home *** CD-ROM | disk | FTP | other *** search
- Newsgroups: comp.security.misc
- Path: sparky!uunet!charon.amdahl.com!pacbell.com!sgiblab!zaphod.mps.ohio-state.edu!pacific.mps.ohio-state.edu!linac!att!att!dptg!ulysses!ulysses!smb
- From: smb@ulysses.att.com (Steven Bellovin)
- Subject: Re: gnumake SGID: potential security hole?
- Message-ID: <1992Nov17.165157.6769@ulysses.att.com>
- Date: Tue, 17 Nov 1992 16:51:57 GMT
- References: <MELLAN.92Nov17131950@syst06.acri.fr>
- Organization: AT&T Bell Laboratories
- Lines: 15
-
- In article <MELLAN.92Nov17131950@syst06.acri.fr>, mellan@syst06.acri.fr (Alain Mellan) writes:
- >
- > I just discovered today that gnumake is installed with SGID bit, and
- > belongs to user root, group kmem.
- >
- > Am I right to be suspicious ? The kmem SGID will allow gnumake to
- > read into /dev/kmem the info needed for load balancing, but is that
- > all?
-
- Someone who can read /dev/kmem can also read interesting things like
- typed passwords in tty input buffers, and disk blocks from read-protected
- files. I have no idea whether or not it's possible to trick gnumake
- into doing those things -- for example, if it doesn't properly reset
- its setgidness and close the file descriptor before execing a user program.
- There's a definite risk here, if things weren't done properly.
-