Introduction


Ever since the Chinese People's Liberation Army marched into Tibet in 1949-1950, the situation in Tibet has been the object of international concern. In the 1980s and 1990s, various fact finding missions have visited Tibet with a view to assessing allegations of violations by the Chinese authorities of the civil and political, as well as the economic, social an cultural rights of the Tibetan people. These missions have yielded much useful information on various aspects of the situation in Tibet. One of the issues which is often raised in relation to Tibet, but has so far not been researched in depth, is the question of whether or not Tibet can be regarded as a colony of the People's Republic of China. It is this question which the following mission report sets out to answer. On the basis of a short but intensive, fact finding mission to Tibet and to Tibetan centers in Nepal and India, the mission came to the conclusion that Tibet indeed displays the basic elements of colonialism as defined in chapter 5 of the report.

This report is based on an unofficial fact-finding mission to Tibet. The members of the mission would be most pleased to accept an invitation to return to Tibet as official guests of the People's Republic of China, in order to carry out a longer, more comprehensive mission, provided they are permitted to bring their own translators and are given unrestricted access to all areas of their own choice.

The mission would like to express the sincere hope that their findings and recommendations will help to bring about a relationship between the People's Republic of China and Tibet which is more satisfactory to the Chinese and the Tibetan peoples, inside Tibet as well as in exile. In this respect, a clear distinction is made between the Chinese authorities and the Chinese people, and the Chinese people are not held responsible for the concerns noted in this report. Moreover, the mission participants believe that the current situation in Tibet is not only of bilateral concern to the Chinese authorities and the Tibetan people, but also a matter which affects the international community at large. During their visits to Tibetan communities in Nepal and India, they were informed that thousands of Tibetans leave Tibet annually, in spite of the grave dangers of the journey. This was considered to be an important indicator of the level of dissatisfaction among Tibetans inside Tibet. Equally distressing was the fact that many young Tibetans are becoming increasingly frustrated by the fact that the non-violent protest against the Chinese regime in Tibet has so far failed to bring about substantial change. The participants are concerned by the indications that an increasing number of Tibetans are considering violent forms of protest. A prompt and effective resolution to the rising political tension in Tibet is considered to be of great importance to the maintenance of international peace and stability.


Mandate of the mission

The mandate of the mission was to determine whether Tibet shows the characteristics of a colony in its relation to the People's Republic of China; to report on its findings objectively; and to formulate conclusions and recommendations.


Participants

The members of the mission were:

Professor Cees Flinterman (mission leader), Professor of International Law at the University of Maastricht, former Head of the Netherlands Delegation to the UN Human Rights Commission.

Ms Josephine Verspaget, Member of Parliament of the Netherlands, spokesperson of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the PvdA (Netherlands Labour Party), member of the Parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee.

Senator David Norris, Member of the Senate of the Republic of Ireland, bureau member of the joint Oireachtas Committee on Foreign Affairs.

The mission was assisted by a senior representative of the UNPO, an interpreter and independent experts with extensive knowledge of and experience in Tibet.


Itinerary of the mission

28 April to 3 May: Visit to Tibet

Visits were made to the following places in and around Lhasa and Tsethang:

the Potala Palace (the former residence of the Dalai Lama), the Barkor (the Tibetan center of Lhasa), construction sites, Tibet University, primary and secondary schools in Lhasa and neighbouring areas, Ramoche Temple, Jokhang Temple, Cement Factory, Sera Monastery, Ganden Monastery, primary schools and small monasteries near Ganden , Tsethang city and Tsethang nunnery.

3 May: Kathmandu, Nepal

The mission met with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees in Kathmandu, Nepal. They also visited the Tibetan Welfare Office/Reception Centre for new arrivals from Tibet, where they interviewed recently arrived Tibetan refugees, the Jawalakhel Tibetan Handicraft Centre and Tibetan Old People's Home.

4 May: Travel to Delhi and Dharamsala, India

5 - 7 May: Dharamsala (Northern India)

Meetings were held with His Holiness the Dalai Lama; the Kashag (the Cabinet of the Tibetan Government-in-Exile); officials from the Department of Information and International Relations; the Chief Justice Commissioner of the Supreme Justice Commission; the Director of the Election Commission.

The mission also met with members of the Tibetan People's Deputies (the Parliament of the Tibetan Government-in-Exile).

Visits were made to the SOS Tibetan Children's Village School, the Tibetan Institute of Performing Arts and the Transit School for new arrivals from Tibet.

Mission members interviewed new arrivals from Tibet, and met with a number of Tibetan NGOs (Tibetan Women's Association, Tibetan Youth Congress, Gu Chu Sum, National Democratic Party of Tibet, Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy).

9 May: New Delhi

Meetings were held with a number of Indian scholars to discuss the issue of colonialism, particularly in relation to Tibet.


Methodology

Organization and Preparation
The mission was organized and facilitated by the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization (UNPO) , with the assistance of the Tibet Support Groep Nederland (TSG NL) and the International Campaign for Tibet (ICT). With the clear understanding that the three mission participants retained their full independence from the objectives and political affiliations of the above organizations, the mission was mandated to report its findings impartially and objectively.


Conceptual Framework for Analysis
Prior to the mission, the UNPO and the TSG NL commissioned an independent researcher to undertake an analysis of colonialism, which identified the nature and constituent elements of colonialism, (Independent Study on Colonialism and Tibet, Part I). This provided the foundation for the mission's understanding of colonialism, on the basis of which the participants would be able to assess whether or not these elements could be detected in Tibet today.


Entry into Tibet, Nepal, and India
Due to the politically sensitive nature of the current situation in Tibet, it was decided that the mission would keep a low and unofficial profile and that the mission members would operate as private individuals. Three of the mission members and the mission staff entered the People's Republic of China, Nepal and India without difficulty. The fourth mission member, an Eastern European Member of Parliament, was not able to enter the People's Republic of China. For unspecified reasons, he was not issued a visa and was therefore unable to participate in the mission.


Use of experts
During the mission, the three members were assisted by two experts with extensive knowledge on Tibetan culture, language and history. One expert stayed behind in Tibet for three weeks to collect further data, which he later conveyed to the mission.


Limitations
The mission was subject to two types of limitations. The first type of limitation is inherent to any kind of fact-finding mission to Tibet: communicating with Tibetans entails the risk of reprisals against these Tibetans by the authorities. Therefore, contact with Tibetans was restricted to a minimum and has to be conducted with the utmost discretion.

The second type of restriction was the short duration and the limited geographical scope of the mission. This restriction was partly compensated by the fact that the aforementioned experts enabled the mission to use its limited time very effectively and to maximise its opportunities to collect information. Moreover, one of the experts stayed behind in Tibet for three more weeks. In addition, the mission brought its own translator and was thus able to communicate directly with Tibetans whenever possible.


Use of terms and abbreviations
In this mission report, the term 'Tibet' refers to the Tibet Autonomous Region, as well as to the Tibetan Autonomous Counties and Prefectures outside the Tibet Autonomous Region (i.e. in the Chinese provinces Qinhai, Gansu, Sichuan and Yunnan)

TAR: Tibet Autonomous Region, which comprises central Tibet and parts of eastern Tibet

CCP: Chinese Communist Party

PLA: People's Liberation Army

PRC: People's Republic of China


Criteria of colonialism

Prior to the mission the following criteria of colonialism, as identified in the Independent Study on Colonialism and Tibet, Part I, were adopted. It was on the basis of these criteria that the situation in Tibet was assessed:


Establishment of Colonial Rule
Colonial rule is established in one or more of the following three ways: military conquest and subsequent annexation; the conclusion of a treaty or contract; the creation of merchant enclaves followed by settlement.

Colonialism always involves the migration of people from a metropolitan state to a satellite region, but the magnitude of settlement differs from case to case.

Characteristics of Colonial Administration
The original population of the colonised territory is not, or poorly, represented in the colonial government. The interests of the original inhabitants are largely determined by the metropolitan, colonial power.

Colonial rule superimposes national borders. In most cases these borders do not correspond to the local community structure(s) or to the political history of the colonised territory. Often the territory in question had not been organized as a nation state before the advent of the colonial power.

Economic development is planned and imposed by the colonial power and often benefits the metropolitan state at the expense of the satellite region. Resources located in the colony are transferred to or used for the benefit of the metropolitan state and for further processing and marketing by that state.

Civilising mission: the colonial power undertakes to 'civilise' the original inhabitants of a colony. The underlying presumption is that the colonial power possesses a culture/civilisation which is superior in relation to the culture/civilisation of the colonised population(s). In addition, the colonial power often claims that the original population of the colonised territory is unable to rule itself for reasons of political immaturity or economic backwardness.

Cultural exchange between settlers/representatives from the metropolitan state and the original inhabitants of the colony is asymmetrical. The latter adopt more aspects of the culture of the former than vice versa.

Maintenance of Colonial Authority
The reactions of colonial powers to colonial resistance of colonised peoples are based on strategies to eliminate dissent.

The maintenance of colonial authority involves a permanent military presence, consisting of soldiers from the metropolitan state or local soldiers under the command of officers from the metropolitan state.

The maintenance of authority is often strengthened by a policy of population transfer.


Perceptions
Colonised people(s) experience colonial rule as alien. Similarly, citizens from the metropolitan state continue to make a distinction between themselves and the original inhabitants of the colony.

Outcome of the Colonisation Process
Colonisation may result in one or more of the following situations:
1) decolonisation, 2) complete take-over of the colony by the metropolitan settlement community, 3) the continuation of colonial rule over a territory which retains most of its pre-colonial identity or 4) integration into the metropolitan state.

None of the aforementioned criteria is essential in establishing that a certain situation can be described in terms of colonialism . A combination of a number of these criteria is sufficient for determining that a situation is at least de-facto colonial.


Findings

In seeking to answer the question whether the relationship between China and Tibet displays the attributes of colonialism as discussed in section six of this report, the mission found that the Sino-Tibetan relationship does indeed display most of these attributes. Its findings with respect to each of these attributes can be summarised as follows:

Establishment of the current relationship between Tibet and the People's Republic of China


Military conquest and the conclusion of a treaty

The question as to how the current relationship between Tibet and China was established is largely a historical question which would require research beyond the scope of this report. It is an established fact, however, that the Chinese People's Liberation Army marched into Tibet in 1949-1950 and reached Lhasa in 1951. The Seventeen Point Agreement for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet was signed in Beijing in 1951. The validity of this treaty is contested by Tibetans on the grounds of coercion.

Merchant enclaves and settlement

Commercial life in the urban areas visited by the mission was found to be clearly dominated by Chinese rather than Tibetan entrepreneurs. Commercial centres both in the urban areas and the countryside attract Chinese entrepreneurs from neighbouring Chinese provinces, in particular from Sichuan Province. While noting that there is a considerable number of wealthy Tibetan entrepreneurs in Lhasa, the mission gained the impression that the majority of wealthy enterprises in Lhasa and Tsethang are owned and run by Chinese entrepreneurs and that the conditions for economic success are set by Chinese rather than by Tibetans.

The following examples reinforce this impression:

On the compound of the Lhasa Cement Factory the majority of the owners of small make-shift grocery stalls and street vendors were all Chinese.

The mission observed that in Lhasa and Tsethang, the Tibetan part of town had been reduced to a small area on the outskirts of the new town. The Tibetan buildings were surrounded by a much larger area of new, modern Chinese style buildings. While noting that a number of Tibetans lived in these Chinese style, urban areas, it appeared that many of those buildings were owned by and/or inhabited by Chinese people. The mission noticed that the Tibetan city of Lhasa had been reduced to a Tibetan quarter, which resembles a folk-art tourist attraction, rather than a developing and self-reliant town. In Tsethang, it was observed that the center of the new city is dominated by modern Chinese style entertainment industries, such as brothels, beer restaurants and karaoke bars. The traditional Tibetan houses are now located on the fringes of the city.

In one shop in the eastern part of Lhasa, along the Beijing Dong Lu, a Tibetan shop girl explained that the Chinese owner preferred to have Tibetan rather Chinese shop girls behind the counter, suggesting that the owner attempted to create the appearance that the shop was Tibetan. The mission thus learned that a number of shops which may look as if they are run by Tibetans are in fact owned by Chinese.

In the areas visited by the mission, Chinese settlement in rural areas remained largely restricted to places of commercial interest, such as road side shops and restaurants, military bases, industrial sites, green house agriculture centers and major tourist attractions.


Administration of Tibet

Political representation:

The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) plays a dominant role in the Chinese administration. The fact that the Secretary of the Tibet Autonomous Region branch of the CCP is Chinese is an important indicator that the ultimate decision making power in Tibet rests with the Chinese government in Beijing. This observation is reinforced by the fact that the People's Liberation Army in Tibet consists almost entirely of Chinese soldiers and officers.

It was noted that the authorities in Tibet are keen to highlight the role of Tibetans in the political decision making process. The following example reinforced this impression: the Chinese guide, who worked for the state-run travel agency CYTS and who appeared to be well-informed about current political affairs in China and Tibet, was asked who was the most powerful person in Tibet. The guide answered that this was Mr Ragdi (a Tibetan who is generally known for his pro-Beijing views). However, it is a well-established fact that Mr Chen Kuiyuan, whom the guide did not mention, is the most important and powerful cadre in Tibet, both in rank and in practice. Mr Ragdi is the deputy Secretary of the CCP (TAR branch), while Mr Chen Kuiyuan is the Secretary.

Recently arrived Tibetan refugees in Nepal and India expressed little trust in Tibetan high-ranking officials. They conveyed to the mission that, with a few exceptions, these officials are 'like toys in the hands of Chinese and hold no real power. Tibetans who speak out, such as the former mayor of Lhasa, are fired or demoted to low administrative jobs.'

Many aspects of life, such as travelling and communicating with foreigners, are controlled by the authorities rather than by the private individuals in question. The following examples will clarify this observation:

It was noted that contact with ordinary Tibetans at cultural heritage sites, such as the Potala Palace, is clearly monitored by officials. In the Potala Palace a monk pointed to one of the Tibetan officials, commenting that 'the Chinese' were very dangerous. This remark was considered significant as it suggested that the monk viewed the Tibetan official as part of the Chinese administration rather than as a Tibetan official.

The mission's visit to Tsethang was delayed by several hours because the (Tibetan) tourist guide who was to accompany the mission had to obtain travel permits from the Public Security Bureau authorities. For reasons not specified by the authorities, the guide, who has extensive experience on obtaining travel permits, was unable to obtain the permit at first. A Tibetan who overheard the conversation between the guide and the mission remarked: 'We have no control over these decisions.'

One of the mission members was told by a newly arrived Tibetan refugee, who used to live in a retreat in the mountains near Trayerpa Monastery (Takste), that he had been forced to change his life after the authorities had started to levy a monthly 'cave tax'. He remarked: 'The mountains no longer belong to us. Now we have to rent them from the Chinese.'

Many of the newly arrived farmers from Tibet mentioned that they had to pay heavy taxes. A number of farmers interviewed by the mission explained that they had to hand over part of their harvest to the authorities, sell part of it at a low price, and the part they were allowed to keep was not enough to live on. One Tibetan from a Tibetan Autonomous County in Qinghai who worked as a tax collector told the mission 'Whenever I went on my tour to collect taxes from the Tibetans I felt very sad because I know that the farmers had very little or not enough to feed their own families, but if I failed to collect the required quantity, they would deduct it from my monthly salary.'

Another farmer from one of the Tibetan Autonomous Counties in Qinghai Province explained that he had been forced to leave his home after the authorities decided to build a dam in the Machu River. He and approximately 500 other Tibetan farmers had been resettled in an area which was very isolated. There was no road fit for motor vehicles and the only way to cross the river was by boat. The area was too far away from any school for his children and therefore he decided to bring his children to India so they could be educated in one of the Tibetan schools in exile.

The authorities in Tibet regularly make use of unpaid laborers, e.g. for the construction of roads or government offices. New arrivals from Tibet in Kathmandu related that failure to participate in these projects results in having to pay a fine. They told the mission that the Tibetans who are working on these projects generally do not have a say in the planning and construction process and that the authorities are often the primary beneficiaries of these projects. This is particularly the case in the construction of roads leading to major mines.

Borders

The Chinese geographical definition of Tibet as one Tibet Autonomous Region and a number of Tibetan Autonomous Prefectures and Counties1 incorporated in Qinghai, Yunnan, Gansu and Sichuan, is a unilaterally imposed administrative organization of an area which Tibetans perceive as one region consisting of the three provinces Utsang, Amdo and Kham. The current borders between the Tibet Autonomous Region and the Tibetan areas incorporated in the Chinese provinces Sichuan, Qinghai, Gansu and Yunnan partly correspond to the borders of the pre-1950 Tibetan provinces Utsang (Central Tibet), Amdo and Kham. But in a number of areas, e.g. in the case of the western border of Kham, the new borders cut across historical boundaries.

Control over and use of resources

Many centres of major commercial interest are dominated and/or controlled by Chinese entrepreneurs or the authorities. Apart from the Barkor, the Tibetan centre of Lhasa, the mission did not see any centres of commercial interest which were dominated by Tibetans.

The following examples reinforce this general observation:

In the Lhasa Cement Factory, the mission conducted a series of short conversations with the workers at the plant. The factory was built by the authorities, after the Chinese annexation of Tibet. It was noted that most of the ordinary workers of the Cement factory were Tibetans, while the higher level management consisted mainly of Chinese. The working conditions at the factory were unsanitary and the hands of a number of the workers had peculiar stains and scars as if they had been exposed to harmful chemicals. The mission discovered that the cement is mainly used for Chinese style new construction projects in urban areas. On the basis of cursory observation and conversations with workers at construction sites, the impression was that the main beneficiaries of these new buildings are Chinese officials and entrepreneurs.

A number of Tibetans mentioned that the Chinese authorities are involved in uranium mining in Tibet, and that the uranium is subsequently transferred to mainland China. The mission was told that the workers in these uranium mines come from mainland China for the mining, that these mines appear to be administered under the control of the military, and that Tibetans are denied entry into these mines. Although the mission was unable to carry out any on-site research on this subject, it took note of these remarks and was concerned that Tibetans are not given access to information on this subject. (see recommendation no. 9b)

There are many reports of large scale logging and export of timber to China. A recently arrived Tibetan couple from Chamdo and Bawa in eastern Tibet confirmed these reports. Tibetans in exile expressed concern that this deforestation (primarily in eastern Tibet ) has a negative impact on the fragile ecosystem of Tibet and Central/South Asia at large.

A monk at the Potala Palace spoke about the current location of the original treasures of the Palace. The monk informed the mission that a selection of the most valuable books and other treasures from the Palace had been transferred to Beijing, for 'safe keeping' and 'conservation'.

The tourist industry, which is an important economic resource, is largely dominated by Chinese. The main and best-equipped tourist agencies are Chinese government institutions, such as the CITS and the CYTS. There are indeed some Tibetan run travel agencies, which are much smaller and which generally cater to low-budget travellers. The mission learned from a Chinese tour guide from Shanghai, that one of the incentives to come to Tibet was that he earned more in Tibet than in Shanghai for the same type of work. It was also learned that since December 1996 more than sixty Tibetan tour guides who had been educated in India had been fired and replaced by Chinese and Tibetan guides who had been educated in Tibet or China.

A foreign tour guide who had visited Tibet for many years, told the mission that the type of tourist industry which was being developed and promoted by the authorities resulted in turning the highlights of Tibet's spiritual heritage into an economic commodity and destroying Tibet's distinctive culture, identity, architecture and the traditional way of life of the Tibetan people. The tour guide complained that many tourists were losing interest in Tibet for that reason and that he considered relocating his tours to other parts of the world.

The mission noted that one of the rooms of the Potala Palace, which used to be an assembly hall for the monks, had been turned into a Chinese tea pavilion, with Chinese-style chandeliers of tinted glass. Compared to the normal prices in Lhasa's restaurants, the prices of tea and cold drinks were extremely high. According to one of the Potala monks the profit went to the authorities administering the Potala Palace.

On the basis of its own observations, the mission believes that the Chinese authorities try to exploit Tibet's economic potential and also permit private Chinese entrepreneurs to do so at the expense of the Tibetan population.

Civilising Mission

Some of the English speaking Chinese which the mission came into contact with were positive and sympathetic towards the Tibetan people and culture. However, they were all employed in the tourist business and were likely to have a vested interest in pleasing their customers. It was not possible to carry out in-depth interviews about their perceptions of and attitude towards the Tibetan people, but it was clear that the majority of the Chinese have come to Tibet to make money and that they show little or no interest in the Tibetan culture and lifestyle. Those Chinese with whom the mission talked considered the replacement of ancient Tibetan buildings by new Chinese-style structures as necessary and useful.

The views expressed by the official newspaper, the China Daily, were markedly different from those of the Chinese people contacted by the participants. During the mission's visit the China Daily denounced the Dalai Lama, who is perceived by the overwhelming majority of the Tibetans as the essence of Tibetan Buddhism, in aggressive and condescending terms. Among other things, the newspaper accused the Dalai Lama of not being a genuine, 'normal' Buddhist. The newspaper even accused the Dalai Lama of betraying Buddhist doctrine. On 21 April 1997 the China Daily reported:

By using Tibetan Buddhism as a political tool to incite separatism, the Dalai Lama has engaged in a number of activities to wreck Tibet and the Buddhist religion, to destroy the religion's normal order, and to wilfully violate religious disciplines. He has committed many evil acts that betray the religion's goals as well as Buddhist doctrines.2

The paradox of a declared atheist Chinese leadership defining the criteria for 'genuine Buddhism' was striking. It was noted that the China Daily articles on the Dalai Lama were not signed. This was interpreted to signify that the article expressed the official view of the Chinese government.

It was learned that during the mission's stay in Tibet, a series of political re-education sessions were being conducted in a number of the monasteries visited by the mission. On one of the main walls of the Jokhang temple in Lhasa, a large bright yellow notice was discovered which announced the results of the first series of exams which are part of the political re-education programme conducted at the temple. One of the Jokhang monks discreetly contacted was asked what he thought about the political re-education session which were being conducted in the afternoon. He answered that the classes were compulsory for all monks. He added that all monks had to study four books in the course of a period of three months. The first book, on law, had just been completed and the exam results were displayed on the yellow notice board on the wall. The monk explained:

We have to study four books. The first one deals with legal issues. We did not have a real problem with this book. Now we have to study the second book, which deals with Tibetan history. This will cause problems, as we are not prepared to accept the Chinese version of Tibetan history.

In the same temple, the mission noticed a room full of modern, tubular chairs, in which, according to one of the Jokhang monks, re-education classes took place. It was noted that this room was markedly different from any of the rooms used for religious education, in which monks sit on the floor behind low, long wooden tables, facing each other. It was perceived as significant that the political re-education classes made use of furniture brought in from outside the monastery for this occasion. The fact that this happened within the context of political re-education reaffirmed the impression that the political re-education classes constitute the imposition of one (political) culture upon another.

The mission gathered some information booklets and brochures on Tibet in hotels and offices, which invariably portray the old pre-1949 Tibetan society as dark, feudal, primitive, superstitious and backward and describe the 'new' society as scientific, rational, practical and modern. The collected material shows that the Chinese authorities go to great length to explain that they have come to Tibet to help the area to develop economically, politically, culturally and socially. The following quotes from a tourist guidebook for sale in Lhasa illustrate this point:

A reporter from the Italian news service asked high ranking official of the Chinese government in Beijing (an ethnic Tibetan), 'Do you think the Tibetan people could have got rid of the feudal serf system on their own, instead of letting the Han people liberate them?' Jigme Ngapoi Jigme replied: 'In old Tibet it would have been very difficult for the Tibetan people to liberate themselves, since Tibet had long been under the feudal serf system, which allowed the majority of the Tibetan people no political and social rights. If you really understand the actual social conditions at that time, you will comprehend that it would have been difficult for the Tibetan people to overthrow the feudal serf system without the help of the Central Government and the People's Liberation Army.3

In a section on economic development, the guidebook states:

Pests and weeds in the fields are also under control. In the past, since religious people thought that killing pests meant taking lives, they wouldn't accept the idea of using pesticides. Thus over 1 million mu were attacked by harmful insects and over 1.3 mu overrun by weeds (...) Meanwhile a large number of scientific and technical personnel have gone to the fields, explaining the necessity of destroying insects and teaching the farmers how to destroy insects and weeds.

And:

Tibetans have gradually come to realise that animal husbandry will have a bright future only if they attach great importance to scientific and technological development.4


Cultural exchange/Acculturation

In the places visited by the mission a clear acculturation process is taking place, and cultural exchange is asymmetrical. In a number of cases this process was imposed, but in other cases it appeared to be unintentional.5

One of the clearest examples in this respect is that many Tibetans are living in the new Chinese style urban areas, e.g. Lhasa and Tsethang, while no Chinese person was encountered living in the traditional Tibetan quarters of these two cities.

It was noted that many traditional Tibetan buildings are torn down and replaced by new structures. Some of the new houses in the Barkor (the Tibetan centre of Lhasa) resemble the traditional architecture. The new buildings in other parts of Lhasa and in Tsethang bear little or no resemblance to Tibetan architecture. It was clear to the mission that the construction taking place in parts of Tibet largely consists of modern, Chinese style buildings which are superimposed on the Tibetan cities and towns.

Chinese is the dominant language which everyone is expected to speak. On the other hand, Tibetan is perceived by the Chinese as a 'minority language', which only those belonging to that 'minority' are expected to speak. It was learned that the presence of a handful of Chinese students in a classroom automatically entails that the language of education is Chinese. This demonstrates that Tibetans are expected to learn Chinese, while Chinese do not have to learn Tibetan, even though they live in Tibet. Tibetans are generally handicapped in the education system as they tend to lag behind their fellow Chinese students. Moreover, Tibetans who do not acquire sufficient command of the Chinese language face limits in finding a job after graduation.

The mission visited the University of Tibet and was welcomed by the staff members of the University who were helpful and friendly. After an extensive tour around the campus and visits to several classrooms, the mission noted that the dominant language of education is Chinese. As far as could be discerned, at least 95% of the lectures were given in Chinese. A student working at the computer department told the mission that the two languages used in the computer classes are Chinese and English. He added that experts were working on a Tibetan language programme, and it was about to be introduced at the University. Later it was discovered that Tibetan language programmes have existed for a long time and are in use in Tibetan communities in India and in Tibetan institutions in the West. This raised the question of why Tibetan language computer programmes were not yet used in Tibet itself, if these programmes were readily available in other parts of the world.

The mission conducted a series of conversations with students at the university and asked some specific questions about the language of education. It was noted that all university textbooks, with the exception of those used in the course on Tibetan language and literature, are written in Chinese instead of Tibetan.
The mission visited a number of student dormitories at the University of Lhasa and talked to a Tibetan student who shared his room with three others including one Chinese student. Although this Chinese student had been living in Tibet for a number of years, he did not speak a word of Tibetan and the Tibetan boy had to act as a translator between the Chinese student and the mission participants.

As far as the mission members could make out, most of the senior staff of the university were Chinese. The members were shown around by a Chinese woman who was born in Tibet and spoke some Tibetan. The mission's translator could make out that she did not speak it very well and that most other Chinese staff members did not speak it at all.

The mission attended an art class and noted that most of the drawings, some of which were very fine indeed, were painted in the classical Chinese style. The portraits of Tibetan nomads, however beautiful, were painted in a western European style. Whether students were indeed discouraged from producing art in the traditional Tibetan style, or whether it was their own choice to follow another cultural tradition, was questioned.

It was noted that each classroom had big portraits of Mao Zedong on its walls. The pictures were accompanied by a Chinese slogan with a translation in Tibetan.

The mission was struck by the fact that the University of Tibet does not have a law department. Lawyers in Tibet receive their legal education in China. This implies that only Chinese law as such will be applied in Tibet. No activities seem to be under way within the university of Tibet to codify the laws of an autonomous Tibet (e.g. family law, land law, etc.), let alone to set up a legal education programme with due respect for Tibetan national laws.

The Lhasa Traffic Middle school, which appears to have been part of a transport work-unit in the past, is now an ordinary middle school. Most of the pupils in the class were Chinese and the language of education was Chinese. When a mission member asked how many students in the class could write their names in Tibetan, it turned out that only one student was able to do so.

Aware of the official policy of bilingualism for public notices and signs, the mission checked carefully whether this policy was upheld in Lhasa and Tsethang. In the modern parts of Lhasa and Tsethang, most street signs and notices are in Chinese. Whereas most public signs are bilingual, the Tibetan letters are generally smaller than the Chinese ones and in some cases even absent. On several shops and restaurants, the Tibetan language signs are a direct transliteration from the Chinese rather than a Tibetan expression or name. In most cases the inscriptions and signs at military sites are only in Chinese. While most public notices were indeed in Chinese and Tibetan, it was noted that the inscriptions on military bases and military institutions were generally only in Chinese. The mission also noticed that certain traffic signs provided Chinese language warnings only. For example, on a road construction site on the road from Lhasa to Ganden, a sign which warned drivers of an upcoming road block was only in Chinese.

Tibetan language newspapers do exist, but they are hard to find. Chinese and English language newspapers on the other had are readily available in local shops and hotels. Mission members tried to find Tibetan language television and radio programmes in all hotels it stayed in and at many different moments of the day. However, they were not able to find these programmes. It appears that Tibetan language television and radio programmes are either few in number or transmitted at unusual hours or both.

The music played on the street, in restaurants, bars and other public places is pre-dominantly Chinese. Special attention was paid to the advertisements at the cinema, which were either in Chinese or in English. No Tibetan language videos were found. In a number of cases English films were dubbed in Chinese but not in Tibetan.

It was noted that very few Chinese in Tibet could speak Tibetan. Even those who were born in Tibet or had lived there for many years, rarely spoke Tibetan. Those who did speak Tibetan had extremely limited language skills. From conversations with Tibetans and Chinese on this subject, it was learned that Chinese and Tibetans believe that it is not necessary for Chinese living or working in Tibet to be able to speak Tibetan. Urban Tibetans on the other hand, need to learn Chinese in order to be able to function fully in their own urban society. In one Chinese restaurant on the Beijing Donglu, the mission tried to order food in Tibetan, but the Chinese waiters and waitresses were unable to understand. After several minutes a Tibetan girl working in the kitchen was asked to translate for the mission from Tibetan into Chinese. However, her command of Chinese was not sufficient for this task. As some of the staff spoke fluent English, orders were then taken in English. The Tibetan girl told the mission she was from a rural area and had recently started her job in the Chinese restaurant. When asked how much she earned per month, she answered she was rather uncertain about this. After her first month she had received RMB 300 while her colleagues earned around RMB 1000 a month. When asked why there was a difference between her salary and those of her colleagues, she answered that she did not know as her Chinese was not good enough to ask for an explanation. It was clear that the girl was severely handicapped by not being able to speak and understand Chinese sufficiently.

Maintenance of Authority

Suppression of dissent

On many occasions Tibetans raised political issues, even though they were not formally interviewed on political subjects. It became clear that the level of political discontent is widespread in urban areas as well as in the countryside. As stated in the introduction of this mission report, it was alarming to learn that thousands of Tibetans leave Tibet annually, in spite of the dangers of the journey across the mountains as well as harassment by the Chinese and Nepalese police. This fact is a significant indicator of the dissatisfaction of the Tibetan people with the current situation in Tibet.

Given the well documented fact that the mere expression of political criticism of the Chinese authorities or policies, as well as support for the Dalai Lama, may lead to prison sentences ranging from two to ten years, the mission felt that any expression of dissent in Tibet was significant.

In the Potala Palace, the mission was secretly given a note by a monk, with the following text in English: 'Tibet is not China's territory. Tibet needs assistance from your country to regain its freedom.' The writer of the note decided to pass on the note regardless of the fact that a policeman was standing close to him, albeit with his back turned towards the monk. It was surprising that the monk had signed the note with his name. He was apparently willing to risk a prison term of several years if the note had been discovered by the authorities. His resentment against Chinese rule over Tibet was obviously very strong indeed. In order to protect the identity of the monk, it was decided not to include a copy of the hand-written note in this report.

Many of the main tourist sites are under heavy surveillance, both by video cameras and microphones as well as by officials. Particularly in the Potala Palace, the number of video cameras was extraordinarily high and most of the cameras are directly pointed at the seats of the monks rather than the books, statues or other cultural treasures.

In one of the main temples in Lhasa, a hand-written slogan in red chalk was discovered on the wall, which stated: 'Tibet is independent' The person who had written this slogan was apparently prepared to risk severe repercussions. Later, similar slogans were found elsewhere.7

Criticism of the Chinese regime is being systematically silenced. It was learned that Tibetans speaking out for independence or criticising the Chinese regime face the risk of being arrested and detained for several years. The suppression of political dissent remains more or less invisible to those unable to speak or understand the Chinese language or without expert knowledge of the area. The flow of information on this subject is severely restricted, not only to foreigners but also to Tibetans themselves. It was striking that a number of extremely high profile Tibetan political prisoners had been sentenced in a secret trial in Shigatse, one of Tibet's main cities, but that no one in Tibet appeared to be aware that this trial had taken place. This is all the more remarkable since the trial took place immediately prior to the mission's visit and that it concerned an issue of major importance to all Tibetan people: the dispute over the succession of Tibet's second most important spiritual leader, the Panchen Lama.

In Tibet itself, the mission witnessed subtle acts of suppression of dissent. On 29 April the mission happened to witness a public, military ceremony in front of the Potala Palace. During the raising of the national flag of the People's Republic of China, a number of soldiers beat up a Tibetan onlooker, apparently in answer to a critical remark. These soldiers belonged to the music band of the PLA.

A discrepancy was observed between strong and widespread discontent with the current political regime in Tibet on the one hand, and a virtual absence of graffiti, wall posters or other forms of natural, popular protest on the other hand. The rare examples given in the previous paragraphs are the exceptions rather than the general pattern in this respect. The mission interpreted this discrepancy as an indication that the repercussions of discovered dissident views and activities prevent the open expression of criticism. This conclusion was strengthened on a number of occasions.

The absence of pictures of the Dalai Lama in the market, monasteries or other public places was noted. Several pictures of the Dalai Lama were discovered in private rooms and in some cases these pictures were covered by other pictures or wall carpets. Mission members were constantly approached by Tibetans who asked for pictures of the Dalai Lama. The fact that these pictures are not for sale at the market nor permitted to be on display in public places is part of the systematic restriction of religious and political rights of the Tibetan people to freely show devotion to and support for the Dalai Lama.

Despite the widespread if subtle expressions of Tibetan nationalism, the traditional Tibetan flag was entirely absent. The Chinese national flag, on the other hand was prominently displayed even in such traditional Tibetan places as monasteries and nunneries. It was concluded that the authorities in Tibet are strictly prohibiting any manifestations of Tibetan nationalism. This is corroborated by official statements of Chinese officials who repeatedly call for measures to combat 'splittism' in Tibet:

Maintaining stability is one of the two major tasks of our region. (...) In the past decades, since the Dalai clique betrayed the Motherland and fled away, their sabotage activities of the conspiracy to separate the motherland have never stopped. We emphasise the Tibetan language, development, the improvement of the living standards of the masses, the importance of unity, prosperity, and the construction of a civilised Socialist Tibet. The basic condition for it is to stop and prevent the damaging acts of the Dalai clique and create a social atmosphere in which we can concentrate our energy on economic development.6

Tibetans inside Tibet said that programmes from the Voice of America are frequently jammed, and expressed great concern about this to the mission. Some Tibetans complained that they were not able to find the Voice of America programme, nor the recently started Tibetan language service of Radio Free Asia on their new radios. It was not possible to verify whether this was due to a deliberate effort by the authorities to stop Tibetans from listening to the programme, but the mission noted that Tibetans are concerned about the lack of access to reliable information about Tibet and international affairs.

Military/Police

During the mission's visit, the PLA presence among civilians was rather discreet. On the other hand the PLA barracks on the outskirts of Lhasa and Tsethang are large. One of the main objectives of the heavy, army presence appears to be to deter potential unrest as well as to establish the physical reality of the Chinese regime in Tibet. The mission was informed that PLA presence is extremely heavy during times of political unrest as well as during sensitive dates, such as 10 March, the anniversary of the mass uprising in Lhasa in 1959. It was discovered that most of the daily monitoring of political protest is carried out by the Public Security Bureau or by the People's Armed Police.

A considerable number of military trucks and convoys were seen on some of the main roads in Lhasa, as well as on the road between Lhasa and Meldrokungar and between Lhasa and Tsethang. On 1 May, at least 46 east-bound military fuel trucks were counted on the road from Ganden to Lhasa.

The mission noted a clear difference between the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) on the one hand and the Public Security Bureau (PSB) on the other hand. As far as could be discerned, the PLA consisted entirely of Chinese soldiers and officials, while the majority of the PSB personnel were Tibetans. One Tibetan commented: 'We do not like it if Tibetans join the PSB, but we can understand it. It is hard to find work and we need to feed our families.' No interaction was observed between the Chinese PLA and the Tibetan people. In daily life, there is little or no contact between the army and the Tibetan population. The army appears to be a garrison army brought in from outside, living in isolation from the local population on its own private compound with its own facilities. The PSB on the other hand is part of the local population, speaks the same language, and visits the same restaurants, shops and night clubs.


Population transfer

A clear pattern of continuous and intensifying Chinese migration into Tibet was discerned. In Tibet itself the mission was not in a position to verify whether or not the influx of Chinese settlers was the result of a deliberate policy by the Chinese government. However, statements were taken from Tibetans in Nepal and India that Beijing practices a policy of population transfer in Tibet. Moreover, it was learned that Tibetans regard this phenomenon as a serious threat to the preservation of their culture, religion and distinctive identity. They fear that the increasing presence of Chinese economic migrants from neighbouring provinces could place the Tibetan population in position of economic subordination.

Note was taken of the considerable amount of independent research which has been carried out on the subject of population transfer. A recent and in-depth report about population transfer in Tibet concludes:

Our research has demonstrated that the Chinese government is responsible for having set up a framework which facilitates and encourages migration to Tibet. (...) Immigrants to Tibet are dominating new market opportunities, encroaching on agricultural land and marginalising Tibetans in their own economy.7


Chinese and Tibetan Perceptions of each other

Chinese perceptions

Tibetans and Chinese view each other as foreigners, or 'alien' peoples. All Chinese contacted emphasised that they were different from Tibetans. They stressed that the Tibetan language was very different from Chinese, and that Tibetan was an extremely difficult language to learn. They added that the Tibetan culture and life-style were very different from the Chinese culture and lifestyle. Many Chinese said that they had come to Tibet purely for economic reasons, and that they would have preferred to stay at home if the economic prospects there had been more favorable. Many Chinese settlers in Tibet maintain strong links with their home bases in China, where they often spend the winter months. Many Chinese send their children to schools in their home provinces. Even those who have lived in Tibet for many decades continue to consider themselves residents of their hometowns in mainland China.

Tibetan perceptions

It is significant that there are very few inter-marriages, despite the fact that many Chinese have lived in Tibet for more than one generation.


Tibetans clearly perceive the Chinese residents in Tibet as outsiders, or strangers. Those Tibetans who were asked to comment on this said that the difference between Tibetans and Chinese concerned many aspects, including race, religion, language, traditions and lifestyle. One Tibetan commented that the fact that travelling inside Tibet is controlled by (Chinese) authorities clearly shows that Tibet is under foreign control.


Outcome of the Colonisation Process

It is clear that Beijing's policy on Tibet is to continue to absorb Tibet into the People's Republic of China. Recognising that Tibet has so far largely remained economically, culturally and socially separate from the PRC, Beijing appears to be doing its utmost to integrate Tibet fully into China. For this purpose, it uses various political, economic, and educational/cultural tools:

It was observed that the word 'Tibet' on public signs is practically always accompanied by the word China. The title of the most widely sold tourist map and tourist guidebook in Lhasa reads: China's Tibet. A number of publications were found under the same name, including a magazine. Moreover, the large number of Chinese national flags in Tibet, both in the cities as well as in the countryside, was striking. For example, the number of Chinese national flags in Tibet was much higher than in Xian, where the mission stopped over en route to Lhasa.

The Chinese government attempts to integrate the Tibetan economy fully into the economic system of China proper. During the mission's stay in Tibet, the China Daily published an article which explicitly referred to economic development in Tibet as a way to undermine 'splittism'.

With respect to the issue of integration, the mission observed a difference between urban and rural areas in Tibet. In the areas visited by the mission, it was noted that the Chinese presence in the Tibetan countryside is limited to administrative centers, industrial sites as well as places of commercial interest, such as villages along the main roads. There were no Chinese farmers or rural settlers. It seemed that at present a dual track process is taking place, with Tibet's cities, major towns and road side villages becoming increasingly linked to mainland China, while Tibet's countryside remains more or less isolated. The further extension of the road network into rural areas will have a major impact in this respect.

Recently arrived Tibetans interviewed in Nepal and India clearly favored independence or at least a high degree of autonomy for Tibet. During an in-depth interview with the Dalai Lama in India, the mission learned that the Tibetan Government-in-Exile has presented the Chinese government with detailed proposals on a form of association between Tibet and China which would leave the Chinese government in charge of foreign affairs and defence and which would leave the responsibility for all other affairs with a locally and democratically elected Tibetan government in Lhasa. It was also learned that the Chinese government has so far not indicated any willingness to negotiate with the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan Government-in-Exile about any of these proposals, and continues to integrate Tibet further into the People's Republic of China.


Concluding observations and recommendations

On the basis of the foregoing assessment of the question of whether the characteristics of colonialism, as defined in the mission statement, apply to the current situation in Tibet, it was concluded that Tibet is a de-facto colony of the People's Republic of China. This conclusion is based on the following findings:

Establishment of Colonial Rule
Communist Chinese rule over Tibet was established by means of a military intervention and the subsequent conclusion of a treaty. This was followed by a gradual process of establishing an administration under the strict control of the Chinese Communist Party and settlement of Chinese nationals in Tibet.

Administration of the Colonised Territory
Tibetans have little or no decision making power in the administration of Tibet. This observation extends to the political as well as social, economic and cultural aspects of administration.

The current division of Tibet in the Tibet Autonomous region and the Tibet Autonomous Prefectures/Counties runs counter to the Tibetan concept of Tibet as consisting of one unified territory divided into three provinces. In a number of instances the borders of the TAR do not correspond to the historic Tibetan provincial borders.

The Chinese government presents and explains its policies in Tibet in terms of a 'civilising mission'.

Intercultural exchange is asymmetrical: The Chinese residents in Tibet adopt hardly any aspects of Tibetan culture, while the influence of Chinese culture on Tibetans, in particular those living in urban areas, is strong.

Natural resources are 'exported' to China proper or used for industrial and construction sites which primarily benefit Chinese settler communities.

Chinese development projects in Tibet are imposed and Tibetans have little or no say in the planning and implementation of these projects.


Maintenance of Colonial Authority

Tibetan protest against Chinese rule, or any aspects of Chinese rule, in Tibet is systematically silenced.

The Chinese government maintains a heavy and permanent military presence in Tibet, in order to maintain control.

There is a clear pattern of continuous and intensifying Chinese settlement in Tibet. In spite of the concerns expressed by the Tibetan people, the Chinese authorities do not impose any restrictions on this process. On the contrary, there is well-researched evidence that the Chinese authorities are facilitating and encouraging Chinese migration into Tibet.
Perceptions

Tibetans and Chinese view each other as 'alien' peoples.


Outcome of the Colonisation process

There is clear evidence that Tibetans in Tibet want independence from China or at least a high degree of autonomy within the People's Republic of China. The Dalai Lama and the Tibetan Government-in-Exile have proposed a form of association with China which would permit China to retain responsibility for foreign affairs and defence. However, until present the Chinese government has not indicated any willingness to negotiate with the Dalai Lama or the Tibetan Government-in-Exile. Meanwhile, the Chinese authorities continue to accelerate the political, economic, social and geographical integration of Tibet into China.


Recommendations

1 a. The mission believes that it is of the utmost importance that negotiations take place between the Chinese government and the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan Government-in-Exile at the earliest possible date. The mission is convinced that such negotiations should be unconditional.

1 b. The mission urges strictly non-partisan third countries, such as Norway or countries in the Middle East, to offer their good offices to facilitate such negotiations and to host such negotiations on their territory.

2. The mission supports the demand by the Tibetan Government-in-Exile for a referendum on the future status of Tibet, provided this referendum takes place in all Tibetan areas8 and is conducted under strict international control.

3. The mission calls on the European Union establish a (joint) consular presence in Lhasa.

4. With due respect for cultural and ethnic diversity, the mission recognises and is concerned about the impact of continued Chinese settlement in Tibet on the survival of Tibet's distinctive culture and religion.

a. It urges the Chinese government to formulate and implement restrictions on the migration of Chinese to Tibet.

b. It calls upon the Chinese government to allow an international and impartial commission to assess the formal legal status of Chinese currently in Tibet and suggests that the position of those Chinese who have no formal residence permit should be reassessed in the light of the preservation of Tibet's distinctive culture.

5. Without prejudice to recommendation number 2, the mission calls upon the Chinese Government at least give effect to the concept of genuine Tibetan autonomy, which is enshrined in the constitution of the People's Republic of China. In order to achieve this objective the Chinese government should transfer genuine authority to a locally elected, representative Tibetan government with full powers in all fields relating to local affairs and the preservation of Tibet's Buddhist culture. These powers should include but not be limited to the following fields:

a. The local Tibetan government should be exclusively responsible for establishing and maintaining a system of education

b. The local Tibetan government should be solely responsible for determining and implementing its im/migration policy.

c. The local Tibetan government should be exclusively responsible for formulating and implementing a human rights policy based on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

d. The local Tibetan government should be exclusively responsible for formulating and implementing economic policies, including tourism, mining and investment by companies from outside Tibet.

e. The local Tibetan government should be in charge of and maintain a police force.

f. The local Tibetan government should be entitled to issue local currency and stamps as well as passports to Tibetans. In this context, the mission would like to point out that the European Union passports retain their own national identity while being part of the larger unit of the European Unity.

6. a. The mission calls upon the World Bank, the European Union, the United Nations Development Programme and other international or bilateral donors to refrain from giving development aid to projects conducted by the Chinese government in Tibet, unless there are verifiable guarantees that the project(s) will benefit the local Tibetan population and unless there is freely expressed agreement by the Tibetan population that the project will be to its benefit.

b. The mission calls upon all foreign corporations not to invest in Tibet, unless there is clear well-researched evidence that the local population will benefit from these projects. Moreover, the mission calls upon those foreign corporations which have already established a presence in Tibet, to ensure that no human rights violations take place on their premises and within their control.


7. The mission calls upon the government of the PRC not to hinder the establishment of non-governmental human rights organizations and independent grassroots movements in Tibet.

8. The mission urges the Chinese government to establish a fully fledged law faculty at the University of Lhasa.

9. a. Recognising the limitations of its own fact-finding capacities in Tibet, the mission calls upon the government of the People's Republic of China to provide full access to a well-equipped international fact-finding commission consisting of experts from all relevant disciplines, accompanied by translators of their own choice.

b. The mission calls upon all relevant organizations such as the International Atomic Energy Agency, Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, the Unrepresented Nations and People's Organization and others to request the government of the People's Republic of China to allow for an independent fact-finding mission to Tibet, on the condition that they are to be given full access to all areas and are permitted to bring their own translators.

10. The mission calls upon the international community to support the establishment of a democratic government in Tibet which is based on the rule of law, equality, a modern legal system, which respects the equality of all people without distinction with regard to race, gender and sexual orientation.

11. The mission calls upon the ICRC and the UNHCR to establish aid posts at the border of Tibet and Nepal

12. While respecting the intrinsically religious nature of the Tibetan culture, the mission supports the plans of the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan Government-in-Exile to establish a democratic regime in Tibet which is based on the secular state principle.

13. The mission calls upon the government of the PRC to halt any further unauthorised exploitation of natural resources in Tibet.

14. The mission urges the government of the PRC to ensure Tibetan language education at primary, secondary and tertiary levels in all disciplines with the exception of Chinese language and literature.


Endnotes:

1 In the Chinese Provinces Qinghai, Gansu, Sichuan and Yunnan, there are 11 Tibetan Autonomous Prefectures, consisting of a large number of counties and 3 Tibetan Autonomous Counties (including Xining City). The Autonomous Prefectures are: Dechen (Yunnan), Kartse (Sichuan), Ngaba (Sichuan), Kanlho (Gansu), Haidong (Qinghai), Tsojang (Qinghai), Tsolho (Qinghai), Malho (Qinghai),Tsolho (Qinghai), Malho (Qinghai), Golog (Qinghai), Yushu (Qinghai), Tsonub (Qinghai). In addition there are three Tibetan Autonomous Counties which are not part of a larger Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture: Mili (Sichuan), Pari (Gansu) and Xining City/County (Qinghai).
2 China Daily, Monday 21 April, p. 4.
3 Potala, New Star Publishers, Beijing, 1991, p. 6.
4 Potala, New Star Publishers, Beijing, 1991, p. 17.
5 It should be noted that it is often hard to establish whether assimilation is intentional or unintentional.
6 Speech by TAR Party Secretary Chen Kuiyuan during the 4th Plenary Session of the 6th TAR Regional Congress
on 14 May 1996.
7 New Majority, Chinese Population Transfer into Tibet, published by Tibet Support Group UK, London Printing Press,
London 1995, ISBN 0 9526388 0 0, p. 157 and 159.
8 i.e. the Tibet Autonomous Region and all Tibetan Autonomous Prefectures and Counties.

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