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- Newsgroups: sci.crypt
- Path: sparky!uunet!telebit!phr
- From: phr@telebit.com (Paul Rubin)
- Subject: Re: Triple DES
- In-Reply-To: leichter@zodiac.rutgers.edu's message of 20 Nov 92 14:43:21 GMT
- Message-ID: <PHR.92Nov20183932@napa.telebit.com>
- Sender: news@telebit.com
- Nntp-Posting-Host: napa.telebit.com
- Organization: Telebit Corporation; Sunnyvale, CA, USA
- References: <921116133628.385022@DOCKMASTER.NCSC.MIL> <1eg516INNrrq@uniwa.uwa.edu.au>
- <1992Nov20.094321.1@zodiac.rutgers.edu>
- Date: 20 Nov 92 18:39:32
- Lines: 13
-
- A pure chosen-plaintext attack against DES would not move directly
- to double DES. But that only says something about ONE PARTICULAR
- ATTACK; it says nothing about the inherent strength of the
- cryptosystem.
-
- It's worse than this. We don't even know that double DES is much
- stronger than single DES against exhaustive search. (We know it's
- at least a little bit stronger).
-
- We know that DES is not a group; however, we don't know that DES
- doesn't *contain* a large group. It might be that only a few of
- the possible DES keys generate elements outside of DES. Anyone
- know better?
-