NetNews Usenet Archive 1992 #31/NN_1992_31.iso/spool/sci/military/12282

Text File | 1992-12-29 | 9.6 KB | 182 lines

Newsgroups: sci.military
Path: sparky!uunet!gatech!hubcap!ncrcae!ncrhub2!ciss!law7!military
From: MR KR COMAN <[e-mail]>
Subject: Re: No Army Needed -- Civilian Resistance???
Message-ID: <[e-mail]>
Sender: [e-mail] (Sci.Military Login)
Organization: Rhodes University, Grahamstown, South Africa
References: <[e-mail]> <[e-mail]> <[e-mail]> <[e-mail]>
Date: Tue, 29 Dec 1992 17:28:20 GMT
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From MR KR COMAN <[e-mail]>

>From Gary Coffman <emory!ke4zv![e-mail]>
>In article <[e-mail]> Tim Smith <[e-mail]> writes:
>>In article <[e-mail]> [e-mail] (Dan Sorenson) writes:
>I too would like to tread carefully into this area.

 --- Ditto ---
>
>>Dan continues:
>>>         For a start, let us assume that 50% of the populace own guns,
>>> and can use them fairly effectively.  Variations are welcome, of course.
>>> This strikes me as a hopeless situation for a war.  As you drive down
>>> the street, some farmer with an old .30-30 shoots at you from the sewer.
>>> On the other hand, you do control the streets.
>>
>>>         So what is the military significance of deer rifles in the hands
>>> of farmers, bankers, and the like?  I would like to think that it would
>>> make the war too costly, but know that I could be merely looking at the
>>> military situation through rose-tinted goggles.

Not to repeat the interesting points raised by Dan and Gary, but to add
a few cents' worth.

The question of civilian/popular resistance to foreign invasion or a central
government that sections of the population deem to be illegitimate hinges on
a host of factors that jointly and severally *may* influence the relative
success of their activities:

1.
Social values of the oppressed population.  Here, a distinction can be drawn
between societies that fundamentally subscribe to some restraining cultural
values versus those that do not.  In essence, how easy is it for average
civilians to act aggressively, even to the point of committing acts of "
frightfulness" or terrorism?   Farmer Brown from Illinois might thus be
tempted to take a few ineffectual pot-shots at long range with his 30-30,
but he might refrain (even decry as inhuman) from going to work with his
Black & Decker on the unhappy flesh of a captured enemy or suspected informer
with the aim of causing alarm and despondency.  To the contrary, an Afgan
hillsman might regard this type of torture and public example of what
happens to traitors as pretty mild and lenient.  OK, how far are average
members of the society prepared to go?  Where do they draw the line on acts
of individual and collective "terrorism"?

2.
Motivating ideology.  What is it that animates the average civilian to become
actively involved in resistance?    Long-term guerilla war seems to demand
that there be "something of value" that will be enjoyed at some future stage
once the invaders have been driven out or the govt toppled.  It goes beyond
simple hatred of an enemy and encompasses a paradoxically simple
set of spiritual beliefs.   Materialism (money, cars, houses, Cokes and
pizzas) do not seem to provide the necessary spark -- especially over the
long-term.  Indeed, a society whose basic values reflect the acquisition and
preservation of assets appears to be ill-suited to waging aggressive civil
resistance.  Compare, for instance, the French civilian of WW2 versus an
Afgan tribesman.  The former was probably not going to become deeply involved
until the risks to his life and property were finely calculated, in the
latter instance we are told that channelled religious fervour was all.   The
existence of a "charasmatic leader" also does a lot for the civilian cause:
Farmer Brown would be unlikely to put his life and those of his family on
the line for the greater glory of President Clinton (now in exile on Samoa);
whereas we are told tens of thousands of Iranians and Iraqis did so
cheerfully for their respective "men, made-legends".

3.
Willingness of the the enemy to use drastic repressive methods.  This has
been raised previously, but bears re-iterating.  How unfettered are the
powers of junior members of the "social stability" units deployed to counter
the actions of civilian terrorists?   Units drawn from societies having
definite "sanctity of life" values will tend to adopt relatively more kid-
glove methods versus those who operate at an opposite extreme.  Consider some
possibilities of the latter kind:

*  Imposition of martial law. (None of that Miranda rubbish, no right of an
   attorney, due process or probable cause.)

*  Unlimited detention without trial and the real possibility of torture
   being administered to suspects.

*  Powers of summary execution for stated offences by forces commanded by
   warrant-officer and above.   (Possession of a firearm will constitute
   such an offense.)

*  Dusk to dawn curfew within free-fire zones.

*  Taking of hostages.

*  Reprisals against life and property.  (Including "making public examples"
   of dissidents and traitors -- Farmer Brown is forced to bayonet to death
   his eldest son (found in possession of resistence literature and a .22
   Colt Woodsman) in the 7-11 parking lot before the assembled townsfolk.)

    (On balance, I don't think Old Farmer Brown would find the
temptation to toss his 30.30 into the nearest river and opt for a quiet life
too difficult to resist should some or all of the above hang over the heads
of himself and his family.)

4.
Relative freedom from independent media scrutiny.  Self-evident.  A military
force engaged in suppressive operations (against civilians) that can't move
anywhere without a blow-waved CNN reporter tagging along, stands in contrast
to one that is free of  such attention.  By the same token, the
civilian resistance fighters must be denied media coverage.   (There's been
a 20 year guerilla war in the Sudan -- worse than Somalia, but who knows? So
who cares?)   The current Palestinian "deportees in limbo" fiasco also
springs to mind as an example of how media coverage can sway events.

5.
Lack of logistic supply.  Self-evident again.  As long as North Vietnam
could bring in supplies from China and elsewhere, it didn't matter how many
bombs fell on Hanoi, trucks got blasted on the Ho Chi Min trail, or what the
body-counts were below the DMZ.   Once airdrops began on a regular basis into
France, only then could the Resistance upgrade its levels of activity.  The
case of the Stingers to Afganistan...etc.    When Farmer Brown runs out of
30.30 rounds he must either find a captured rifle or start thinking in terms
of petrol and swimming-pool chemical bombs  -- real war-winning stuff.

6.
Ability to be a "fence-sitter".  To what extent can the average civilian
attempt to adopt a survival strategy by simply trying to play the "soldiers"
and the "guerillas" against one another?   In other words,  when the soldiers
are in the neighbourhood Farmer Brown is a silent, barely co-operative cypher
who's seen and heard nothing -- and raises no protest when a few of his
chickens are purloined.   Later when the freedom fighters some to call, he
co-operates, joins in the ritualistic singing of freedom songs, declaims his
devotion to the cause, and at the back of his mind hopes that they'll soon
be gone and that there are no soldiers' informers about.   If this is a
viable strategy (as it was for many in France in WW2, and perhaps in other
subsequent guerilla wars) then Farmer Brown's willingness to become deeply
involved in guerilla activites that he sees as just plain madness is very
low indeed.   Contrary-wise, if no fence-sitting posture is viable (e.g.
The soldiers/guerillas are coming take his children away for "re-eduaction
and to better serve our noble cause".); then Farmer Brown is obliged to do
one of two things: throw his lot in with the side that *seems* to be the
long-term winner and hope that things will work themselves out eventually or
opt-out and attempt to become a refugee by escaping over the border -- into
Mexico???

7.
Organisation structure.  One of the fundamentals is that civilian resistance
must occur within the framework of a disciplined organisation; an
underground army if you like.    All successful guerilla wars have this in
common.   Farmer Brown acting autonomously amounts to nothing but a pathetic
brief nuisance; 5000 Farmer Browns acting in accordance with definate plans
to meet specific objectives is another matter entirely.   Again social
values and a motivating ideology seem to be pretty important.  Thus, a
society that in peacetime is divided up into special interest groups and
minorities each competing for a bigger slice of its material welfare seems to
be rather poor stuff upon which to erect a liberation army versus a society
that is unified in terms of language, culture, social values, history,
wealth, past shared heros, etc. etc.

    In summary, any so-called "Western" population would probably proove
to be pretty "easy game" for any oppressive forces with the necessary powers
and the ruthlessness to use them to the fullest....IMO.
Cheers,
Keith Coman
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
"If we pay dogfood salespeople more than we   :  Dept of Management
 do teachers, we should not be surprised if   :  Rhodes University
 our dogs eat like kids, and our kids end     :  Grahamstown, 6140
 up reading like dogs."                       :  Rep of South Africa
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