Day 302 - 18 Nov 96 - Page 30


     
     1        That was done by Gill Barns, who gave evidence, and she
     2        absolved, effectively, Mr. Chapman of any responsibility in
     3        the death, and basically she stood by the conclusions of
     4        her report, her investigation, which I think showed
     5        something like 15, or something, failures in safety
     6        procedures.
     7
     8        Now, you know, it is not that I want to focus only on this
     9        one situation and then say that damns the whole company,
    10        but the point is, it is the tip of an iceberg, a
    11        particularly extreme result from what is a general problem,
    12        which is identified in that report.  That up to that time
    13        at least, 1992, or 1993 when the report was completed,
    14        safety is not seen as being important at store level.  And
    15        Gill Barns' evidence was, effectively, yes, that is all
    16        true up to the point that I took over and then we started
    17        sorting it all out.  But certainly, whether it has been
    18        sorted out or not is irrelevant because at the relevant
    19        times in this case we have serious problems.  McDonald's
    20        have serious problems.
    21
    22        In fact, the Manchester Council issued a prohibition order
    23        forcing McDonald's to instal residual electrical devices on
    24        all wash-up areas, because without such devices there was
    25        "a risk of serious personal injury", and that was an
    26        offence against the - I can't remember if it was byelaws or
    27        the Health and Safety Act anyway.  So the effect of the
    28        prohibition order issued by Manchester Health Department
    29        was that McDonald's were in breach of the law such as to
    30        give rise to a risk of serious personal injury.  Hence,
    31        they were responsible for that death and there were no
    32        residual current devices as far as we have heard in court
    33        nationally and, therefore, there was a risk of serious
    34        personal injury in every McDonald's store in the country up
    35        to the time they were installed, which, taken together with
    36        the memo saying that several recent incidents of severe
    37        shocks from faulty items of equipment, and with the safety
    38        not being seen as important at store level recognition,
    39        then I think we have a bit of a picture of the safety
    40        conditions, certainly with the electrical equipment taken
    41        into consideration.
    42
    43        On top of that, around the same time, a confidential Health
    44        and Safety Executive report in 1992 was -- the accident
    45        prevention unit was set up and made 23 recommendations for
    46        improvements, and one of its conclusions was "the
    47        application of McDonald's hustle policy in many restaurants
    48        was in effect putting the service of the customer before
    49        the service of employees".
    50
    51        Now, the thing about hustle as opposed to other aspects of
    52        safety is that, first of all, it is worldwide as a
    53        culture.  Secondly, it is something that could affect every
    54        operation that is being done in a restaurant.  It is not
    55        just about -- well, it is a fundamental unsafe policy. And
    56        do not forget we are talking about a positive policy to use
    57        hustle, not just the lack of, you know, education or
    58        something, of staff in safety techniques, we are talking
    59        about positive incitement to be unsafe.
    60

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