NetNews Usenet Archive 1992 #27/NN_1992_27.iso/spool/alt/callahan/13899

Text File | 1992-11-19 | 3.6 KB | 76 lines

Newsgroups: alt.callahans
Path: sparky!uunet!gator!towers!bluemoon!onetouch!jpalmer
From: [e-mail] (John Palmer)
Subject: Re: God and Science: The Ramblings of The Nightstalker
Organization: MCS/OneTouch, Inc.
Date: Thu, 19 Nov 92 17:15:39 GMT
Message-ID: <[e-mail]>
References: <[e-mail]> <[e-mail]> <[e-mail]> <[e-mail]>,<[e-mail]> <[e-mail]>
Lines: 65

[e-mail] (Speaker-to-Minerals) writes:

>In article <[e-mail]>, [e-mail] (Michael Wasson) writes:
>="Hmm.  One argument I've heard against moral relativism goes like this:
>=If I say, 'I believe the world is flat,' that's a *claim* that the
>=world is, in fact, flat.  You wouldn't say 'I believe the world is
>=flat but I'm wrong.'  Moral relativists seem to be saying something
>=quite like that in the realm of normative truths.  'I personally
>=believe that X is wrong, though it may not be wrong for somebody else'
>=is just like saying 'I believe the world is flat but it may not be
>=flat for somebody else'.  By this argument, moral relativism is not
>=distinct from moral nihilism -- itself a consistent enough position if
>=you care to adopt it, but one most moral relativists would (I think)
>=shy away from."

>Well, if we're going to argue by analogy without presenting arguments as to why
>the analogies might be valid, try this one:
>    I believe injecting 22 units of insulin every morning is good, but it
>    might not be good for somebody else.


     Actually, StM, that's a bit of a straw man. . . since you neglected to
mention that there are obvious different circumstances.

     If you say, however, that injecting 22 units of insulin might be bad for a
person living under different circumstances, you have changed the whole 'moral'
point of the question.

     The one thing that bothers me about relativism is that it seems to be
demanding that you not judge a PERSON as evil for committting such and such an
act, and does so by saying that the evil of the act is determined by the
beliefs of the person.

(That is, you can't say if action A was evil, until you know if Person A
believed that action A was evil.)

    I believe it is good not to call people evil without all the facts.  I
don't see, however, how that makes an action less 'bad.'

    If killing a person is wrong, it is  wrong, regardless of who does it.
Whether the PERSON is evil or not depends on their motivation.

     Pretend there is a culture with super strong honor codes.  A young person
who is perfectly intentioned sees a relative commit a gross impropriety (gets
drunk and makes a pass at the (married) owner of the estate upon which the
party is being held)  According to the rules of 'honor', this young person must
kill this relative.

     Does the morality of the young person depend upon whether or not killing
this relation is 'right' or 'wrong' in the cosmic sense?  (that is, if there
are moral absolutes, and these state that it is wrong to kill the relative,
does that change the fact that this young person will do the right thing, as
s/he sees it?)

    This is my problem with relativism. . . that it's throwing away the baby
with the bath water, that it's attacking a dead issue, etc, etc, etc.

    Is there a form of relativism that doesn't make blame the real issue?  I've
never heard one,but I haven't heard everything.

                                        John/The Crazyman

--
John Palmer                    [e-mail]
Columbus, OH                    ...!uunet!onetouch!jpalmer