Day 132 - 07 Jun 95 - Page 47
1 matters?
2 A. Well, the management of Health & Safety has always been
3 the line management position. Jill's role is one to
4 co-ordinate and obviously to respond to any emergencies.
5 Obviously, it means that the development of systems and so
6 on was put on hold until Jill came back but I was there, if
7 you like, as a long-stop if there was anything the
8 management could not cope with, but issues, day-to-day
9 health and safety issues, arising out of the running of
10 departments, of restaurants, are dealt with by the existing
11 management structure.
12
13 Q. So that at that time were you more called and involved than
14 you were at other times for the Company?
15 A. I do not remember putting much more time in. As I say,
16 apart from with the exception of this one particular
17 incident where, obviously, we needed to go a bit further,
18 as much as anything it is a question, say, of their
19 management team knowing that there is somebody they can
20 refer matters to because, quite obviously, they would feel
21 that they have this sort of advice, if necessary.
22
23 MR. MORRIS: I think we have finished. Can we just check our
24 notes?
25
26 MR. JUSTICE BELL: Yes.
27
28 MR. MORRIS: We have heard from a memo by Frank Frost in the
29 northern region in 1992 -- I will not take you to the memo;
30 I can quote it -- effectively it says that in their region
31 there had been a number of severe cases of severe electric
32 shock which had not been reported to him. This was just
33 before the death of Mark Hopkins by electrocution. Were
34 you aware of that at the time?
35 A. I was aware that a memo was going to be circulated
36 because that came out of the work I had done at Harbourn,
37 as I understand it. I have to get it right, but certainly,
38 as I say, we had suggested that the whole system be
39 reinforced, if you like, and I think that was part of it.
40
41 Q. So was it as a result of investigation into Harbourn that
42 uncovered these other matters that the Company was not
43 aware of?
44 A. Not as far as I am concerned. I just know of the
45 Harbourn incident. I do not know what Frank Frost had
46 uncovered by looking at systems similar himself, but
47 certainly I had suggested that a memo should be circulated
48 to all and sundry reinforcing the fact that plugs should
49 not be rewired by anyone who was not qualified to do so.
50
51 Q. Yes, but never mind the plugs at Harbourn, in terms of were
52 the number of severe shocks in one region investigated or
53 did you know, were you informed, were you asked to comment,
54 or investigate?
55 A. I was not asked to comment or investigate. I do not
56 know what he classifies as "severe shocks" and I do not
57 know of the individual incident. Obviously, he is making
58 the point that they may they must be reported to him.
59 Remember, under RIDDOR an electric shock only becomes
60 statutorily reportable if treatment or whatever is
