NetNews Usenet Archive 1992 #31/NN_1992_31.iso/spool/soc/motss/54187

Internet Message Format | 1992-12-30 | 4.8 KB

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From: [e-mail] (Tom Lord)
Newsgroups: soc.motss
Subject: what is a man-hater? (was Dworkin...)
Message-ID: <[e-mail]>
Date: 30 Dec 92 21:31:35 GMT
Organization: Carnegie Mellon, Pittsburgh, PA
Lines: 80


In the soc.motss `dworkin debate', in which the critics have NOT ONCE
scratched the surface of dworkin's actual writings, two sides seem to
have agreed on one thing: that andrea dworkin hates men.

The hatred, which is probably real and arguably justified, is bound to
to lead to confusion and charges of hypocrisy if it is not read
properly.  What is being hated?  A certain set of genes and the
genitalia they code for and the whole organisms they are part of?  Or
a social construction elaborated on the biology, subject, perhaps, to
non-biological change?  Is it males she hates?  or manliness? or males
who are manly?

It is hard to make the distinction, especially to careless louts such
as continuously pound the supposed absurdity and mental instability of
man-haters (usually without ever offering any evidence other than
their own rightous indignation).  But the distinction is, at least
arguably, real.  More careful readers and debators should at least be
aware of its possibility.

There is a line of thought i'll call `identity politics' (which i
won't attribute to anyone in particular; i'm taking a trend to
extremes in this description).  This line is defensive of who we think
we are -- of the aspects of our selves that seem least subject to
change, most deeply felt, most mysterious in origin, least volitional.
Identity politics attempts to construct a _right_ around our social
identities: to describe them as an a priori, deserving of protection
and cultivation.  Identity politics can be built on nearly any aspect
of identity and theory about its origin -- what is required, in
disguise or directly, is the belief that one's identity should not be
challenged or questioned; that challenges to one's identity are the
chief social problem; that one's identity is never a source or cause
or part of social ill.  Demographicly, the chief proponents of
identity politics are those whose identity serves them well, even if
it is in the context of an alleged repression.  To give up one's
identity is often to reject a great deal of social structure; a
dangerous, perhaps intimidating possibility.

Opposed to identity politics are thinkers who seek to draw a careful
distinction between organism and identity.  In this line of thought,
one finds reason to believe in the contingency of identities: their
dependence on social conditions, and importantly, their role in
creating social conditions including social ills.  In this view, an
identity such as `man' is at least as much something which one does,
as something which one is.  Identity is subject to reform or
replacement, at least in principle.  An identity, in this view, may be
as rightly a target of hate as, say, a particularly harmful
pedagogical tradition.  Social-constructionism is an example of this
way of thinking, but, from what i can tell, not everyone who thinks
this way calls themselves a social constructionist, and the two
positions don't necessarily converge.

I think it is fair to say that dworkin's writings make no sense from a
viewpoint steeped in the beliefs of identity politics.  She writes a
lot about identities and their effects; if identities hold a sacred
place for you, then she must necessarily seem irrevecably hostile to,
for example, all people of a certain genetic makeup (one which you
equivocate with a manly identity).

I think it is also fair to say (going way out on a wobbly limb) that
dworkin's anger extends, not only only to a set of identities, but to
those that promote and enact them; those who resist the destruction of
identities which her analysis convinces her are wrong-headed.  One
name, commonly applied to a large group of such people, even if for
the wrong reasons, is `men'.  Interestingly, males who are recognized
as not being defenders of the sex are often denied the name `man', so,
there are larger forces than dworkin using the name `man' to refer to
a male that acts in a particular way.

If this group, call them `real men', are defending and resisting the
correction of harmful social conditions, intentionally or not, then
they are an enemy to those who would bring change about.  Hate,
directed against them, may or may not prove effective -- but it is at
least thoughtful, purposeful; crazy, perhaps, as are any thoughts that
stray outside of orthodoxy.  But in the end, such hate may prove to be
crazy like a fox.

If the hate seems unfair, consider that what makes it seem so may be a
belief that a manly identity is an inviolable property of certain
organisms; a belief that isn't shared by everyone.