Day 127 - 23 May 95 - Page 38
1 make as much of this as possible.
2
3 Q. You write further, "Employees are told not to tamper with
4 equipment, to report faults to a manager, and that
5 electricity can kill. Yet without a supporting 'safety
6 culture', where appropriate resources are allocated and
7 employees can see theory supported by example. The safety
8 message becomes diluted and confused."
9
10 Are you content to continue?
11 A. Yes.
12
13 Q. What do you mean by the words "a supporting safety
14 culture"? What is that?
15 A. Well, really there I am referring to the fact that it
16 is no good just saying that safety is important.
17 Throughout the management hierarchy that has to be
18 supported by actions, and at the time here we were talking
19 about, before Mark Hopkins' accident, talking about
20 spending a lot of money in terms of bringing in appliance
21 checks, electrical equipment checks, and I certainly felt
22 there was still some disbelief that the Company were
23 prepared to do that. I certainly feel that emphasising
24 something that Keith Smith put in his memo about
25 maintenance and repair that store managers might still have
26 felt that they could not spend the money when the culture
27 was there to support that, but they might not have been
28 brave enough to ask, if you like, or felt it was their role
29 to ask. I certainly felt that maybe Judith Chapman, the
30 store manager, had felt a little that way.
31
32 Q. You write at the end of this passage, "It is clear from
33 what we know of this accident that the employees involved
34 were not aware or did not believe that their actions could
35 have the consequences that..."
36 A. Yes.
37
38 Q. Is that still your view?
39 A. It is. In doing that investigation it certainly came
40 out that they had all gone through training, including
41 Robert Chapman at his orientation, but there is no doubt in
42 my mind that either Robert Chapman or Mark Hopkins himself,
43 if they believed that electric shock -- truly believed that
44 it would have those consequences, then the accident would
45 never have happened.
46
47 Q. Then page 5, equipment, 4.3 at the bottom of the page
48 "Training", where you write, "McDonald's have long
49 recognised a filtering process to be hazardous because of
50 the involvement...(reads to the words)... A training
51 observation checklist has been formulated for use in
52 training and monitoring employees, but also more detailed
53 procedures for training, ...(reads to the words)... written
54 records are kept. Robert Chapman received this training in
55 January 1989." Over the page, "Training is given on the
56 AEC, which specifically covers electrical hazards,
57 premailer, taught session and handout". What is a
58 premailer?
59 A. It is information that is sent to students before they
60 go on one of our internal courses.
