Organization: Computer Science Department, University of Cape Town
Lines: 27
In <BzJKxs.1L9@iat.holonet.net> ken@iat.holonet.net (Ken Easlon) writes:
How does this:
>I think it's more a case of our emotional state telling us what our mind is
>currently viewing as reality, and this is subject to change with mood.
lead to this:
> but any attempt at emulating consciousness is going to have to
>take emotions into consideration.
There's a hint here of a strange breed of dualism: we being different to our
minds, wherefore we are *informed* about the perception that is carried out by
our minds. Now if this (duality) were to be, then emotions are akin to sieves
that filter parts of our mental perception through to the conscious "I". But
why then is it necessary to emulate this messenger when reproducing consciousness. Why not just focus on emulating the consciouss receptor. Or perhaps have a
messanger that tells all, not as selective as our emotional states.
If this apparent dualism is unintended, then your first quoted sentence implies that conscious perception preceeds emotional interference "... our emotional
state telling us what our mind is [*already*] currently viewing as reality ..."
whence the emotional states at play are secondary agents, altogether dispensible
