NetNews Usenet Archive 1993 #3/NN_1993_3.iso/spool/alt/atheism/26856

Text File | 1993-01-23 | 9.3 KB | 176 lines

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Path: sparky!uunet!cs.utexas.edu!qt.cs.utexas.edu!yale.edu!ira.uka.de!Sirius.dfn.de!tubsibr!dbstu1.rz.tu-bs.de!I3150101
From: [e-mail] (Benedikt Rosenau)
Subject: Re: Arguments for the existence of God
Message-ID: <[e-mail]>
Sender: [e-mail] (Mr. Nntp Inews Entry)
Organization: Technical University Braunschweig, Germany
References:  <[e-mail]>
Date: Fri, 22 Jan 1993 20:01:08 GMT
Lines: 164

In article <[e-mail]>
[e-mail] (Albert Haig) writes:

>        I hold to the theory, which actually is reasonably widely held
>in philosophy, that anything which is *coherently imaginable* is possible.
>That is, any proposition which is not self-contradictory describes a
>possible fact. Confusion often arises here because we colloqually often
>use the word impossible in a loose sense, to mean `is very, very unlikely'
>rather than to mean strictly impossible (could never be under any concievable
>circumstances). The only things which are strictly impossible are contradictions,
>for example a square circle. In fact, one of the best arguments for the
>possibility of non law-governed universes (and even that our universe
>could be one, it just hasn't started misbehaving yet), is found in the
>works of David Hume, who can hardly be accused of being sympathetic to
>thiesm. Hume argues that any future state of affairs is *logically*
>compatible with any past state of affairs. The proposition that gravity
>could hold one minute but not the next contains no contradiction. And
>unless it contains a contradiction, there seems to be no good reason why
>it should not be possible. Certainly, I have yet to see a deductive argument
>from certain premises to prove that the universe must display law-like
>behaviour (and believe me, such an argument would *revolutionize* philosophy).
>I re-emphasize that it is not good enough to appeal to the fact that
>the universe *as a matter of fact* does display law-like behaviour to exclude
>the possibility of it not doing so, because this confuses the actual with the
>possible.

Have you ever considered that the universe is a purely random process, and
that what you think NOW, and everything that is connected with it, is just
an effect of the constellation of the universe now? Everything you imagine
to imply time is just part of that random constellation.

It is coherent, so it is possible. Assuming that the random process is infinite
and the state of 'your pseudo-imagination' is possible, the measure of its
probability would be 1. As would random processes that come up with states
of your consciousness and link them in temporal order.

I say this system is smaller than yours. Sets of axioms that define
infinite sets are not necessarily bigger than sets of axioms that
refer to finite realms.


>        In summary, I think no good argument has been presented as to why
>any of the universes I mentioned, and a huge number besides, are impossible.
>Any *coherently imaginable* universe is possible.
>
>MULTIPLE UNIVERSES: There were a number of varients on this same theme.
>One varient was that the dice had been rolled many times before, so
>to speak, that multiple other universes randomly selected from the set
>of possible universes do exist or have existed. The more radical variant,
>known in philosophy as *modal realism*, is that all possible universes
>actually exist.
>        If these views are correct, they do indeed provide a satisfactory
>explanation for the fact that we have such a remarkable universe. The problem
>with all of these theories is that there *is no evidence whatsoever* for any
>universe other than our own. These other universes are being introduced not
>to explain any evidence, but to save the theory in question i.e. athiesm.
>This constitutes the ultimate violation of Occam's Razor: do not postulate
>entities unnecessarily. Faced with having to postulate a huge or infinite
>number of other universes or having to postulate God, a very good
>case can be made that God is by far the better solution all round, including
>that it is far simpler and postulates just one entity for which I would
>claim there is some other evidence (this is not critical to the argument)
>rather than a huge/infinite number of entities for which there is not a
>skeric of independent evidence.

It occurs to me that the descriptions of god are usually connected with notions
of infinity, so I see not what has been gained. The god, as described by you
later, that can do everything that is logically possible is definitely not
finite.

And what you say implies would imply at least one god, not only one god.
Once the concept of gods has been introduced, Occam's Razor does not rule
out NOW (probably as opposed to when it was formulated) more instances of
a class. I can get much more sense out of a universe that has grown out of
two universes that were created by two gods. I think to say that it is
exactly one god is just an axiom more that makes the system even bigger.

And you haven't addressed major points. Like why can a 'god' be without a
cause? Is it rather a definition? Everything that is without cause is a god?
Why, for instance, can't the universe be without cause? Or why is it 'smaller'
to assume that gods can exist without a cause?

All you do is to define something that is without a cause, but you fail to give
proof that it is not the universe, and in case it is the universe, the whole
notion of god having caused the universe is a waste of time.


>        In conclusion, I think the fact that most athiest's had to resort to
>this argument as evidence of the unsatisfactory nature of athiesm.
>

I have yet to see a satisfactory definition of what you mean with god at all.


>THE `FIRST CAUSE' ARGUMENT: First, one valid point was made by some: in
>saying there were two possibilities, that the universe existed uncaused
>or that God existed uncaused and created the universe, I did exclude an
>in fact infinite array of other possibilites (e.g. that some finite god
>Zeus created the universe, etc etc etc). This was simply because I regard
>the other alternatives as being very improbable - the two hypotheses
>mentioned are, I think, the most likely, and, as they say in horse racing
>in Australia, daylight is third. I'm not going to defend this here, although
>it is quite defensible. Secondly, people consistently mistook what was
>meant to be an inductive argument for a deductive one. Please note: I am
>NOT saying it is impossible that the universe just existed uncaused,
>merely that it is unlikely. This was a mistake people made in both arguments:
>I am not saying that I have `irrefutable evidence' (as one person said) of
>God's existence; only that it is more probable that He exists then that He
>does not.

I do not have any trouble at all imagining an eternal course of events linked
by a causality. It is like there is no biggest number.

(Deletions)

>
>THE COHERENCE OF THIESM: Some people maintained that thiesm was incoherent,
>i.e. that it contained contradictions. This is not so, nor is it widely
>held in philosophy - even Mackie I believe conceded the coherence of thiesm.
>As no-one mentioned specific problems with  omnipotence, I can only guess
>as to what was meant. Perhaps the old monk's paradox `can God create
>a rock heavier then He can lift'. The answer to this is simple. No. When
>we (at least I) say that God is omnipotent I merely mean that He can do
>whatever it is logically possible to do. He cannot create the logically
>impossible (see above), for example a square circle, which could never be
>in any possible world. Similar restrictions hold on omniscience etc.

The interesting thing is, what kinf information does this god view hold?
And to know what is possible for a god implies

>        Re perfect goodness, it can be proven that God must be perfectly
>good if He is perfectly free and one accepts one (controversial) extra
>premise: that moral statements (e.g. `you ought not murder') have truth
>values, i.e. can be said to be true or false. I am not going to bite into
>this (largely irrelevant) debate here.
>

Lack of integrity. If it is irrelevant, do not mention it.

You introduce some more buzz words here, namely: free, good,
and truth values for actions (such as 'murder').

'Good' in that context does not resemble morally good as it is commonly
understood.

But since you appear to think otherwise, can you name a reference system
for truth values of moral statements, and name experiments that show that
these systems have meaning, ie predict something that happens? Can you name
experiments that show that god is good, so to speak? If not what use is it?


>CONCLUSION: In conclusion, I would like to say that, contrary to people's
>expectations, I am not a Christian nor an adherent to any other religion.
>I therefore am not responsible for any incoherencies/silliness on said
>religions part. I do happen to believe in God, though not one who
>intervenes in the course of nature. I believe there are good rational grounds
>for doing so. Thanks to everyone who sent responses - I think these matters
>are fun to argue about, as long as you don't take them too seriously.
>

I say you redefine the meaning of god in order to keep pet beliefs. The god
that is good for instance, or all powerful. It is the very base of religion,
and that's IMO only through my teeth.
   Benedikt