NetNews Usenet Archive 1992 #27/NN_1992_27.iso/spool/talk/origins/14258

Internet Message Format | 1992-11-16 | 7.5 KB

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From: kalki33![e-mail]
Newsgroups: talk.origins
Subject: Re: Probability of Evolution
Message-ID: <Fuw9TB12w165w@kalki33>
Date: 14 Nov 92 20:16:38 GMT
References: <[e-mail]>
Reply-To: kalki33![e-mail]
Organization: Kalki's Infoline BBS, Aiken, SC, USA
Lines: 128

[e-mail] (Loren King) writes:

> |> If there isn't a model for abiogenesis "yet", then why do supposedly
> |> reputable scientists make the premature claim that life arose from
> |> non-life? Unless a model can be shown to be correct, then it is not
> |> scientific to claim that the phenomenon occurred, is it? No one has ever
> |> seen a living organism arise from an assemblage of lifeless matter, have
> |> they?
>
> Well, the "claim" is in fact a testable inference: if we can approximate the
> conditions of early earth and generate living matter, then the inference is
> validated.  Now, one might claim that, as we can never really "know" the init
> conditions that existed on earth, we can never "really" validate this inferen
> This claim, however, is tantamount to radical contextualism, and I think if y
> buy into it, then the only way to compare competing explanations is to see wh
> attempt to minimize the complexity and import of their unprovable assumptions
>   I think evolutionary biology does a pretty good job of this.  Everything ho
> together after the hypothesized genesis of life, regardless of the character
> this genesis; further, tests have replicated simple proteins from primordial
> gases and electrical stimulus, further consolidating the inference of biochem
> genesis.

Good. Test the inference. Create a set of initial conditions (sole
criterion--no living organisms of any kind present), allow the
conditions to vary in whatever way you like, and see if you observe life
coming into existence from non-life. Look for, say, an E. coli, or even
a T4 phage. That shouldn't be too difficult.

> Well, okay, but then you have to ask: "what isn't predicated on an article of
> faith, and given this, how do we judge between competing explanations of the
> phenomena?"  Well, how?

It is apparently supposed by some scientists that the existence of
any nonmaterial phenomenon is necessarily predicated on an article of
faith. In other words, God or the soul cannot be observed because only
matter can be observed and God and the soul are not material. This point
of view says, in effect, that no one has ever observed God or the soul
directly, and that all knowledge of them is hearsay, or an article of
faith. But we say no, there are nonmaterial phenomena which exist
objectively and which have been directly observed, so that their
existence is not solely predicated on faith. While it is true that there
are some persons who accept the existence of God and the soul on faith
alone, having only heard about them from certain spiritual authorities,
it is also true that there are many people who are not scientists, but
who accept the existence of many of the phenomena described by science
on hearsay alone, having only heard about these phenomena from
scientists.

> I think we have to ask about the character of our presuppositions, our "artic
> of faith" and whether they are open to the scrutiny of the logic which we
> construct from them.  I call such systems `reflectively open,' in that they a
> critical self-reflection of their base assumptions from within the belief sys
> itself.  Science generally does this.  Religions, for example, generally do n
> For instance, try hypothesizing a god-less system of Christian ehtics from wi
> the Christian belief system ... you can't do it, because once you question th
> basic hypothesis of God's existence, you've left the system.
>   Now, compare this with Einstein, who questioned the basic assumptions of
> Newtonian dynamics (absolute time and space) ... but he stayed within the
> methodological framesork of scientific enquiry while questioning these basic
> assumptions.
>
> I think this is a crucial distinction.
>
>
> In fact, I think it is scientific to claim that live just happened, and to
> formulate coherent testable models based upon this unprovable, but well-
> constructed and falsifiable inference.
>
> For example, consider the Goldbach conjecture in mathematics.  No one can pro
> it, but it has never been disproven by a specific example.  Does this invalid
> the usefulness or `reality' of prime numbers, or make the study of mathematic
> any less valuable?  I don't think so.
>

The Goldbach conjecture, that any even number greater than 2 is the sum
of two primes, is predicated on the existence of the natural numbers,
which include the primes. The existence of natural numbers is generally
regarded as following from a set of hypotheses, such as Peano's axioms.
However, Peano's axioms were formulated long after the natural numbers
were already in de facto use. What Peano's axioms did, in part, was to
give an efficient language in which to formulate statements about the
natural numbers. A great deal (some would say all) of mathematics is
just such a process: developing more efficient ways of speaking about
already existing objects. Occasionally, the mathematics itself will
reveal objects that were unknown before the development of the
particular mathematical formalism which describes them. But this does
not mean that their existence is caused by the mathematical formalism.

Similarly, the "creationist conjecture", that the universe and life are
the creations of an intelligent God, is predicated on the existence of
God. God's existence is thought by some to follow from "faith" in the
scriptures. But the scriptures were written down long after the idea of
God was already in de facto use. What the scriptures do, in part, is to
offer a language in which to formulate statements about God.

Just as Peano's axioms clarified what was known about the basic
structure of the natural numbers, the scriptures clarify what is
basically known about God. And just as Peano's axioms are insufficient
for dealing with many of the higher-order properties of the natural
numbers, so also the scriptures are insufficient for describing all that
can be known about God. But we have not abandoned Peano's axioms,
because, although they are simplistic, they work. So we should not
abandon the scriptures, even though they may be simplistic. What is
needed instead is a more efficient language in which to formulate
statements about nonmaterial phenomena such as God, the soul,
consciousness, and life. This is the mission of the Bhaktivedanta
Institute.

Now, i'm sure you could argue the nature of mathematical truth with us
for many posts, citing the intuitionists, the logico-formalists, etc.
But we have given an analogy whose purpose is not to make a claim about
mathematics, but a claim about nonmaterial phenomena by comparing their
investigation with a certain method of investigation that is found in
mathematics.

Sincerely,
Kalki Dasa


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