Day 132 - 07 Jun 95 - Page 47


     
     1        matters?
     2        A.  Well, the management of Health & Safety has always been
     3        the line management position.  Jill's role is one to
     4        co-ordinate and obviously to respond to any emergencies.
     5        Obviously, it means that the development of systems and so
     6        on was put on hold until Jill came back but I was there, if
     7        you like, as a long-stop if there was anything the
     8        management could not cope with, but issues, day-to-day
     9        health and safety issues, arising out of the running of
    10        departments, of restaurants, are dealt with by the existing
    11        management structure.
    12
    13   Q.   So that at that time were you more called and involved than
    14        you were at other times for the Company?
    15        A.  I do not remember putting much more time in.  As I say,
    16        apart from with the exception of this one particular
    17        incident where, obviously, we needed to go a bit further,
    18        as much as anything it is a question, say, of their
    19        management team knowing that there is somebody they can
    20        refer matters to because, quite obviously, they would feel
    21        that they have this sort of advice, if necessary.
    22
    23   MR. MORRIS:  I think we have finished.  Can we just check our
    24        notes?
    25
    26   MR. JUSTICE BELL:  Yes.
    27
    28   MR. MORRIS:  We have heard from a memo by Frank Frost in the
    29        northern region in 1992 -- I will not take you to the memo;
    30        I can quote it -- effectively it says that in their region
    31        there had been a number of severe cases of severe electric
    32        shock which had not been reported to him.  This was just
    33        before the death of Mark Hopkins by electrocution.  Were
    34        you aware of that at the time?
    35        A.  I was aware that a memo was going to be circulated
    36        because that came out of the work I had done at Harbourn,
    37        as I understand it.  I have to get it right, but certainly,
    38        as I say, we had suggested that the whole system be
    39        reinforced, if you like, and I think that was part of it.
    40
    41   Q.   So was it as a result of investigation into Harbourn that
    42        uncovered these other matters that the Company was not
    43        aware of?
    44        A.  Not as far as I am concerned.  I just know of the
    45        Harbourn incident.  I do not know what Frank Frost had
    46        uncovered by looking at systems similar himself, but
    47        certainly I had suggested that a memo should be circulated
    48        to all and sundry reinforcing the fact that plugs should
    49        not be rewired by anyone who was not qualified to do so.
    50 
    51   Q.   Yes, but never mind the plugs at Harbourn, in terms of were 
    52        the number of severe shocks in one region investigated or 
    53        did you know, were you informed, were you asked to comment,
    54        or investigate?
    55        A.  I was not asked to comment or investigate.  I do not
    56        know what he classifies as "severe shocks" and I do not
    57        know of the individual incident.  Obviously, he is making
    58        the point that they may they must be reported to him.
    59        Remember, under RIDDOR an electric shock only becomes
    60        statutorily reportable if treatment or whatever is

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