NetNews Usenet Archive 1992 #27/NN_1992_27.iso/spool/alt/callahan/13734

Text File | 1992-11-17 | 1.9 KB | 41 lines

Newsgroups: alt.callahans
Path: sparky!uunet!pilchuck!li
From: [e-mail] (Phyllis Rostykus)
Subject: Re: God and Science:  The Ramblings of The Nightstalker
Message-ID: <[e-mail]>
Sender: [e-mail] (The News)
Organization: Data I/O Corporation
References: <[e-mail]> <[e-mail]> <[e-mail]>
Date: Tue, 17 Nov 1992 17:49:43 GMT
Lines: 29

In article <[e-mail]> [e-mail] writes:
>In article <[e-mail]>, [e-mail] (Michael Wasson) writes:
>="Hmm.  One argument I've heard against moral relativism goes like this:
>=
>=If I say, 'I believe the world is flat,' that's a *claim* that the
>=world is, in fact, flat.  You wouldn't say 'I believe the world is
>=flat but I'm wrong.'  Moral relativists seem to be saying something
>=quite like that in the realm of normative truths.  'I personally
>=believe that X is wrong, though it may not be wrong for somebody else'
>=is just like saying 'I believe the world is flat but it may not be
>=flat for somebody else'.  By this argument, moral relativism is not
>=distinct from moral nihilism -- itself a consistent enough position if
>=you care to adopt it, but one most moral relativists would (I think)
>=shy away from."
>
>Well, if we're going to argue by analogy without presenting arguments as to why
>the analogies might be valid, try this one:
>    I believe injecting 22 units of insulin every morning is good, but it
>    might not be good for somebody else.
>OK, now we've got one analogy proving that moral relativism is silly, and one
>analogy proving that moral relativism is well-grounded.
>
>Either that or we've got an example of why arguing by analogy doesn't work.

Liralen giggles, "Especially when neither analogy contains a moral situation."

--
Liralen Li
[e-mail]