NetNews Usenet Archive 1992 #31/NN_1992_31.iso/spool/sci/virtual/4217

Internet Message Format | 1992-12-29 | 12.8 KB

Path: sparky!uunet!haven.umd.edu!darwin.sura.net!gatech!destroyer!cs.ubc.ca!uw-beaver!news.u.washington.edu!stein.u.washington.edu!hlab
From: [e-mail]
Newsgroups: sci.virtual-worlds
Subject: Re: PHIL: MUDs and Reality; Reply to Tom (2)
Date: Tue, 22 Dec 92 22:43:21 PST
Organization: University of Washington
Lines: 306
Approved: [e-mail]
Message-ID: <[e-mail]>
NNTP-Posting-Host: stein.u.washington.edu
Originator: [e-mail]



[Part 2 of a four part response to t. zier]

Thyagi's model:

> That they distinguish one as 'real' and the other as 'virtual' or
> 'imaginary' displays the bias toward the default dimension
> (quite reasonably), but tells us nothing about what 'real' means
> aside from 'preferred' or 'longer-lasting'.

t. zier:

The sensible and the rational realms are confused here when you say
"(quite reasonably)", be specific. You ought to spend some time
differentiating between the two for your readers or you will never
make any progress in this work. Consult Parmenides' original work - -
NOT Copleston.

Response:

Neither Parmenides nor Copleston is relevant here, as I see it.  I
only cited Copleston as a reference for the assertion that WHAT PLATO
CALLED 'THE REAL' WAS HIS 'WORLD OF FORMS'.  I don't think that
original works are necessary to verify this.  It is common knowledge
and a ridiculous thing to challenge.

As to my specificity, I agree that I may need some work in order to be
understood by you and others in this and other newsgroups.  That's why
I'm very happy you have taken the time to pose these questions and
show me where I have not been clear enough.

It is 'reasonable' to assume that the physical realm (object-MUD) is
more impinging due to the example you gave in another thread.  If a
physical truck comes barrelling through my home and kills my body
while I am in a cyberMUD, then it seems reasonable to assume that my
experience of that cyberMUD will cease.  If the computer upon which
the cyberMUD is generated short-circuits and stops, then it is
reasonable to assume that the MUD it generates will also cease to
exist.

With this I have no disagreement.  However, just because one is
dependent upon the other, what does this imply anything regarding
their REALITY?  Why is the cyberMUD less REAL than the truck or the
computer?  You see, this applies directly to what we take to be our
base assumptions about what CONSTITUTES THE REAL.

The questions which I now socratically ask you and have asked you in
another thread:

What is our criteria for deciding what constitutes 'the real'?

Why is this criteria more reasonable or logical than any other?

What is our criteria for deciding what exists and what does not?
How are we to assess existence?

These are basic epistemological questions which have NEVER been
absolutely solved.  In my opinion, anybody who thinks that they HAVE
been solved is living in a dreamworld or a world full of logical
fallacies.

Thyagi's model:

> 5. The Real World and RL
>
> We shall here take for our definition of the 'real world' that
> realm which is a superset of all MUDs.  That superset upon which
> all other dimensions depend is logically the 'real'.  Plato
> claimed that the real world is the world of Forms or Ideas, and
> many other philosophers offer their own speculation as to what
> constitutes the 'Source Code of Existence' as we know it.

t. zier:

Your definition here of the "real world" in terms of MUD supersets is
necessary for your argument, but obviously not sufficient. Stating the
same proposition in reverse order as you do is simply a reiteration,
and cannot improve your argument even if you do take the name of logic
in vain.

Response:

Please be further advised that this is a MODEL and requires no
bolstering of the sort you mention.  If it were an 'argument' then it
would of course need to be very much more complete.  As it stands,
this is again, as even you recognize, simply a DEFINITION.  Please
take it as one and either suggest an alternative or leave it alone.

t. zier:

I assume that your Plato reference is from Copleston. PLEASE read
Platos' original works, a translation is fine. (Do NOT accept any
substitutes!)  Plato does use the notion of perfect forms or ideas as
a basis for perceived existence, but these forms were created by a
god; they did not come into existence on thier own account. Did this
god write the source code? Who wrote the source code for this god?
Indeed; here lies the fundamental flaw in the foundation of
Platonopolis. AND western intellectual culture.

Response:

Your arguments here are irrelevant to the model.  The fact is that
Plato did take the perfect forms to be 'reality'.  Their origin is of
NO importance.

t. zier:

What about perceivable elements of existence we don't yet know of?
Must we assume, as Plato and western culture demand, that all
existence is dependent upon our 'knowing' it? And then only the
perceptions which quallifiey according to Platonist ontologies?

I think not (And then he vanished). A little Cartesian joke for you to
ponder in establishing a meaningful relationship between knowing and
existence (or reallity).

Response:

I fail to see the relevance of any of this to the model in question,
but must assume that these questions and comments result from your
mistaking it as an argument which has persuasive value.

In any case, we can NEVER know how much we don't know.  That is the
nature of knowledge.  I tend to assume that 'knowledge' is not so much
dependent upon knowing as it is upon 'ignorance' (see Lao Tzu for
more).

Thyagi's model:

> 'The superset of all MUDs' is not an easy concept to understand.
> It transcends both the MUD of our subjective experience and
> the MUD of 'space' (I leave 'time', which connects and/or
> interweaves these two, for future speculation).   It is easy to see
> why any aspect of RL in THIS context must be beyond words to some
> extent, especially when attempting to ascertain information about
> 'you' or 'me', or indeed any isolated object/subject.
>
> To say 'I went shopping in RL' would seem not only fallacious,
> but completely dishonest.  No separate 'individual' can ever
> 'do' anything in 'RL', not when we take it to be this superset,
> this Unity which includes all dimensions of subject and object.

t. zier:

Well, I did, and I bought Trix for my kids, and a gallon of milk, hot
dogs, potato chips, oh............. and hot dog buns. And we ate em,
and I'm not hungry now. Nothing falacious about that, oh, and I got
coffee too. Be right back ; -)

Response:

Your emphasis on the difference between the cyber and NONcyber realm
is tedious.  Yes, you can explore the object-MUD and do these things.
You cannot, under the definition which I have assumed in this model,
'do' anything in 'RL' because the object-MUD DOES NOT COMPRISE 'RL'.
I hope this makes sense.  The object-MUD is simply one dimension (with
3 subdimensions of H/L/D).  'You' exist in it.  So do 'I'.  'We' don't
exist in 'RL' because 'RL' is the world of Unification.  In RL 'you'
and 'I' are a Unified Singularity.

t. zier:

When you say "No separate 'individual' can ever 'do' anything in 'RL'
" you have stumbled into what is called Zenos' paradox. It is a
paradox which has only been patched up over the millenia, and I'm not
sure on the disposition of it recently.

Response:

Well, this shows how far apart we really are, then.  As I see it,
Zeno's paradoxes (there are more than one) are illustrative of a
comparison of MUDs.  Zeno was one of the first few InterMUD
scientists.

Notice that they are called 'paradoxes'.  The nature of a paradox is
such that one cannot simply 'reason it away' or 'patch it up'.  It
isn't possible to explain it within either of the two MUDs it compares
because it points to their limitations.  Another good example of this
is Godel's Theory of Incompleteness with regard to all knowledge
systems, but I suspect you're not very receptive to this example.  :>

Thyagi's model:

> A note about Unity seems necessary.  When speaking of 'Unity', it
> is not meaningful to compare this with 'Diversity'.  The reason for this
> is that the unity here implied transcends all lingual expressions.
> For the same reason that 'Spirit' cannot be compared with 'Matter'
> because in the nondual realm Spirit and Matter are One, so also is
> Diversity identical to Unity and vice versa.  The term is only a useful
> indicator of the realm or dimension (that superset) to which we refer.

t. zier:

Is this Zeno, or Taoist? Give us a reference. It certainly isn't
original, and if you would have us understand, we must be given a
reference.

Response:

I didn't think a reference was necessary because I'm not asserting
that this concept Unity is true anywhere but INSIDE THE MODEL.  You
needn't have references because I'm not posing an argument.  In any
case, check out Buddhism: Nonduality or Hinduism: Advaita if you'd
really like to do some reading on the subject.

I doubt I could point to a comprehendable Western philosopher because
I don't know any who explain 'Spirit' in this sense, though I'm sure
some must (Merton surely implies it, Heidegger?  dunno).

t. zier:

This note about unity is not necessary within the context of your
current doctrine, as a matter of 'fact', you are getting into yet
another classic blind alley by raising the topic at all. AND you have
attempted to resolve it through yet another tautology.

I would, however, agree with your statement that the unity embodied by
reality IS beyond the definitive abillities of either letter OR
number. You might be well advised to bundle these two modes of
rational expression together in future speculations.

Response:

First, this is not a 'doctrine'.  Second, I don't understand your
criticism.  What do you refer to when you talk of this 'blind alley'?
What do you think that I'm trying to 'resolve'?  If I understand you
correctly you are saying that I should reference number as well as
letter as symbols which cannot COMPRISE but can symbolize reality.
I'll take this into consideration, thanks.

Thyagi's model:

> Given this, the real world is a subject/object Unity, toward which
> many religious paths point and about which we shall never
> obtain a completely accurate lingual expression (due to the
> disunitive nature of language).

t. zier:

The failure to arrive at some degree of analyticity in other than
Platonist terms is due entirely to the dogmatic paradigms which we
inhabit culturally (that are embraced here in your paper); but if we
can accept SOME ontological methodologies other than Platos', perhaps
not dependent on letter and number, we may very well come to know at
least SOME other things.  However, it does get messy when you abandon
the linear Euclidean-Platonist constructs; the first thing to go is
predictabillity, and Chaos becomes evident.

Response:

Again I fail to understand you.  I fear we are speaking from different
perspectives regarding the same things, yet you seem to have
misunderstood both my goal and method, so this could simply be one of
the vortices of that misunderstanding.  I'll ask questions to get
clarity in any case.

What gives you the impression that my methods or ideas are
'Platonist'?  What are the 'dogmatic paradigms' to which you refer?
Do you feel that my model is itself internally inconsistent or
logically flawed in its construction?  If so, how?

Thyagi's model:

> Comments about RL, therefore, are of a MYSTICAL nature, within
> this context, rather than a 'practical' one. They apply, perhaps
> abstractly, to that superset which some Christians call 'Heaven'
> and some Buddhists might call 'Nirvana'.

t. zier:

This all depends on what you mean by "practical", do you mean
sensible? or profitable? I believe that you mean 'reasonable', and if
that is correct,

Response:

To a certain extent I do mean 'sensible', yes.  I mean that it has to
do with the common 'object-MUD' and 'subject-MUD' in which we are used
to living.  I certainly don't mean 'reasonable', since I think that
people who posit the 'reasonableness' of 'practical MUDs' versus the
'unreasonableness of mystical MUDs' are very foolish.  For this reason
I omit the bulk of your commentary (regarding Platonism).

t. zier:

We CAN know some things about the sensible realm, I can show you
things that are arguably representative of things we can know about
the sensible realm.  (How about an apparent negative dimensional
value?) But I don't think I'm going to waste my time on angels.

Response:

I understand that knowledge can be established regarding MUDs.  This
much is obvious.  Knowledge of that sort, however, can NEVER be
derived regarding the real world.  Why?  Because it exists beyond the
duality of knowledge and nonknowledge; beyond even the concept of
'you' or 'me'.  We're talking theology here, penetrating metaphysics.
Again, these are assumptions within this model.  If you find value in
the model, fine.  If not, abandon it.  If you'd like to help me by
critiquing its logical consistency, then I'm happy to continue this
dialogue.

Thyagi

(Part 2 of 4)