Day 127 - 23 May 95 - Page 38


     
     1        make as much of this as possible.
     2
     3   Q.   You write further, "Employees are told not to tamper with
     4        equipment, to report faults to a manager, and that
     5        electricity can kill.  Yet without a supporting 'safety
     6        culture', where appropriate resources are allocated and
     7        employees can see theory supported by example.  The safety
     8        message becomes diluted and confused."
     9
    10        Are you content to continue?
    11        A.  Yes.
    12
    13   Q.   What do you mean by the words "a supporting safety
    14        culture"?  What is that?
    15        A.  Well, really there I am referring to the fact that it
    16        is no good just saying that safety is important.
    17        Throughout the management hierarchy that has to be
    18        supported by actions, and at the time here we were talking
    19        about, before Mark Hopkins' accident, talking about
    20        spending a lot of money in terms of bringing in appliance
    21        checks, electrical equipment checks, and I certainly felt
    22        there was still some disbelief that the Company were
    23        prepared to do that.  I certainly feel that emphasising
    24        something that Keith Smith put in his memo about
    25        maintenance and repair that store managers might still have
    26        felt that they could not spend the money when the culture
    27        was there to support that, but they might not have been
    28        brave enough to ask, if you like, or felt it was their role
    29        to ask.  I certainly felt that maybe Judith Chapman, the
    30        store manager, had felt a little that way.
    31
    32   Q.   You write at the end of this passage, "It is clear from
    33        what we know of this accident that the employees involved
    34        were not aware or did not believe that their actions could
    35        have the consequences that..."
    36        A.  Yes.
    37
    38   Q.   Is that still your view?
    39        A.  It is.  In doing that investigation it certainly came
    40        out that they had all gone through training, including
    41        Robert Chapman at his orientation, but there is no doubt in
    42        my mind that either Robert Chapman or Mark Hopkins himself,
    43        if they believed that electric shock -- truly believed that
    44        it would have those consequences, then the accident would
    45        never have happened.
    46
    47   Q.   Then page 5, equipment, 4.3 at the bottom of the page
    48        "Training", where you write, "McDonald's have long
    49        recognised a filtering process to be hazardous because of
    50        the involvement...(reads to the words)... A training 
    51        observation checklist has been formulated for use in 
    52        training and monitoring employees, but also more detailed 
    53        procedures for training, ...(reads to the words)... written
    54        records are kept.  Robert Chapman received this training in
    55        January 1989."  Over the page, "Training is given on the
    56        AEC, which specifically covers electrical hazards,
    57        premailer, taught session and handout".  What is a
    58        premailer?
    59        A.  It is information that is sent to students before they
    60        go on one of our internal courses.

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