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- Newsgroups: comp.lang.tcl
- Path: sparky!uunet!eco.twg.com!twg.com!news
- From: "David Herron" <david@twg.com>
- Subject: Insecurity of tk
- Message-ID: <1992Dec22.212801.6306@twg.com>
- Sensitivity: Personal
- Encoding: 21 TEXT , 4 TEXT
- Sender: news@twg.com (USENET News System)
- Conversion: Prohibited
- Organization: The Wollongong Group, Inc., Palo Alto, CA
- Conversion-With-Loss: Prohibited
- Date: Tue, 22 Dec 1992 21:28:12 GMT
- Lines: 26
-
- It occurred to me the other day that tk creates an extreme security risk.
- Anybody who can connect to your server can see any tk interpretor and thus
- get access to any data they can see.
-
- For research-projects that's not a big deal. Winterp, for instance, has
- nearly the same problem. But for commercial products it isn't acceptible
- for them to create yawning security holes.
-
- The authorisation stuff fiddled with by xhost should close this pretty
- well but I wonder how many people actually use it? I sure don't since
- 1) my workstation is pretty well isolated to TWG's network and 2) it has
- the appearance of being a lot of trouble to set up. I don't know if it
- really is hard to set up and surely haven't looked into it.
-
- What are others' thoughts?
-
- There might be some authorisation put into tk's send command.
-
- The send command might be removed entirely 'cept it's such a
- useful thing!
-
-
- <- David Herron <david@twg.com> (work) <david@davids.mmdf.com> (home)
- <-
- <- During the '80s Usenet's mantra was: "Not all the world's a VAX".
- <- During the '90s I hope it becomes: "Not all the world's DOS (ick)".
-