home *** CD-ROM | disk | FTP | other *** search
- Newsgroups: sci.crypt
- Path: sparky!uunet!mcsun!sun4nl!ruuinf!piet
- From: piet@cs.ruu.nl (Piet van Oostrum)
- Subject: Re: Demons and Ogres
- Sender: network-news@cs.ruu.nl
- Message-ID: <1992Nov23.103456.4754@cs.ruu.nl>
- In-Reply-To: ritter@cactus.org (Terry Ritter)
- Date: Mon, 23 Nov 1992 10:34:56 GMT
- Reply-To: piet@cs.ruu.nl (Piet van Oostrum)
- References: <1455.517.uupcb@grapevine.lrk.ar.us> <1992Nov22.075548.19378@cactus.org>
- Organization: Dept of Computer Science, Utrecht University, The Netherlands
- Lines: 15
-
- >>>>> ritter@cactus.org (Terry Ritter) (TR) writes:
-
- >> Nonsense. My proposal is that, given the ciphertext, the user
- >> would be required to make it plain. This means that there would
- >> be a responsibility to log old *keys*, not conversations.
-
- TR> RSA gives public-key capability, but is slow. Typically, a
- TR> "public key" cryptosystem will only pass a session key under RSA,
- TR> and then use a faster private-key system to encipher the data.
- TR> Logging the session key would give the ability to recover the
- TR> plaintext at a later date.
-
- So that would make it a criminal offense to have a disk crash?
- --
- Piet van Oostrum <piet@cs.ruu.nl>
-