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- Path: sparky!uunet!seismo!skadi!stead
- From: stead@skadi.CSS.GOV (Richard Stead)
- Newsgroups: sci.energy
- Subject: Re: Nuclear Power and Climate Change
- Message-ID: <51729@seismo.CSS.GOV>
- Date: 31 Dec 92 20:48:15 GMT
- References: <1992Dec30.161607.25113@vexcel.com> <51726@seismo.CSS.GOV> <1992Dec31.164259.22040@vexcel.com>
- Sender: usenet@seismo.CSS.GOV
- Lines: 226
- Nntp-Posting-Host: skadi.css.gov
-
- In article <1992Dec31.164259.22040@vexcel.com>, dean@vexcel.com (Dean Alaska) writes:
- > In article <51726@seismo.CSS.GOV> stead@skadi.CSS.GOV (Richard Stead) writes:
- > >In article <1992Dec30.161607.25113@vexcel.com>, dean@vexcel.com (Dean Alaska) writes:
- > The study was for replacing only coal electricity generation since it
- > is the dirtiest form of fossil fuel. Oil and natural gas were not
- > included to keep the cost down. The increased use of oil and
- > natural gas over the 40 year period made up for the savings from
- > not using coal. Transportation contributions were not included.
-
- But if the study really did use favorable numbers for nuclear power, then
- it would be cheaper to add nuclear capacity than new oil and gas capacity.
- However, it is not so clear that the study's number really were favorable
- to nuclear power. Perhaps the costs quaoted are reasonable for the cost
- to construct a single nuclear plant today. However, if nuclear power were
- given serious consideration, then we could look forward to lower costs due
- to economy of scale (building many plants would establish an efficient
- industrial infrastructure to support such construction), greatly reduced
- time of construction and licensing, and an improved legal environment.
- Nuclear plants used to be very cheap to build, and would be on-line within
- a few years after the first spade of dirt was turned. In today's climate
- of anti-nuke hysteria, it is completely infeasible to construct a nuclear
- plant, and certainly not to do so economically.
-
- > Any projections require modeling future energy needs, which usually
- > requires modeling future economic growth. The two cannot be separated,
- > whatever the relationship between them. Virtually all public
-
- I agree, but you also argued that conservation could attain 1% per year
- reduction in total energy consumption. How can this square with
- economic growth? That 1% reduction would then mean that conservation
- is saving enough energy on existing uses to offset both economic growth
- and population growth. It then looks like a small-differences problem
- at best. Healthy economic grwoth is considered to be on the order of
- 3-5% per year for a fully industrialized western nation. That means
- conservation would be saving 4-6% per year on existing uses. Not only
- that, but the economic expansion must be assumed to be constructed with
- the most efficient equipment available. So let's make a gross assumption
- and claim that the most efficient stuff available in the future uses only half
- the power of average currently installed equipment. In 24 years, assuming
- only 3% per year economic growth and total conversion to the more efficient
- systems, we would be using more power than today. So the 1% per year savings
- would fail no later than 24 years from now, with the ridiculous assumption
- that our industries can cut their energy uses in half. That 3% has to include
- all growth - standard of living, population growth, international
- competitiveness etc. I think the population alone is growing at that rate.
-
- > >And why have they decided that the third world will be rigidly kept at
- > >its same low level of development? If they develop, they will have
- > >factories, transportation systems, etc., which will all use new energy
- > >that even if it is used very efficiently was not used before. I think
- > >there will be quite a bit of social strain if this was enforced
- > >world-wide.
- >
- > Where does it say that the third world will be kept at current levels
- > of development? You need to read the post more carefully. As to
-
- I did. That 1% savings is unreasonable in the face of development.
- How can an undeveloped country build significant infrastructure
- while actually decreasing their total energy consumption? It's simply
- not possible. They are basically using no energy now, but factories,
- transportation and technology all eat up lots of juice.
-
- > whether the 1%/year is reasonable, you will have to take it up with
- > the researchers. Details of this study were not included.
-
- I would, but you posted it and are using it to support your position.
- I think I have posted sufficient argument to cast significant doubt
- on this claim.
-
- > >what we've built - it's a lot. We could easily develop both nuclear
- > >and conservation. Afterall, conservation would mean less nuclear development
- > >required and that would free up cash for more conservation, etc.
- >
- > 40 years. I am glad you are so optimistic that the money is available.
- > Considering that the good citizens of Colorado passed a strict tax
- > limitation initiative, turned down a sales tax for schools (but approved
- > a baseball stadium), I am not so optimistic.
-
- First, the development would not be funded by taxes, but rather by utility
- rates. But beyond that argument, the main thing here is that if you have the
- money to build all the nuclear capacity needed in the absence of conservation,
- then all you have to do is take the cash that would have been used to build
- a nuke plant, and use it for conservation. Your original argument claimed
- conservation was cheaper per kW, so this practice should more than replace
- the power that the nuke would have produced. Just continue that process until
- diminishing returns prevents it from working anymore. Then you have both
- conservation and nuke capacity.
-
- > >> For another comparison, they show that efficiency improvements cost
- > >> about $.02/kWh. When this is compared with nuclear strategies, at any
- > >
- > >For some current strategies. This is why power companies are investing
- > >in conservation by paying large users to convert to more efficient
- > >motors/lighting/etc. It is a wise and profitable investment. We
- > >cannot plan on having something with efficiency gains equivalent
- > >to modern high-efficiency fluorescent vs. incandescent lighting, for
- > >example. So when they have paid off all existing plants to convert
- > >then buying conservation is essentially eliminated. Presumedly all
- > >new facilities built will already use the best in efficiency. The idea
- > >that efficiency gains can be made indefinitely is clearly as specious
- > >as free-energy arguments.
- >
- > Noone claims these gains can be made indefinitely. They can be made
- > for quite some time (1 or 2 decades) at reasonably expected levels of
- > investment.
-
- But money does not control the technological gains possible. Basically,
- after the simple stuff is done (currently a boom industry), costs will
- go up exponentially for each additional kW saved, (and will approach
- infinity as energy used runs up against thermodynamic limitations, etc.)
- So we can't expect a linear relation between money invested and energy
- saved. As for investing in efficiency, most of the big electric utilities
- currently have programs to pay their major consumers to upgrade to more
- efficient equipment - mostly replacing older fluorescent lighting and
- ballast with modern fluorescent lighting and a few other upgrades.
- The savings are nowhere near the 50% argument I made above, but the 50%
- argument is the only thing that will keep us at the same power use
- 2 decades from now if we include modest economic growth. If we assume
- 20% efficiency gains and 5% economic growth, we will need new electric
- capacity in only 5 years assuming total conversion to the more efficient
- technology! That is a reasonable scenario.
-
- > computer. The developing countries clearly have a different set
- > of choices than the developed countries. Nuclear power has a poor
- > cost record in developing countries and powerful environmentalists
- > and regulation is not a likely cause in most of those countries.
- > Their lack of a well-developed grid makes the use of large
- > centralized plants more problematic than in the U.S. or Europe.
-
- The US and Europe did not come complete with power grids when people
- first started using electricity. Part of developing a country includes
- developing infrastructure. They have no power grid, because they are
- not generating or using electricity. Both use of electricity and the
- power grid will develop together as it did in this country. And they
- better use centralized production for the efficiency and reduction in
- emissions. If they generate on-site (normally a co-generation system),
- the efficiency would be lower and increases in CO2 output will wipe out
- any reduction in CO2 output in developed countries.
- I don't know why you argue that nuclear power has a poor cost record
- in the third world. The two leaders of the third world - China and
- India - have a lot of nuclear capacity and are building more, and they
- do it very cheaply.
-
- > You have not even attempted to rebut efficiency cost estimates. What
- > you have attempted to rebut is the methodology of the study, which you
-
- That is a perfectly valid rebuttal. If the methodology is flawed, then
- so are the numbers. If not flawed, then why would the numbers be suspect?
- Of course I attack the methodology.
-
- > >In big industry, cost of electricity is a significant
- > >consideration and is a big part of the final cost of product. If
- > >electricity cost less, aluminum would be much cheaper. Demand for
- > >aluminum would then increase. Simple supply and demand.
- >
- > The economic argument is true for certain industries, but their component of
- > total electricity consumption is very small. Do you know what
- > percentage of U.S electricity is used for Aluminum? If this
- > argument is to be devastating, then aluminum and similar uses
- > must be shown to dominate the market. Please provide a reference.
-
- But you stated that electricity cost is independent of product cost and
- provided no reference for that. It was simply stated. I then presented
- a case that is a significant rebuttal, since while I do not know the
- numbers, it is well-known that energy cost is the most significant cost in
- the production of aluminum. While aluminum alone probably amounts to no
- more than a couple percent of total electric capacity in this country,
- it is only one example (though, admittedly, it is the best). As for
- percentage of capacity that it uses, I don't know, but I do know that
- a moderate-sized aluminum refinery uses 100's of MW, and because of this
- the plant and a generating facility are usually built together and the plant
- uses the majority of the electricity generated. So if we new how many
- aluminum plants there were and how many electric plants, the plant ratio
- would be close to the fraction of energy used to produce aluminum.
- Other metal-refining processes do not use as much electricity (most notably
- steel, where a lot of the energy comes from coke), but it is still a
- significant contribution to the cost of the metal produced. This would
- not be true of precious metals where most of the cost is mining.
-
- > >back conservation efforts, as long as they remain reasonably viable
- > >economically. (As they get more difficult, you will reach the point
- > >of diminishing returns. Investment in conservation is a big booming
- > >industry right now with lots of room to grow. Let's check it again in
- > >10 years. It will level off and go down.)
-
- > How quickly cost effectiveness levels off depends on how forcefully
- > it is approached. A strong national program for efficiency might
- > lead to leveling off within 10 years but a program of that magnitude
- > at that speed of implementation would lead to a _decrease_ in electricity
- > consumption, even including economic growth, so we would not need to
-
- Not according to my calculations.
-
- > industry likes it. The best likelihood for the fast scenario, IMO,
- > would be for strong and unambiguous proof for climate change, similar
- > to what is now available for ozone depletion, to become available in
-
- There is not "unambiguous proof" of ozone depletion. There are the polar
- "ozone holes" every winter, but it is not known if the holes existed or
- not before the first measurements of them were made. It is possible that
- a certain amount of chlorine has always made it to the stratosphere, and
- the ozone holes (even if very small) have always been a polar winter feature.
- Summer measurements of ozone at mid-latitudes do not show an unambiguous
- reduction.
-
- In stating this, I do not mean to claim that there is no problem with the
- ozone. I just want to put things in perspective. I do not believe all
- is well with the ozone, but I also do not think the problem is the dire
- end-of-the-world catastrophe certain groups would have us believe. Likewise
- with global change. I think the evidence for global change is currently
- every bit as convincing, if not moreso, as the ozone evidence. Ocean
- temperatures definitely seem to point to global warming. The variations
- are very small and the noise is very large, but I'm convinced. Waiting
- for "unambiguous proof", you will wait forever.
-
- Anyway, it doesn't matter how fast the conservation occurs. It may lead
- to a temporary drop in required capacity, but in 5 or 10 years we will
- require more generating capacity than today. If we do not invest in nuke
- power, then this means CO2 emissions will go up.
-
-
- --
- Richard Stead
- Center for Seismic Studies
- Arlington, VA
- stead@seismo.css.gov
-