Day 312 - 11 Dec 96 - Page 40
1 clearly that the courts should decide to remove the right
2 of multi-national corporations to sue for libel.
3
4 And can I make the point, in the NUM case, first of all,
5 that the decision to abandon the case effectively -- if you
6 look on page 1 of the NUM judgment.
7
8 MR. JUSTICE BELL: Yes.
9
10 MR. MORRIS: It was taken after it had started, and when it says
11 at line F 'that people proper and reasonable application to
12 make', even though the case had started, rather than at the
13 start of the hearing, and, secondly, it did not... So,
14 that is the first point I would like to make on this. I am
15 trying to cross reference.
16
17 MR. JUSTICE BELL: The timescale was somewhat different was it
18 not?
19
20 MR. MORRIS: Yes. But, I mean, the point is that the principle
21 is still holds good even though the timescale is
22 different. Obviously we would say that, and in order not
23 to read it all out I am trying to save time by picking out
24 bits. That means it is a little bit chaotic,
25
26 The one implication of the Derbyshire case is that the
27 Plaintiff being a non-public corporation, we would say,
28 should have to show damage in the way of its business. The
29 examples mentioned about impeding the recruitment of the
30 best qualified workers clearly do not apply to Marks
31 because they do not recruit qualified workers, they only
32 recruit unqualified workers, so that does not help us take
33 the point, the Plaintiffs' point, forward or the status quo
34 forward.
35
36 We would say they would have to show, and that backs up
37 what we were saying earlier about the Plaintiff should have
38 an obligation to show actual damage, certainly for their
39 quest for damages to succeed but also for the basis of the
40 action to go forward. It is not right to invite the court
41 to speculate on the effect of a published leaflet, that is
42 not the correct course. Especially in the light of the
43 drastic curtailment of rights to freedom of speech.
44
45 Now, obviously, the general point out of the Derbyshire
46 case, before we go on to the NUM one a bit further, is that
47 it is contrary to the public interest for organs of
48 government to be able to sue for libel, and that NUM case
49 extends that not just to elective governmental bodies but
50 to, effectively, any organs of government, certainly moving
51 strongly in that direction where we have what is deemed to
52 be in the British Coal Corporation case a kind of quango
53 without any elective criteria whatsoever. So, we would
54 argue that multi-national corporations do not even have the
55 pseudo accountability, or the accountability that elective
56 bodies have, and therefore it is even more compelling, we
57 would say, that they be subject to unfettered scrutiny, and
58 therefore have their right to sue for libel removed in the
59 spirit of the Derbyshire and NUM cases.
60
