NetNews Usenet Archive 1992 #27/NN_1992_27.iso/spool/misc/activism/progress/8464

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From: [e-mail] (Rich Winkel)
Subject: Proceso 538: Peace Process
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/** reg.elsalvador: 124.0 **/
** Topic: Proceso 538: Peace Process **
** Written 10:40 am  Nov 14, 1992 by [e-mail] in cdp:reg.elsalvador **
From: [e-mail] (Centro de Informacion Documentacion y Apoyo a la Invest. - UCAJSC)
Subject: Proceso 538: Peace Process

Center for Information, Documentation and Research Support (CIDAI)
Central American University (UCA)
San Salvador, El Salvador

PROCESO 538
November 11, 1992

PEACE PROCESS:
The U.N. defends the proper execution of the peace accords

     The United Nations has once again forced the government to
rescind attitudes and postures which were contrary to the positive
course of the peace process. In particular, President Cristiani's
recent challenge to that maximum world forum, when he expressed his
opposition to complying with the spirit and the letter of the Ad
Hoc Commission report, has been transformed into an unavoidable
commitment on his part to actually purge the top echelons of the
Armed Forces by issuing two "general orders" (see Editorial). This
change was made possible by the timely intervention of the two
special negotiators sent personally by the U.N. Secretary General.
Even so, the atmosphere continues to be dominated by a persistent
media campaign of destabilization and disinformation from the far
right. In appears that these right-wingers have found no other way
to manifest their impotence and accumulated discontent than to
appeal to coups d'etat, their favorite recourse to defend their
privileges.

Frustrated coups

     The peace process unquestionably faced its most critical
moments over the past several weeks. The imminent execution of the
Ad Hoc Commission's recommendations, which means purging the top
military leaders responsible for massive human rights violations,
has shaken the old structures of domination to their very
foundations.
     In effect, this aspect of the peace accords has presented
especially serious difficulties. The pressures on President
Cristiani to prevent him from cleansing the Armed Forces and
instituting real democracy were denounced in Washington on November
4 by Ad Hoc Commission member Eduardo Molina Olivares. According to
Molina, over the last several months, the hard-line sector of the
military has attempted at least three times to break with the
constitutional order in order to reverse the course of the peace
process. The last attempt was foiled only by the direct
intervention of Gen. George Joulwan, head of the Southern Command
of the U.S. army, who persuaded the plotters to desist from their
plans.
     President Cristiani naturally responded to these revelations
by attempting to discredit them immediately and categorically. "I
rather believe they are full of a great degree of imagination,"
said Cristiani, adding that "we believe instead -and this is
unfortunate- that [Molina] is trying to make political hay with
these charges, using forums where he knows they want to hear what
he is saying."
     Molina's denunciations and warnings are quite credible,
however, not only due to his prestige, but also because they are
supported by a historical tendency within the army: the recourse of
the coup d'etat to abort any efforts at truly democratizing and
modernizing Salvadoran society. Curiously enough, and parallel to
Molina's revelations, legislative deputies from all the political
parties agreed to call the Minister of Defense before the
legislature to explain the content and significance of a series of
meetings between the Vice-Minister, Gen. Juan Orlando Zepeda, and
private sector leaders. According to the deputies, Gen. Zepeda was
holding "political meetings which, according to the law, are
unconstitutional." The text of one of the letters inviting private
sector leaders to a meeting was somewhat obscure, but expressed
"concern about the current national situation and about the
possible future of Salvadoran society, given the different threats
posed by the friends of dictatorship."

Legalization of the FMLN

     Besides strong resistance within the military, the peace
process has had to face other difficulties during recent weeks. The
most relevant incident has to do with the legalization of the FMLN
as a political party. On November 5, the Supreme Electoral Tribunal
(TSE) temporarily postponed the formal registration of the FMLN.
The TSE resolution challenged Articles 2 and 15 of the FMLN's
founding statutes as a party, which describe the FMLN as made up of
five organizations instead of independent citizens. The statutes
also maintain that membership in the party requires membership in
one of those five organizations. According to the TSE magistrates,
this provision violates the constitutional right to freedom of
association.
     The FMLN called the measure a simple formality to delay its
registration as a political party. But the tactic coincided with
ARENA's demands to paralyze the registration of the FMLN as long as
the rebels had not finished demobilizing. Even so, FMLN leaders
said they would respect the TSE's resolution and make the necessary
corrections to the statutes within the stipulated time period.

The peace process gets back on course

     Despite the resistance and difficulties faced in the execution
of the accords, the process of reconciling and democratizing
Salvadoran society continues to consolidate. The eight days of
intense negotiations between the two sides, mediated by Assistant
U.N. Secretary General Alvaro De Soto, bore positive fruit. De Soto
left the country on November 7 with a new peace schedule in his
pocket, along with a solemn promise by both sides to carry out
their remaining responsibilities to the letter. As he left, De Soto
said, "an accord has been reached... on a new schedule to implement
the pending reforms and disarm the guerrillas." An ONUSAL
communique published on November 9 stated that "this augurs well
for the positive unfolding of the delicate stage which approaches
for the peace process, which will culminate with the formal end to
the armed conflict on December 15."
     According to this new schedule, the deadline for cleansing the
armed forces, which was December 15, has been extended a few weeks.
The dissolution of the three remaining elite army battalions has
also been postponed; the first must demobilize before the last of
the FMLN troops do so. With regard to the cleansing of the Armed
Forces, the U.N. refused to give in to President Cristiani's
exception (cf. Proceso 537), nor did it allow him any excessive
delays which could have endangered the conclusion of the peace
process.
     The logic of the new peace calendar assumes that progress has
been made by both sides. In order to avoid future crises,
therefore, no more delays in compliance must be allowed to
accumulate. There is no doubt that the U.N. will have an enormous
responsibility to see to it that the two sides meet their
respective commitments within the new time-frame.


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