; Sat, 23 Jan 93 10:24:40 EST
- From: hoffmann@MIT.EDU
- Received: by Paddington (5.57/4.7) id AA11905; Sat, 23 Jan 93 10:24:39 -0500
- Date: Sat, 23 Jan 93 10:24:39 -0500
- Message-Id: <9301231524.AA11905@Paddington>
- To: netusers@MIT.EDU (MITnet Users)
- Subject: [Revised Hewlett-Packard NIS ypbind Vulnerability]
- Status: R
-
- RESTRICTIONS: NONE
-
- _____________________________________________________
- The Computer Incident Advisory Capability
- ___ __ __ _ ___
- / | / \ /
- \___ __|__ /___\ \___
- _____________________________________________________
- Information Bulletin
-
- Revised Hewlett-Packard NIS ypbind Vulnerability
-
- January 22, 1993, 1400 PST Number D-05
-
- _________________________________________________________________________
- PROBLEM: Allows unauthorized access to NIS data.
- PLATFORM: HP/UX Operating System for series 300, 700, and 800 computers.
- DAMAGE: Remote and local users can obtain unauthorized privileges.
- SOLUTION: Install revised patches.
- _________________________________________________________________________
- Critical Information about Hewlett-Packard NIS ypbind
-
- The inclosed advisory was issued by the Computer Emergency Response
- Team Coordination Center (CERT/CC) and is an update to a previous
- advisory CA-92:17.
-
- =============================================================================
- CA-93:01 CERT Advisory
- January 13, 1993
- Revised Hewlett-Packard NIS ypbind Vulnerability
-
- -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
- *** THIS IS A REVISED CERT ADVISORY ***
- *** IT CONTAINS NEW INFORMATION REGARDING AVAILABILITY OF IMAGE KITS ***
- *** SUPERSEDES CERT ADVISORY CA-92:17 ***
-
- The CERT Coordination Center has received information concerning a
- vulnerability in the NIS ypbind module for the Hewlett-Packard (HP)
- HP/UX Operating System for series 300, 700, and 800 computers.
-
- HP has provided revised patches for all of the HP/UX level 8 releases
- (8.0, 8.02, 8.06, and 8.07). This problem is fixed in HP/UX 9.0.
- The following patches have been superseded:
-
- Patch ID Replaced by Patch ID
- PHNE_1359 PHNE_1706
- PHNE_1360 PHNE_1707
- PHNE_1361 PHNE_1708
-
- All HP NIS clients and servers running ypbind should obtain and
- install the patch appropriate for their machine's architecture
- as described below.
-
- -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
- I. Description
-
- A vulnerability in HP NIS allows unauthorized access to NIS data.
-
- II. Impact
-
- Root on a remote host running any vendor's implementation of NIS
- can gain root access on any local host running HP's NIS ypbind.
- Local users of a host running HP's NIS ypbind can also gain root access.
-
- III. Solution
-
- 1) All HP NIS clients and servers running ypbind should obtain and
- install the patch appropriate for their machine's architecture.
-
- These patches contain a version of ypbind that accepts ypset
- requests only from a superuser port on the local host. This prevents
- a non-superuser program from sending rogue ypset requests to ypbind.
- The patches also include the mod from the superseded patches that
- prevents a superuser on a remote system from issuing a ypset -h
- command to the local system and binding the system to a rogue ypserver.
-
- These patches may be obtained from HP via FTP (this is NOT
- anonymous FTP) or the HP SupportLine. To obtain HP security
- patches, you must first register with the HP SupportLine.
- The registration instructions are available via anonymous FTP at
- cert.org (192.88.209.5) in the file
- "pub/vendors/hp/supportline_and_patch_retrieval".
- The new patch files are:
-
- Architecture Patch ID Filename Checksum
- ------------ -------- -------- --------
- Series 300 PHNE_1706 /hp-ux_patches/s300_400/8.X/PHNE_1706 38955 212
- Series 700 PHNE_1707 /hp-ux_patches/s700/8.X/PHNE_1707 815 311
- Series 800 PHNE_1708 /hp-ux_patches/s800/8.X/PHNE_1708 56971 299
-
- 2) The instructions for installing the patch are provided in the
- PHNE_xxxx.text file (this file is created after the patch has
- been unpacked).
-
- The checksums listed above are for the patch archive files from HP.
- Once unpacked, each shell archive contains additional checksum
- information in the file "patchfilename.text". This checksum is
- applicable to the binary patch file "patchfilename.updt".
-
-
- If you have any questions about obtaining or installing the patches,
- contact the USA HP SupportLine at 415-691-3888, or your local HP
- SupportLine number. Please note that the telephone numbers in this
- advisory are appropriate for the USA and Canada.
-
- -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
- The CERT Coordination Center wishes to thank Brian Kelley of Ford Motor
- Company for bringing this vulnerability to our attention. We would also
- like to thank Hewlett-Packard for their response to this problem.
- -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
- ===========================================================================
- CIAC would like to acknowledge the contributions of: CERT/CC.
-
- For additional information or assistance, please contact CIAC at
- (510)422-8193/FTS or send E-mail to ciac@llnl.gov. FAX messages to
- (510)423-8002/FTS.
-
- PLEASE NOTE: Many users outside of the DOE and ESnet computing
- communities receive CIAC bulletins. If you are not part of these
- communities, please contact your agency's response team to report
- incidents. Some of the other teams include the NASA NSI response team,
- DARPA's CERT/CC, NAVCIRT, and the Air Force response team. Your
- agency's team will coordinate with CIAC. The Forum of Incident Response
- and Security Teams (FIRST) is a world-wide organization. A list of
- FIRST member organizations and their constituencies can be obtained by
- sending email to Docserver@First.Org with a null subject line, and the
- first line of the message reading: send first-contacts.
-
- This document was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an agency
- of the United States Government. Neither the United States Government
- nor the University of California nor any of their employees, makes any
- warranty, express or implied, or assumes any legal liability or
- responsibility for the accuracy, completeness, or usefulness of any
- information, apparatus, product, or process disclosed, or represents
- that its use would not infringe privately owned rights. Reference
- herein to any specific commercial products, process, or service by
- trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not necessarily
- constitute or imply its endorsement, recommendation or favoring by the
- United States Government or the University of California. The views
- and opinions of authors expressed herein do not necessarily state or
- reflect those of the United States Government or the University of
- California, and shall not be used for advertising or product
- endorsement purposes.
-
-
-
-