NetNews Usenet Archive 1992 #31/NN_1992_31.iso/spool/comp/os/vms/20148

Internet Message Format | 1992-12-31 | 1.9 KB

Path: sparky!uunet!gatech!rpi!uwm.edu!linac!att!ucbvax!ELROS.STG.TRW.COM!powers
From: [e-mail]
Newsgroups: comp.os.vms
Subject: RE:  Getting rid of SMB_SECURITY once and for all ?
Message-ID: <[e-mail]>
Date: 31 Dec 92 03:29:00 GMT
Sender: [e-mail]
Organization: The Internet
Lines: 31


Rick Murphy ([e-mail]) reminds us:
> The "default" X Window System security scheme on UNIX systems is host-based
> only; anyone logged in to your workstation has access to the display.
> On VMS, the authorization information includes the username of the user.
> Thus, there aren't the same security risks - unless you're sharing your
> password :-)

The whole point about the original post was dismantling the VMS security
scheme from the ground down. I can appreciate a person from DEC reminding
us that VMS and Eunuchs differ in profound ways.  But, the original poster
wanted to make DECwindows/X-windows on a VMS system Eunuchs-like -- totally
unprotected, free-for-all, and anything goes -- contrary to its design.

My point is that DECwindows and DECwindows/Motif have certain security
restrictions.  These restrictions are there for a very good reason, and this is
designed in to the software at the roots.  The restrictions are not annoying
if they are understood.  If someone who is responsible for a computer decides
to deliberately circumvent a basic, fundamental, essential part of a
software design, any software design, without understanding the consequences,
there will be hell to pay for this sooner or later.

Those of us old fuddy-duddies still around know that you can defeat the
design and purpose of any software.  But this is a game best played by
individuals who have very large private bank accounts and who don't need to
hold down a job with an employer.

      Lester Powers
      [e-mail]