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- From: ariel@world.std.com (Robert L Ullmann)
- Subject: Re: New Encryption System - Challenge!
- Message-ID: <Bxw4B1.Lp7@world.std.com>
- Organization: The World in Boston
- References: <1e1632INN94d@roche.csl.sri.com>
- Date: Wed, 18 Nov 1992 02:30:36 GMT
- Lines: 86
-
- I think we ought to give a serious answer to the question:
-
- "I've developed a new, totally different, really, really good encrytion
- algorithm called NuC (pronounced 'nuke' :-), and I understand that it
- isn't going to be taken seriously until it is subjected to, and survives,
- a challenge attack by the real experts. How do I do this?"
-
- (Which is sort of what the base note was saying; give the guy some credit
- for even knowing that sci.crypt exists, and that a challenge attack is
- relevent.)
-
- OK, my shot at a serious answer:
-
- You are proposing that you have a cryptographic device(*) that is
- both:
-
- 1) more intractable that, e.g. DES
-
- 2) intractable enough that it can be safely used to protect millions
- or billions of dollars worth of assets
-
- -or-
-
- 3) is not as effective, but is of serious interest because it uses
- a unique method.
-
- We will discard alternative (3); the obvious answer is to prepare
- a paper describing the innovation, publish it, and either expose youself
- to acclaim, ridicule, or, perhaps, pity.
-
- If your device(*either hardware or software) called NuC is to be
- accepted, it must:
-
- 4) show that it has a theoretical basis for its security other than
- simple obscurity, and
-
- 5) survive challenges by experts who are conversant with the theoretical
- basis.
-
- Now we will back off a little from that: you may want to test its
- ability to resist attack when parts of the algorithm are modified,
- or attempt to conceal the method for a proprietary advantage.
-
- Understand that this will cause nearly all experts to ignore it:
- the probability that it is some method that is (a) known, or (b)
- inane or obviously flawed, or (c) equivalent to a known method,
- is so close to 100% the difference isn't worth considering unless
- there is some indication that this method is different. (Note that
- case (c) is by far the most common case.)
-
- So you still want to run a challenge. Fine. You need to:
-
- 6) provide copies of the device (the software) to the people
- attempting to meet the challenge.
-
- In the real world when NuC is used, the NuC devices will be all
- over the place; reverse engineering one will not be difficult.
- More importantly, we are going to run extensive known-plaintext
- attacks; they are not difficult to run in the real world applications.
- Even given plaintext attacks are fairly easy, and nearly all
- ad hoc encryption methods, probably including NuC, will fall fast
- under a simple differential analysis attack. (Simple A,B,C sort
- of thing, not even using the more recent developments.)
-
- And most importantly, you need to:
-
- 7) Provide a serious reward. Something that will make people with
- better things to do spend time at it. Refer to point #2, and
- plan on offering $100,000.
-
- Too big a risk? But I thought you had this wonderful encryption
- method, better than anything else. You might want to try a smaller
- reward first, and scale it up. Start with $5000.
-
- Best Regards,
- Robert
-
- --
- Robert Ullmann Ariel@World.STD.COM +1 508 879 6994 x226
- Quand Maigret poussa la porte du Tabac Fontaine, vers une heure et demie,
- le patron du bar, qui venait de se lever, descendait lentement un escalier
- en colimaáτon qui s'amoráτait dans l'arriáΦre-salle. ... ArriváΘ derriáΦre le
- comptoir, il repousa le garáτon d'un geste náΘgligent de la main, saisit
- une bouteille de vin blanc, un verre, máΘlangea au vin de l'eau mináΘrale et,
- la táΩte renversáΘe en arriáΦre, se gargarisa. -- Simenon
-
-