home *** CD-ROM | disk | FTP | other *** search
- Path: sparky!uunet!zaphod.mps.ohio-state.edu!sol.ctr.columbia.edu!destroyer!cs.ubc.ca!unixg.ubc.ca!unruh
- From: unruh@physics.ubc.ca (William Unruh)
- Newsgroups: comp.os.os2.programmer
- Subject: Re: Why HPFS SHOULD be secret.
- Date: 24 Nov 1992 01:39:06 GMT
- Organization: The University of British Columbia
- Lines: 21
- Distribution: world
- Message-ID: <1es13qINNkjh@iskut.ucs.ubc.ca>
- References: <1992Nov23.194539.20288@murdoch.acc.Virginia.EDU>
- NNTP-Posting-Host: physics.ubc.ca
-
- etb2s@uvacs.cs.Virginia.EDU (Erik Timothy Brandsberg) writes:
-
-
- >...
- >I realized that IBM should NEVER release this information, and if they
- >... If someone decides to make a driver
- >to access the HPFS from DOS or Linux... Then these security measures
- >can very easily be stripped off and anything on the disk can be read
- >by anybody.
- ...
-
- Security by obscurity? Anyone able to install a device driver should be
- able to read everything (eg, root on a Unix system). If you don't ahve
- permission to read everything you should not be ablke to install a new
- device driver either. If IBM allows that then they have made a big
- mistake. If someone can boot bare DOS on your system then your system is
- in trouble anyway. A secure system should either not allow DOS to be
- booted, or should have a password for bootup. Yes, getting a secure
- OS2/WindowsNT/Unix on a 386 will be tough without protection from
- booting into DOS. But trying to keep the details of HPFS hidden isn't a way
- to go.
-