NetNews Usenet Archive 1993 #3/NN_1993_3.iso/spool/alt/atheism/26698

Text File | 1993-01-21 | 5.3 KB | 104 lines

Newsgroups: alt.atheism
Path: sparky!uunet!pipex!warwick!dcs.warwick.ac.uk!simon
From: [e-mail] (Simon Clippingdale)
Subject: Re: Evolution implied by the Bible
Message-ID: <[e-mail]>
Sender: [e-mail] (Network News)
Nntp-Posting-Host: nin
Organization: Department of Computer Science, Warwick University, England
References: <[e-mail]> <[e-mail]>
Date: Thu, 21 Jan 1993 13:19:14 GMT
Lines: 91

In article <[e-mail]> epowers@dewey (POWERS) writes:
>In article <[e-mail]> [e-mail] (Simon Clippingdale) writes:

>> So I agree that `we' can't know anything, in the sense of Erik's "who's
>> to say my thoughts are true and yours false". But I fail to see why this
>> implies a supernature *unless* there is a hidden axiom behind Erik's
>> position: the axiom that such 100% certain knowledge *is* possible
>> (and thus it requires a supernature since it can't result from natural
>> processes). In which case my complaint is with the hidden axiom.

>    I'm not sure why you would complain about a hidden axiom, as it
> seems to me that all arguments in conversation could be said to have
> hidden axioms, in the form of the assumptions that lead to the premises
> we begin with.

Fair enough, but this one seems rather too material to the development to be
left unsaid. Like "My car is blue, and thus my car is a tomato". What? Ah,
I didn't mention that all blue things are tomatoes, did I? The notion that
100% certain knowledge is possible (or at least desirable) looks like a
major plank in your development, without which you would have no reason to
invoke a supernatural to `get around' the problems you raise. Having said
that, you seem to imply at other points in your post that such 100% certain
knowledge isn't possible in principle, supernatural or no, so I wonder
whether I have misunderstood your position.


> I'm not trying to be terribly formal, since I have no
> training in being terribly formal, and I wouldn't be able to communicate
> that way.  But I'm glad you pointed this out, and so here's my thought
> process:
>     I try to reject all ideas that lead to self contradiction, logical
> dead ends, and infinite loops.  A logical dead end would be like "I do not
> exist."  Well, where do you go from there?  An infinite loop would be like
> what is described below, "I cannot trust my thoughts.  Therefore, I can
> trust my thoughts.  Therefore, I cannot trust my thoughts...etc."  So I
> reject the idea that I cannot trust my thoughts and the idea that I can
> trust ALL of my thoughts.  An example of a self-contradictory thought is
> "I cannot know anything with 100% certainty", because, to say this, I
> would have to be 100% certain that it was true.

Well, we very nearly agree on what the problem is, but not on how to react
to it. There are clearly problems raised by the idea of 100% certainty, and
thus the whole realm of black'n'white language (`true',`false',`proof',`know',
and the like). But I see no need to panic and resort to supernature when just
the rephrasing of your example as "I *probably* cannot know anything with 100%
certainty" will do, and is internally consistent, and is closer to being
appropriate language for the kinds of stuff neurons do anyway (more below).


>    The reason I can't accept the idea that all phenomena are the
> result of natural occurrences is that it leads me to say that I can't
> trust my own thoughts, which I reject on the basis that it throws me into
> an infinite loop, and also contradicts the inherent assumption I had at
> first that I could trust my own thoughts (at least to some extent).

Does the contradiction go away if you *probably* can't trust your thoughts?
I would have thought it does. Furthermore, this is as much certainty as can
be expected if thoughts are purely natural phenomena anyway, since neurons
are very noisy things with finite bandwidth and all sorts of drift and
instability. But that's OK, because they're only required to do statistical
stuff to within acceptable limits of accuracy. You can't expect better than
`probably' out of a bunch of neurons, and the apparent contradictions arise
when you get into rigid language which is inappropriate for describing
thought if indeed thought is the operation of such natural and statistical
processes.


> If I throw out the idea that everything in nature is the result of something
> else in nature, where else do I go but the supernatural (which has only
> been vaguely defined so far)?  It may not be the only possibility.  Surely
> the logic pundits on a.a. can come up with some other ones?
>
>                    Erik Powers

I think the problem lies right here in the natural world, and in the rather
paradoxical tendency for large groups of neurons, working statistically, to
decide that they want to treat everything as black and white. Our conscious
brains are just *so* much happier with the language of sharp divisions.

Cheers

Simon

PS Apologies to Ray Ingles for misunderstanding his position last time round.
The leg's in the post.

--
Simon Clippingdale                [e-mail]
Department of Computer Science    Tel [phone]
University of Warwick             FAX [phone]
Coventry CV4 7AL, U.K.