Day 177 - 26 Oct 95 - Page 32


     
     1        The other passages in Skuse v. Granada TV to which we would
     2        draw your Lordship's particular attention are number 4 on
     3        page 8, which I do not need to read -----
     4
     5   MR. MORRIS:  Sorry, which one?
     6
     7   MR. JUSTICE BELL: Skuse v. Granada TV again now.
     8
     9   MR. MORRIS:  Number 4.
    10
    11   MR. RAMPTON:  I have got back to Skuse v. Granada TV.  4 in
    12        brackets between C and D on page 8:  "The court should not
    13        be too literal in its approach."
    14
    15   MR. MORRIS:  Sorry, page 8?
    16
    17   MR. RAMPTON:  Yes.
    18
    19   MR. MORRIS:  I have not got any page numbers.
    20
    21   MR. RAMPTON:  It is 4 in brackets.
    22
    23   MR. MORRIS:  I have Morgan v. Odhams Press Limited in number 4.
    24
    25   MR. JUSTICE BELL: It is divider number 1, the case of Skuse v.
    26        Granada TV, page 8, paragraph 4 in brackets.
    27
    28   MR. RAMPTON:  The Master of the Rolls there sets out the very
    29        familiar words of Lord Devlin in Lewis v. Daily Telegraph
    30        Limited.  I will read that now so that when I come to Lewis
    31        I need not go back to it.  It is from page 277 of Lewis v.
    32        Daily Telegraph [1964] A.C. 234.
    33
    34             "My Lords, the natural and ordinary meaning of
    35             words ought in theory to be the same for the
    36             lawyer as for the layman, because the lawyer's
    37             first rule of construction is that words are to
    38             be given their natural and ordinary meaning as
    39             popularly understood.  The proposition that
    40             ordinary words are the same for the lawyer as
    41             for the layman is as a matter of pure
    42             construction undoubtedly true.  But it is very
    43             difficult to draw the line between pure
    44             construction and implication, and the layman's
    45             capacity for implication is much greater than
    46             the lawyer's.  The lawyer's rule is that the
    47             implication must be necessary as well as
    48             reasonable.  The layman reads in an implication
    49             much more freely; and unfortunately, as the law
    50             of defamation has to take into account, is 
    51             especially prone to do so when it is 
    52             derogatory." 
    53
    54        My Lord, for the purposes of this case and this leaflet,
    55        those words are of extreme importance.  Put shortly, if you
    56        publish what is, in effect, nothing more than a scare sheet
    57        or polemic about a person or a company, you cannot really
    58        be surprised if the readers draw from what you have
    59        published all the most derogatory meanings that are
    60        available.

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