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- Newsgroups: sci.crypt
- Path: sparky!uunet!think.com!mintaka.lcs.mit.edu!knight
- From: knight@gnu.ai.mit.edu (Nighty Knight)
- Subject: Anti-Encryption Laws are none too bright.
- Message-ID: <1992Nov19.234304.15571@mintaka.lcs.mit.edu>
- Sender: news@mintaka.lcs.mit.edu
- Organization: Free Software Foundation
- Date: Thu, 19 Nov 1992 23:43:04 GMT
- Lines: 106
-
- Recently, there has been quite a bit of debate on this newsgroup
- as to the morals and considerations against allowing Public Key into
- the world society. People have been proposing laws against it, and
- giving out examples that are quite paranoia inducing (such as
- Mr. Ritter's child pornographer example.)
-
- My own viewpoint is somewhat tainted toward patching holes which
- exist currently with common, every day computer usage -- I started
- gaining interest in cryptography and application programming with
- encryptions out of necessity to everyday security issues.
-
- Let me try to express my point of view to the public in such a
- way as encryption not only makes sense -- but very good sense.
- Furthermore, I can't help but feel that the government is going to
- shoot themselves in the foot (or possibly a more vital organ) by
- outlawing public key.
-
- I've discovered a large number of backdoors placed in computer
- software, programs which are trusted by banks, large businesses,
- investors, and the like. These holes were placed in these programs
- in such a way as anyone who used them could gain supervisor, root,
- sys_adm, or otherwise super-user rights.
-
- Whenever I discover these, I let the channel deal with them.
- Most of the time "copy protection" is the excuse I get back, and for
- people running PC networks, I can understand the worry makers of
- business software have with the programs they distribute. Having an
- entire network of pirated software is basically more painful then
- a single home copy. They need some way to identify the person who
- invalided the license agreement, and that way is through super-user.
-
- Copy Protection in this regard makes most software purchased
- a liability to security. If placing backdoors in software were
- deemed illegal, then part of the necessity of encryption would go
- away. But since a backdoor is hidden to all but the trained,
- experienced eye, they might be unnoticed for long periods or maybe
- even never. They could also argue it was a "bug" and not deliberately
- placed in thier code. Regardless, I've seen too many examples of
- how backdoors could be triggered to know that any law prohibiting
- them could be effectively "sidestepped"..
-
- Encryption is necessary to keep private material truely private.
- Even if a person gets super-user on your computer, e-mail would be
- safe, documents would be safe, and transaction records would be safe
- (provided they implemented the encryption reasonably.)
-
- As of right now, I'd harbor a guess that entire banks could be
- robbed blind, that investments could be shammed or ruined, and
- more. It doesn't take a C.S. degree to spot these holes in software,
- hackers keep finding holes because they keep being placed right
- where hackers look for them.
-
- If members of the US Government continue to push for more
- "secret" ways to "investigate", they will undoubtably become victims
- themselves. If the makers of the equipment the government uses cannot
- protect themselves from intrusion, then the U.S. Government cannot avoid
- intrusion. I guess they will figure it out when we get nuked by
- a few of our highest-tech jet-planes, or malfunction during combat.
-
- How long will it be before terrorist activities begin on the
- Internet? How long will it be before scientists will have to
- conduct costly battles to keep thier information safe from
- sabotage, alteration or piracy? Even as we speak, programs have been
- written which can disconnect socket connections between any two
- machines. CERT classified this as a "denial of services" security
- violation.
-
- Worse yet -- very brilliant minds would be arrested for having
- a "secure" computer system they built out of self defense. People
- who could have worked for the government will be denied security
- clearance, and will have to move elsewhere to practice thier own
- livelyhood. Literally to be a citizen of the U.S. and to know
- security would be a heinous violation of it, because anyone with but
- a small idea could be a bank robber, terrorist, or otherwise right
- when they discovered thier first backdoor..
-
- Dr. Robert Morris of the NSA wrote to me recently, explaining
- to me that my development of the Mcrypt program was classified in
- the same way as munitions, and high-tech ones at that. They are
- treated in the same way as surface-to-air missiles. After hearing
- that, I'd might as well write off getting a tour of NORAD with the
- rest of the engineers this winter. Its rediculous! I guess I've
- probably created a zoning problem, risking peoples lives having a
- munitions / software encryption "research lab" in a residential
- district. One of my programs might accidently explode, killing
- off most of the neighborhood.
-
- As usual, technology moves far too fast for the fogies on Capitol
- Hill to deal with. The green light needs to be given for the issue of
- computer security to end. Encryption will eliminate all backdoors
- except backdoors that exist in the encryption itself. If backdoors
- become moot, they will stop being added into programs. Bankers and
- brokers can rest easier knowing that people are concerned about thier
- computer safety, and the government, which might not be able to catch
- the child molester with encrypted databases, won't lose the lives of
- soldiers or pilots, and won't have to pay billions in damaged items
- which terrorist hackers destroyed.
-
- (athiests need not read this) Besides, no matter how tough your
- encryption is, you can't hide what you do from either God or your mother.
-
- -- Eric Knight
-
-
- > These opinions are mine, and not that of either my employeer or
- > the Free Software Foundation, whose machines I'm currently (ab)using.
-