Day 052 - 21 Nov 94 - Page 29


     
     1   MR. JUSTICE BELL:  There is authority for the proposition that
     2        the Defendants should plead what they say the meaning is,
     3        at least if they say that it is different to the one
     4        proposed by the Plaintiffs.
     5
     6   MR. RAMPTON:  There are two cases; there is Lucas Box v.
     7        Newsgroup and there is Prager v. The Times which is also in
     8        that small clip of files.  It is not that the Defendant has
     9        to say what he says the meaning of the words complained of
    10        is directly, though I must say, despite the best efforts of
    11        Lord Justice Mustill, I find it difficult to see a
    12        distinction.  What the Defendant does have to do is to say
    13        what the defamatory charge against the Plaintiff which he
    14        is justifying.
    15
    16   MR. JUSTICE BELL:  Yes.
    17
    18   MR. RAMPTON:  I do not believe -----
    19
    20   MR. JUSTICE BELL:  But on route to that he is to say what
    21        meaning he is proposing is ------
    22
    23   MR. RAMPTON:  If the meaning is one either which the words are
    24        not capable of bearing, or which has a meaning which is not
    25        defamatory of the Plaintiff, the court will strike the
    26        defence out.  So, it has to be a defamatory charge which
    27        can be found -- it may not be the same charge as the
    28        Plaintiff complains of, of course -- it has to be
    29        defamatory charge which is capable of being found within
    30        the libel and which the Defendant says is true.
    31
    32        All we have at the moment from the Defendants side as until
    33         -- at any rate, on the original pleading all you had from
    34        the Plaintiffs' side was this word "link" or "association"
    35        or "relationship" which I have to say, with due respect to
    36        the learned pleaders on both sides, is frankly useless as
    37        the statement of the nature of the case, which is why ever
    38        since I started arguing this case, I have made my position
    39        absolutely crystal clear, which is that the Plaintiffs'
    40        complaint is that the leaflet accuses them of selling food
    41        which causes degenerative diseases, whilst at the same time
    42        saying that you cannot propose a causal relationship
    43        between diet and cancer in the same way that you can
    44        between diet and heart disease or smoking and lung cancer.
    45
    46   MR. JUSTICE BELL:  I must say I have used the word "bland" in
    47        relation to "linked with" or "associated with", and it had
    48        occurred to me that at some stage I was bound to have to
    49        ask both sides what was meant there, because it could mean
    50        any number of the things, but there we are. 
    51 
    52   MR. RAMPTON:  My Lord, we now have now abandoned it in favour of 
    53        what I at least (and I know Mr. Atkinson) have always felt
    54        that it did mean, which is the new pleading.  My Lord, it
    55        does not end with what was brought to the attention of the
    56        Defendants in court and by way of transcript, newspaper
    57        report and judgment after court; it goes much further back
    58        than that in relation to the question of whether they knew
    59        what the Plaintiffs' case was, because the expert witnesses
    60        whose statements were exchanged on both sides --

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