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- Path: sparky!uunet!zaphod.mps.ohio-state.edu!cs.utexas.edu!usc!news.service.uci.edu!ucivax!ofa123!Erik.Lindano
- From: Erik.Lindano@ofa123.fidonet.org
- Newsgroups: sci.crypt
- Subject: New Encryption - a Challenge
- X-Sender: newtout 0.02 Nov 17 1992
- Message-ID: <n0eeet@ofa123.fidonet.org>
- Date: 18 Nov 92 21:47:04
- Lines: 50
-
- Writes rschnapp@metaflow.com (Russ Schnapp):
-
- > I think you are discounting time value here. The cryptologists
- > who hang out here are probably not terribly interested in carrying
- > out even a known plaintext attack on something encrypted with an
- > unknown algorithm -- they just don't have the time to waste.
-
- Well, if that's the case, then that's the case! :-( I just thought
- they might be thrilled at the opportunity. I know I would've been.
-
-
- > They would much rather look at and analyze the algorithm in order
- > to assess its characteristics (security, speed, patent
- > infringement, etc.).
-
- Eh, sure, of course they would. But we can do the speed tests
- ourselves and search the patents also. We only wanted to know whether
- anyone here could decrypt our test file.
-
- Data encryption is not a theoretical exercise. If the purpose of
- cryptoanalysis had been limited to pontificating on known algorithms,
- life would be sweet and simple, wouldn't it?
-
- > To assert a NIH attitude is absurd, given that there is no _here_
- > here.
-
- Oh yes, there is! Gosh, we even have a FAQ post and everything...
- We have people who support each other against newcomers. There is a
- remarkable solidarity among the "in" crowd. FAQ + solidarity
- creates a definite "here" place. Don't you think? ;-)
-
-
- > The problem is that neophytes show up with "unbreakable" code
- > challenges in sci.crypt on a regular basis (about every other
- > month, or so).
-
- Really? I'll take your word for it, although I've been reading
- this newsgroup for a while and have not seen a large number of
- such challenges.
-
-
- > If your friend is truly interested in having experts assess the
- > security of this algorithm, s/he must submit the _algorithm_ to
- > the experts -- not the _output_ of the algorithm.
-
- We certainly don't want to do that. The output is the challenge,
- not the algorithm.
-
-
- --- Maximus 2.00
-