NetNews Usenet Archive 1993 #3/NN_1993_3.iso/spool/alt/atheism/26712

Text File | 1993-01-21 | 21.4 KB | 547 lines

Newsgroups: alt.atheism
Path: sparky!uunet!usc!rpi!lib103.its.rpi.edu!johnsd2
From: [e-mail]1 (Daniel Norman Johnson)
Subject: Re: Arguments for the existence of God
Message-ID: <[e-mail]>
Nntp-Posting-Host: lib103.its.rpi.edu
Reply-To: [e-mail]1
Organization: Sun Microsystems, Inc.
References: <[e-mail]>
Date: Thu, 21 Jan 1993 15:49:52 GMT
Lines: 534

In article [e-mail], [e-mail] (Albert Haig) writes:
>    Hi everyone. It seems I am being accused of a) ignoring arguments
>    and b) claiming people made arguments they did not. So, I have
>    saved all previous posts in one humungous file and will try
>    and do better this time around. I still cannot guarantee that I
>    will address every argument, but I'll try and address what I
>    think are the better ones.
>
>> Hey! You left some of mine out!
>
>    Sorry!

Ok. But don't go saying atheists need to get a clue, justifying it
on the grounds that we have no good arguments, if you leave
out arguments. That kinda cheezed me off, I and went into you a bit
hard.

>> >POSSIBLE WORLDS: It was maintained by some people that the universe that
>> >exists is either the only possible world or one of a limited number
>> >of possible worlds, and that many of the worlds I described were just
>> >impossible. I think this is simply wrong. It is to mistake what is *as
>> >a matter of fact* a law of physics for being a logical necessity. To
>> >begin with the easy part, some people said that the laws of physics
>> >were such as to prevent the type of worlds I mentioned. This simply
>> >misses the point. These laws of physics themselves are not necessary,
>> >it is possible that other laws could have held or that no consistent
>> >laws should have been manifest.
>>
>> No, no, nobody said that- I was watching.
>
>Two examples (quotes from previous posts):
>
>`Whoa right there, sonny!  How can you possibly justify that ANY of these
>universes is possible?  I know you haven't SEEN any of these universes!
>It has been suggested (by Einstein, among others) that we live in the only
>                                                                      ^^^^
>possible kind of universe. ' etc ...
>^^^^^^^^

You accuse this guy of mistaking a "matter of facts" for a
"logical necessity" on the basis of this? Just aint so. He
is saying that one of your premises- that any kind of universe
you can imaging is possible- is not necessarily valid. I made
the same argument. You can't count on that as part of your proof
unless you show it is true, or at least reasonably probably (inductively
prove it somehow), imho.

But I can see where you get what you said; It just doesn't sound like
it says that to me. Perhaps it is I who misinterprets the quote.

>  `I suspect that for reasons we don't yet
>understand, the various physical constants that make the universe the
>way it is can only have their current values.'
>              ^^^^^^^^^

This actually refers to an argument you did not quite make- that the
universe is (partly) determined by a whole bunch of physical constants-
G, the electric permittivity of free space, etc. These determine
its behavious, and if they were much different we would not exist.

However, they are quite possibly all related- and maybe they are just
all artifacts of they way we measure things. The speed of light
is an example- its derived from the electric permittivity of free space
and the magnetic permiability of free space (or something like that)

>> >    I hold to the theory, which actually is reasonably widely held
>> >in philosophy, that anything which is *coherently imaginable* is possible.
>>
>> Human imagination is quite incoherent at times.
>
>That is why I qualified it with the prefix *coherently* imaginable!

Hmm. Apparently I was unclear.

I mean this:

The human imagination often comes up with things that seem coherent to
it- it imagines them coherently, but it does NOT imagine all their
reprocussions, some of which may not be coherent. Therefore the
idea so (coherently as far as it goes) imagined is not neccessarily
coherent in reality- or possible.

>>
>> The question is what universes are *coherent*, not whether the
>> coherent ones are possible.
>>
>
>No! The issue *is* that any coherent universe (I use this term loosly
>to include what you call worlds e.g. non-law governed universes) *is
>possible*.

I stand by what I said. I ->agree<- that any coherent universe is possible,
but I dont think that just because you can imagine it  coherently
means that it IS coherent.

>
>> > The problem
>> >with all of these theories is that there *is no evidence whatsoever* for any
>> >universe other than our own. These other universes are being introduced not
>> >to explain any evidence, but to save the theory in question i.e. athiesm.
>>
>> Atheism is not a theory in the sence you seem to mean. It has no predictions,
>> for one thing.
>
>Athiesm most definitely *is* a theory in the sense that I mean i.e. an
>ontological theory (a theory about what does and does not exist).

Then you mean something different that what I thought; you were talking
about science so I thought you meant "scientifict theory".

Oops.

In any case I dispute that atheism is a theory about what
"does and does not exist";

Atheism is the quality of not believing in any gods. This is a theory?

>> The universe we are in may indeed be very improbable. However, there is
>> nothing special about it. It is not, as you put it, "remarkable". It just
>> annother universe. This particular one contains a planet with some
>> hairless primate lifeforms that discuss this sort of thing, but there
>> is nothing special about any of that. What we are (human, that is)
>> is not relevant- we could be philosophical dust and nothing
>> important to this argument changes.
>>
>> Sure, this particular universe is improbable. But so is _every other
>> one_. This is the point of my 10-dice example- ANY result from the
>> dice is very improbable. Yet something always comes up. Nothing unusal
>> seems to be going on here.
>>
>
>O.K. This is all I need. Whether you regard this universe as remarkable or
>not, (and I think it is rather implausible not to),

That's because you are a human, and you are rather important to
yourself. :)

If you take away the koala bears does the universe become less
remarkable? How bout if you take away all sedimentary rock? Argon?

> it nevertheless
>does belong to a subset of the total set of possible universes which
>is the subset of universes which God would have reason to create.

'reason to create'? I dont quite see what reason there is.

> There
>are two main theories under consideration here, one of which says
>that God exists and hence that any universe should be a member of this subset,
>and the other of which denies that God exists and can give no reason
>as to why any possible universe should be more or less likely then any
>other.

You got it.

> Given that the universe is a member of the subset mentioned, this
>constitutes evidence for the existence of God, the strength of the evidence
>depending on the size of the subset in relation to the whole set. And,
>I think it is clearly the case that the subset is much smaller than the
>whole.

I disagree where. The problem is that the subset was SPECIFICALLY
CONSTRUCTED to include this universe!

This is one of the things humans automatically put in all their
mythologies- because they tell stories about themselves (And other
things, but always including humans)

>If I walked into a room, and there were 1000 coins on the floor, all tails,
>and a friend told me he had just tossed them only once each and they had
>come down that way, I would be faced with (at least) two options. 1) He is
>telling
>the truth. 2) He is lying/deluded. I would certainly argue that a rational
>person should adopt 2), because the probability of a person lying or
>being decieved is higher than that the event actually occured (hey, this
>is just Hume's argument against miracles!). If there were no other possibility
>but that he had tossed them, then, OK, I accept it, but in this case in
>question this means assuming athiesm is certian.

I'd take #2 anyway, because IF this example is to be analagous, this
guy must have flippde the coins, looked at what he got, and they
called you in and said "look, I just tossed these and I got
<whatever it was he got>."

That he got all-heads is not relevant- it is no more or less likely
than any other combination.

>> Surely not every one does, but I'd wager most of them do. Remember, there
>> is one hell of a lot of time and space in a universe for something like
>> this to form in.
>
>What? For every universe with lots of time and space there are just as many
>with hardly any. I think you grossly underestimate the peculiar conditions
>required for intelligent life to exist in a law-governed universe.

No, I just dont think its very relevant whether life exists. Or intelligent
for that matter, but at least I can make a good argument that it
hardly matters if anything is by our standards "alive". (what you consider
unusal about this universe is that it contains thinking beings- us.
If we were robots, would it matter?)

>>
>> >THE `FIRST CAUSE' ARGUMENT: First, one valid point was made by some: in
>> >saying there were two possibilities, that the universe existed uncaused
>> >or that God existed uncaused and created the universe, I did exclude an
>> >in fact infinite array of other possibilites (e.g. that some finite god
>> >Zeus created the universe, etc etc etc). This was simply because I regard
>> >the other alternatives as being very improbable - the two hypotheses
>> >mentioned are, I think, the most likely, and, as they say in horse racing
>> >in Australia, daylight is third. I'm not going to defend this here, although
>> >it is quite defensible.
>>
>> This is totally garbage. There is no reason to presume that YOUR God
>> is there instead of some other. (or... is there? Show it to me if there
>> is one.)
>
>Oh yes there is.

This ought to be good.

> Incidentally, He is not my God, I do not own Him.

I didn't mean that, as you know.

> The
>reason is that the thiestic hypothesis is a God who is omnipotent, omniscient,
>and so on is simpler than any other and therefore more likely - there being
>no other reason to suppose one particular God rather than another.

That's true. This is getting more complicated already. :)

> The
>only way that we could have a God and not have thiesm would be to limit
>something - say to make Him limited in power. But this would be arbitrary -
>why just so much power, no more and no less?

You could make us ignorant of him instead. (not very important but still)

> If one is to have a God, the
>most likely one is the thiestic one.

That is the ->only<- kind of God, by definition of theistic.

> Incidentally, there could only be
>one such being of logical necessity (who would over-rule who in case of dispute)
>so I think that anyone whether Jewish, Christian, Islamic or whatever who
>refers to such a being is refering to the same dude. I just think they hang
>a whole lot of extra attributes on Him which complicate the matter.

They certainly do.

Do you dispute these attributes? If so which ones? All of them?

Im not entirely sure that an omnieverything being is necessarily
a God, so I'm now in doubt as to whethers yours is (tho I am too
ignorant of it to draw any conclusions that way now)

So what ARE the attribute of your God?

Incidentally, you still haven't shown that the complex-appearing
idea of a God is simple.

>> > Secondly, people consistently mistook what was
>> >meant to be an inductive argument for a deductive one. Please note: I am
>> >NOT saying it is impossible that the universe just existed uncaused,
>> >merely that it is unlikely. This was a mistake people made in both arguments:
>>
>> Odd that I saw no-one make it.
>>
>
>Once again, a quote (from an email reply):

Such a bummer I dont get to read your email! :)

>`If you say: "It (God) has always existed", I'll ask: "If you can
>accept the possibility of the FCE having always existed, why can't you
>postulate the same about the Universe?".'

Oh, this argument has nothing to do with deduction OR induction. This
basically says your argument works on something other than God, which
it does. This is true whether you phrase it deductively or inductively.

>> >I am not saying that I have `irrefutable evidence' (as one person said) of
>> >God's existence; only that it is more probable that He exists then that He
>> >does not.
>>
>> We dispute this.
>>
>
>I guessed as much!

:)

>> > One or two people challenged the idea that a simple hypothesis
>> >is more likely than a complex one where the evidence is equally explained
>> >by both; I am not going to bite into this since it raises the whole problem
>> >of induction - suffice to say that, if you're right (and I don't think
>> >you are) your belief in science or any other knowledge appart from your direct
>> >experience and logic is unfounded. Don't expect the sun to rise tommorrow!
>>
>> :) I also agree here, but I dont seem to remember this argument
>> being made. (Either I missed a lotta posts, or you're going after a lot
>> of straw men)
>>
>
>Particularly silly quote from a post included here:
>
>`Golly, I really wish the simplest answer was always the right one.  But
>its not!  The square root of a negative requires an imaginary number.
>Imaginary numbers are NOT simple.  If you're driving your car, and you
>hear a thumping noise, perhaps the simplest answer is that you have a
>flat tire.  But that may not be true, and that would not neccesitate the
>existence of god.'

Apparently this guy disagrees with occams razor. He's right that
the simples answer isn't always the right one, tho. However, if
there is nothing to distinguish between them I still think one should
take the simplest. (wouldn't call this argument silly tho)

>> >    No good reason was given, either, as to why thiesm was not a simple
>> >hypothesis (I think, the most simple appart from that nothing exists).
>>
>> This is plain old fashioned untrue- the reason was presented, and I saw it,
>> but it wasn't all that clear. Allow me to try to restate it:
>>
>> A godless, uncaused universe is one thing. A universe with a god is annother
>> thing. The one without a god can be (at least!) as simple as a singularly
>> going boom and releasing slightly uneven energy and matter distribution.
>
>In terms of the first cause argument, we are considering the simplicity of
>the first cause. The thiest does not need to have the universe in this
>consideration at all, just God, there being no universe. It is thus
>God vs the universe in simplicity. And I think God wins out here.

I don't. I believe I present somewhere the idea that God
must contain all knowledge of all POSSIBLE universes that he might
have made, for all time. He must have contained this at the beginning too,
since he was omniscient then. The universe- according to one theory-
was nothing at the beginning but a singularity; that's a fairly
simple thing. Perhaps you have the simplest of all possible *Gods*,
or omnieverything Gods, but that's not quite the same thing.

>>
>> The one with a god is still an uncaused universe! It simply says
>> "The universe starts out with a god in it, and he makes the rest."
>>
>
>Not unless
>you are rapidly changing the definition of universe, (an unfortunate tactic
>sometimes employed by athiests), from `the physical time-space universe'
>to `everything that exists', quite a different thing, at least to a thiest!

That ->IS<- my best definition of universe!

If you have a better one, present it.

"the physiscal time space universe" is circular.

>> God is a complex thing. It has emotons (Jealousy, Hate, Love), preferences
>> and desires. It can talk- it has language. ("Let there be light!"). Lots of
>> stuff that had to be there IN THE BEGINNING; in the first scenario this
>> can develop over time from a simple beginning.
>
>Who says God has all these things. God certainly by definition knows all
>langauges.

Bang. Right there a whole heap of complication.

> I do not believe he has emotions etc,

He at least understands them.

> these are men attempting to
>understand God and attributing their own characteristics to Him.

Ok.

> Incidentally,
>I dispute that Love is an emotion. DO NOT quote the Bible at me please (geez).

Well, its not worth arguing at all here. I wont quite the Bible
if you don't like it; I just wanted to show that God is supposed
to be able to talk. Most other holy books have him do so at some point.

>
>> Anyway, the god you desribe (unless you hedge it, destroying that
>> "simplicity")
>> is flat out impossible. Ill get to that.
>
>Please do.

I did.

>>
>> But first, assuming its possible, an all knowing god is ->REALLY<- complex.
>> It must contain knowledge of all that will be- and all that COULD HAVE BEEN.
>> Every universe- everything in every possible universe, down to the smallest
>> detail is part of such a things knowledge.
>>
>> Pretty complex isn't it?
>
>No. Take any person. This person will know some things and not others.
>I simply assert that God knows everything (he believes all true propositions
>and disbelieves all false ones, and has reasons for said beliefs). This is
>as simple as you can get.

Nowhere near as simple as a thing which has no beliefs whatsoever.
No knowledge; no nothing. Just itself.

> Otherwise you need a long account of why
>He only knows so much and no more.

For Gods this is true.

> Certainly, He knows an awful lot of
>detail of which I haven't got a clue, but this doesn't affect the simplicity
>of the hypothesis.

I'm afraid it does. It puts information into the universe that
is very complex.

(yes, I'm back to my old definition of universe)

>>
>> >THE COHERENCE OF THIESM: Some people maintained that thiesm was incoherent,
>> >i.e. that it contained contradictions. This is not so, nor is it widely
>> >held in philosophy - even Mackie I believe conceded the coherence of thiesm.
>>
>> Theim ITSELF ->is<- coherent. It is *omnipotence* (and maybe omniscience too)
>> that is incoherent. This is NOT INTEGRAL in Theism!
>
>I suppose this is an argument over definitions, but I think omnipotence is
>integral to thiesm.

I do not. See some polytheistic religion. Take the old greco-roman
polytheism for one.

It may be intergral to YOUR beliefs, tho.

>>
>> >As no-one mentioned specific problems with  omnipotence, I can only guess
>> >as to what was meant. Perhaps the old monk's paradox `can God create
>> >a rock heavier then He can lift'. The answer to this is simple. No. When
>> >we (at least I) say that God is omnipotent I merely mean that He can do
>> >whatever it is logically possible to do. He cannot create the logically
>> >impossible (see above), for example a square circle, which could never be
>> >in any possible world. Similar restrictions hold on omniscience etc.
>>
>> Then it is not all-powerfull.
>
>Rubbish. Self-contradictory `things' are not things - what the heck is
>a chair that is not a chair like for instance. You are simply maintaining
>a silly view of omnipotence if you think it has to require that logically
>impossible can be done.

No, I am holding a *simple* view of it.

If you wish to define it so that it IS possible, you will destroy
that simplicity you wanted. It suddenly is non-infinite. It has
limits. Definable, understandable ones.

>>
>> This is a complex thing.
>>
>
>See above on omniscience.

Just did. :)

>> This is also not what is usually meant by "omnipotence"; that is
>> "able to do anything".
>
>Not true. Most modern philosophically inclined thiests would hold to
>what I have said above.

That is because they realize that the colloquial definition is
incoherent.

>>
>> I see you have already heard of some things God can't do. Ill come up
>> with more if you see the flaw in the rock paradox.
>
>If we have previously defined the word God to mean a being who can
>do anything which is logically possible, then `a rock heavier than God can
>lift' translates to `a rock heavier than a being who can lift anything can
>lift'. It is a straight out contradiction like a square circle. Hence,
>it can't be done.

Well, no. It can. He just has to limit his own powers.

>>
>> >    Re perfect goodness, it can be proven that God must be perfectly
>> >good if He is perfectly free and one accepts one (controversial) extra
>> >premise: that moral statements (e.g. `you ought not murder') have truth
>> >values, i.e. can be said to be true or false. I am not going to bite into
>> >this (largely irrelevant) debate here.
>>
>> Me neither. Its demonstrably false that this omnipotent, omnicient being
>> is omnibenevolent anyway. Such a one would be able to, and would
>> wish to, fix all the flaws in the world. Anything causing suffering.
>
>This is all highly contentious.

The only thing it assumes is that this universe could be better.
Do you dispute this?

>> > I do happen to believe in God, though not one who
>> >intervenes in the course of nature.
>>
>> You mean you believe in a God that does not intervene, right?
>> Or do you really mean YOU do not intervene? If this is so,
>> how do you manage it?
>>
>
>I am generally not in the mood to intervene. If you need gravity
>suspended sometime, let me know 8-)

Why yes, it would make it easier to get to my next class! :)

>> I wasn't taking it to seriously, as you seemed sincere. I now have my
>> doubts. I do not like it at all that you ignored my best argument
>> on probabilty. Please address it this time!
>>
>
>OK!

Thank you!

---
            - Dan Johnson
And God said "Jeeze, this is dull"... and it *WAS* dull. Genesis 0:0

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