home *** CD-ROM | disk | FTP | other *** search
- Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
- Path: sparky!uunet!zaphod.mps.ohio-state.edu!rpi!gatech!enterpoop.mit.edu!news.media.mit.edu!minsky
- From: minsky@media.mit.edu (Marvin Minsky)
- Subject: Re: Drawing the entity/environment boundary
- Message-ID: <1992Dec31.223448.28663@news.media.mit.edu>
- Sender: news@news.media.mit.edu (USENET News System)
- Cc: minsky
- Organization: MIT Media Laboratory
- References: <BILL.92Dec18123201@ca3.nsma.arizona.edu> <BzLCx1.JF5@iat.holonet.net> <C052B5.95t@spss.com>
- Date: Thu, 31 Dec 1992 22:34:48 GMT
- Lines: 33
-
- In article <C052B5.95t@spss.com> markrose@spss.com (Mark Rosenfelder) writes:
- >In article <BzLCx1.JF5@iat.holonet.net> ken@iat.holonet.net (Ken Easlon) writes:
- >>Oh, THAT "Systems Reply". Searle discusses it briefly in the Scientific
- >>American article, but I don't see how that relates to the entity
- >>environment boundary.
- >
- >Neither does Searle, and that's precisely the problem. Searle never seems
- >to question the notion that you can determine whether understanding occurs
- >in the Chinese Room by asking if the man in the room understands Chinese.
- >The corollary of his position would be that if a Turing Test-passing AI
- >*were* intelligent, the intelligence must lie in the *CPU*. The Systems
- >Reply more sensibly draws the entity boundary around the computer/algorithm
- >combination (and emphasizes the need to think more carefully about what
- >systems exhibit what cognitive properties).
-
- There are two more serious problems with all this.
-
- 1). The notion of "understanding" is itself defective if we try to
- define "A understands X". Read Chapter 30 of The Society of Mind.
- A major point is that this is relative to someone's judgment, so one
- really should be discussing "O agrees (thinks, believes, assumes) that
- A understands (in some sense proposed by O) X. So Joe may think Jack
- understands Physics, whereas Gell-Man thinks Jack understands nothing
- about it.
-
- See also my "Reply to Searle" in that old Brain and Behavior
- collection of reviews of Searle.
-
- 2) the notion of "boundary" should also be relative to some observer
- with some purpose (disposition, etc). Read Dawkins' The Extended
- Phenotype for many examples of where it is bad to draw a boundary
- around a particular cell, organ, or individual organism's body. See
- his discussion of Beaver-caused lakes, for example.
-