NetNews Usenet Archive 1992 #31/NN_1992_31.iso/spool/sci/cognitiv/944

Text File | 1992-12-21 | 1.9 KB | 40 lines

Newsgroups: sci.cognitive
Path: sparky!uunet!utcsri!psych.toronto.edu!christo
From: [e-mail] (Christopher Green)
Subject: Re: John Searle
Message-ID: <[e-mail]>
Organization: Department of Psychology, University of Toronto
References: <[e-mail]> <[e-mail]> <[e-mail]>
Date: Mon, 21 Dec 1992 17:15:20 GMT
Lines: 29

In article <[e-mail]> [e-mail] (Danny) writes:
>In article <[e-mail]> [e-mail] (Christopher Green) writes:
>>In article <[e-mail]> [e-mail] (Danny) writes:
>>>
>>>OK.  If there are no differing causal consequences at all between your
>>>sensation of colour and mine then I would argue that your sensation of
>>>colour is the same as mine.
>>
>>And what, pray tell, would be your warrant for that conclusion.
>>Assuming you're limiting "causal consequences" to behavioral ones,
>>you've only looked a half the story. If you don't, on the other hand,
>>limit to behavioral consequences, then I'll claim (from personal
>>experience) that you're just wrong.
>
>I am not limiting "causal consequences".  You can claim that I'm wrong,
>but since from your own position there's no way of telling who's right,
>and since your position require extra properties, I win by application
>of Occam's razor...

No way of telling who's right? You've lost me. But even if there were no
such way, that would hardly warrant you abolishing the topic. Maybe
there are things we can't know (though I certainly wouldn't claim this
for qualia. I'm perfectly satisfied they exist.)
-cdg-
--
Christopher D. Green                [e-mail]
Psychology Department               [e-mail]
University of Toronto
Toronto, Ontario M5S 1A1