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- Newsgroups: sci.crypt
- Path: sparky!uunet!gumby!wupost!csus.edu!netcom.com!strnlght
- From: strnlght@netcom.com (David Sternlight)
- Subject: Message digests and key security
- Message-ID: <1992Nov20.165750.15164@netcom.com>
- Organization: Netcom - Online Communication Services (408 241-9760 guest)
- Date: Fri, 20 Nov 1992 16:57:50 GMT
- Lines: 21
-
-
- One scheme to prevent spoofing is to enclose a message digest encrypted
- with one's private key, which can be verified by the recipient by
- using one's public key.
-
- This provides a digest which reflects encryption with one's private key.
- If a recipient can then produce a new digest, encryptied with the sender's
- public key, he now has two streams of cipertext, one representing the
- private key and one representing the public key, he has the plaintext,
- and he has the public key.
-
- Does this make it any easier to crack one's private key than if such
- message digests weren't used at all (ignoring for the moment their
- main purpose)? In particular, does it significantly weaken things?
-
- David
-
- --
- David Sternlight
- (pgp 2.0 and ripem public keys available on request)
-
-