Day 053 - 22 Nov 94 - Page 42


     
     1        statements.  In some of them, I have suggested Dr. Barnard
     2        was one -- I will not say without rechecking in detail that
     3        every time he used the word "link" he meant something other
     4        than causal link, but I think just about every time he did
     5        use the word "link" in relation to high in fat of various
     6        kinds or meat, he was talking "causal link".
     7
     8   MS. STEEL:  In terms of cross-examination of the Plaintiffs'
     9        witnesses though, in particular, we did -----
    10
    11   MR. JUSTICE BELL:  I appreciate it was not all the time then,
    12        some of the time, but there we are.
    13
    14   MS. STEEL:   It was not always clarified what they meant by it.
    15        Really, 15 touches on that in that, as I say, we do not
    16        really feel that we have cross-examined the Plaintiffs'
    17        witnesses, in particular, as much as we could have done
    18        about what they meant by "link" and pinned them down on
    19        that.
    20
    21        Going on to No. 16, from what I can remember, all the
    22        authorities referred to by Mr. Rampton yesterday on
    23        allowing amendments were not specifically about meanings in
    24        a libel action.  We would argue that it is a different
    25        situation to change their meaning than it is to allow other
    26        sorts of amendments that have become necessary or whatever
    27        through a change in circumstances, or changing facts or
    28        additional facts that have come to light.
    29
    30        We would say that there are no new facts which have come to
    31        light which could have led to the Plaintiffs wanting to
    32        change their meaning.  The only thing that has changed is
    33        that the Plaintiffs' witnesses have now admitted that there
    34        is a link.
    35
    36        In point (c), as Mr. Rampton referred to it in his third
    37        skeleton argument, I think it is -- I think he did mention
    38        it yesterday as well -- that "The Court cannot find a
    39        meaning more injurious than the meaning alleged by the
    40        Plaintiff"; that means that because the pleaded meaning of
    41        the Plaintiffs was "link", if it is now changed to
    42        something higher -- if the pleaded meaning was "link", we
    43        only needed to justify up to link, and we did not need to
    44        go to "cause" which is higher.  So, if it is now changed
    45        to "cause", then that is prejudicial to our case, and also
    46        if the "nutritional content" is changed to "meals", that is
    47        highly prejudicial to our case, because it is a much higher
    48        meaning than the one originally pleaded and the one
    49        originally pleaded in the Statement of Claim and,
    50        consequently, what we pleaded in our defence and 
    51        particulars of justification and fair comment.  Had the 
    52        meaning been a higher one pleaded initially then, 
    53        obviously, we would have to look at that and see whether we
    54        could deal with that and wanted to deal with that in our
    55        pleadings or applied to strike out, of course, although
    56        that is a slightly different and separate point.
    57
    58        The point is, really, that we did not prepare, we did not
    59        do all the preparations for our case to go to the higher
    60        meaning that the Plaintiffs are now wanting to change to.

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